

This article was downloaded by: [Bilkent University]

On: 07 May 2014, At: 01:34

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Southeast European and Black Sea Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbss20>

Security through trust-building in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: two perspectives for the partnership

Ali Bilgic^a

^a Department of International Relations , Bilkent University , Ankara, Turkey

Published online: 14 Dec 2010.

To cite this article: Ali Bilgic (2010) Security through trust-building in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: two perspectives for the partnership, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10:4, 457-473, DOI: [10.1080/14683857.2010.529994](https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2010.529994)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2010.529994>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

Security through trust-building in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: two perspectives for the partnership

Ali Bilgic*

Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

(Received 4 February 2010; final version received 14 September 2010)

Trust-building creates puzzles for analysts in relation to what kind of trust is built in world politics, between whom, and to what end. This article studies two types of trust in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: rationalist trust which characterizes inter-state cooperation to protect order and cosmopolitan trust which reveals the emancipatory potential of political structures that aim to achieve more security for individuals. In this study, two types of trust will be illustrated in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation by analyzing the link between security and trust. It is argued that while rationalist trust between states with 'security as order' rationality reconstructs the status quo in North African countries, cosmopolitan trust with 'security as emancipation' rationality toward North African individuals has the potential to transform these countries' political structures.

Keywords: security; trust; Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; emancipation; cosmopolitanism

The contribution

This article studies two types of trust in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: rationalist trust which characterizes inter-state cooperation to protect order and cosmopolitan trust which reveals the emancipatory potential of political structures that aim to achieve more security for individuals. Through the analysis, the article aims to contribute to the developing literature on trust in world politics and critical approaches to security. It also aims to provide an alternative perspective for scholars to study the Euro-Mediterranean relationship.

1. Introduction

This article is built on the assumption that trust is functional to constructing particular political structures in world politics, depending on the security rationalities of the actors among whom trust is built. By focusing on the EU–North African states relationship in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), it aims to answer the following question: what patterns of trust-building doing the analysis of the EMP reveal when studied through competing security rationalities of the EU in relation to North Africa? The main argument is that the EMP is characterized and can be explained by two types of trust. Rationalist trust between the EU and North African states reconstructs the status quo, and the authoritarian regimes in North Africa are left

*Email: abilgic@bilkent.edu.tr

largely unchallenged by the EU. In contrast, cosmopolitan trust of the EU's decision-makers toward North African civil society actors can transform these countries' political structures¹ by, first, challenging authoritarianism through EU policies and, second, by integrating civil society actors into the partnership's decision-shaping and -making.

The argument will be elaborated in two sections. In the theoretical section, it will be argued that trust in world politics can become both a tool for the preservation of the status quo and a source of transformation, depending on the security rationalities of the actors involved in the trust-building process. First, the different definitions of trust will be introduced in order to clarify what 'trust' means in this study. Hence, rationalist and cosmopolitan trust in world politics will be situated within the wider literature about trust. In addition, the theoretical section, by bringing two different understandings of security in International Relations (IR) into the discussion, aims to explore the security rationalities, which can facilitate the two types of trust-building.

In the empirical section, rationalist and cosmopolitan trust will be illustrated within the EMP. The questions the empirical section seeks to answer are what insecurities does the EU perceive in the southern neighborhood? How has the EU been dealing with these insecurities through trust-building? Does trust-building produce security and, if yes, for whom? First, the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation based on rationalist trust will be problematized with specific reference to two issues: the failure of the partnership to promote democracy in southern Mediterranean countries and the marginalization of civil society in the EMP by the dominant pro-status quo states. Second, the political relationships enabled by cosmopolitan trust will be discussed, namely the European Union's emancipatory policies, which challenge authoritarian states and strengthen wider civil society participation in the EMP. It will be argued that the EU, by adopting emancipation as the norm of security rationality and transcending its fears about the uncertain consequences of political reforms, can offer cosmopolitan trust to North African individuals. Therefore, the EU can generate political transformation in North Africa.

2. Rationalist trust and cosmopolitan trust

Trust has remained an under-theorized concept in the discipline of IR, although it has been conceptualized in different ways in sociology, psychology, and political science.² It is not possible to find an agreed definition of trust in the academic literature. One approach defines trust as the character of a relationship which serves the interests of both trusting and trustee parties (Hardin 2001; Kohn 2008). It is a consequence of rational calculation (Dees 2004, 34). This approach has been adopted by several scholars of IR, as will be discussed below. Another approach, while not completely neglecting the role of interest, conceptualizes trust by focusing on its normative side: the belief that the trustee will 'do the right thing' because of love, compassion, empathy, and optimism engendered between human beings. Hollis (1998) calls it 'normative trust', Hoffman (2005) 'fiduciary trust', and Lewis and Weigart (1985) 'emotional trust'. Some approaches emphasize the risky character of trust by identifying it as 'betting' (Sztompka 1999). Moreover, some analysts argue that trust can be developed between individuals who share certain cultural/communitarian characteristics (Soraka, Banting, and Johnston 2002). Others argue that this is not necessarily the case (Uslaner 2002). Differences in the literature about trust are important indicators of how trust can be built differently in world politics. In relation

to trust in politics, the meaning of trust changes depending on the political actors, their values and interests, and their political agendas.

2.1. *Rationalist trust and the preservation of the status quo*

As Luhmann states (1988, 103), any system, be it political, economic, or legal, operates through trust because without trust, 'it cannot stimulate supportive activities in situations of uncertainty and risk'. In the international system, actors do not fully interact under the condition of uncertainty, contrary, for example, to what offensive realists would argue. The character of the relationships in 'mature anarchy' is more cooperative than that in 'immature anarchy' (Buzan 1991; Smith 1991). Hobbesian, Lockian, and Kantian anarchies are constructed through different ways of interaction among states (Wendt 1999). In other words, some students of IR have acknowledged that the realm of world politics is not fully characterized by mistrust and fear, but there are possibilities of constructing and conducting more positive relationships on the basis of trust. However, questions about what kind of trust can be conceived, between whom, and to what end remain unanswered.

Trust in the discipline of IR is generally understood as a means to achieve particular ends. Therefore, it is conceived as a tool which serves the interests of rational actors – primarily states. While the normative side of trust is overlooked, the concept of interest lies at the heart of this type of understanding of trust. Russell Hardin (2001, 3) defines trust in relation to interest, by arguing that maintaining the trust relationship depends on the actors' interests in it. Actors choose to be trustworthy as long as the trust relationship serves their interests.

Initial theorizing of trust in IR was conducted within the Prisoner Dilemma framework. According to this approach, trust is characterized as a 'leap of faith' and as 'risk-taking' to enable cooperation in a game in which defection is preferred over cooperation (Brennan 1997; Deutsch 1958). It was argued that trust through communication is possible to achieve a particular end even under the structural constraints which promote mistrust (Wallace and Rothaus 1969). Later, Andrew Kydd theorized trust as 'the belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one's own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one's own cooperation to returning it' (2005, 6). In this study, this type of trust is called *rationalist trust*. In world politics, rationalist trust, as its conceptualization suggests, is built between states. Trust, according to this understanding, is a tool which enables cooperation between states of which interests are defined in relation to the cooperative relationship. In this understanding, trust has no normative dimension, it just has instrumental value.

Rationalist trust can be studied as an element, among many, of the cooperative relationships between states in world politics, such as the EMP. At the same time, it raises questions about the political agendas of states involved in the cooperation and what their values and interests are. The political agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is dominated by the construction of order in the Mediterranean region, as explicitly stated in many EMP documents. Order and stability have become shared norms manifested in common institutions, as the political ideas and practices which might disturb the status quo and risk the cooperation have, by and large, been overlooked and, to a certain extent, marginalized. Differently put, the security rationality of trust in the Euro-Med cooperation is defined in terms of the norm of order, derived from the political agendas of the pro-status quo states.

If states adopt 'order' as a norm of their security rationality, the underlying security thinking of Kyddian trust between pro-status quo actors can be studied through the perspective provided by Hedley Bull. Security rationalities are always dominated by particular norms and values which prioritize particular ends such as national self-interest, international order, or global justice. Bull put 'order' at the heart of security thinking as the principal norm of security. States can develop shared norms and values with the objective of building order in inter-state relationships (Bull 1977, 13; Buzan 2001; Wheeler 1992).

International order, defined by Bull, refers to 'a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains the goals of the society of states' (Bull 1977, 16). If the goal of the society of states is to protect stability, as in the EMP, international order based on shared norms, values, and interests can enable cooperative relationships to that end. Therefore, the construction and protection of international order itself becomes the main security interest of states. Cooperation between states of which main interest is to build and protect order is enabled by trust in the Kyddian sense. As a result of the cooperation enabled by rationalist trust, states in international society work for the construction of order through shared norms and values manifested in common institutions.³ In other words, security defined in terms of order is realized by trust-building between pro-status quo states. This leads to the expense of ideas and practices which might disturb order, such as in the case of the EMP, the invention of channels for active civil society participation to the decision-making.

As practices which might destabilize the existing order constructed by states can be abandoned, alternative actors and their ideas might be overlooked because they risk order. For example, in relation to the promotion of individual rights, Bull (1977, 84) stated that the promotion of human rights can 'lead to disorder in international relations, or even breakdown of international society itself'. Through this argument, Bull stressed that order and stability are the norms of the international system. Bull was not against the promotion of human rights (1999, 220). Rather, for him, the rights of individuals should be promoted within the framework of the nation-state system without disturbing order. However, this study problematizes the unconditional prioritization of order as security because order does not necessarily produce security for individuals. Cooperation in the EMP based on rationalist trust is in the interests of pro-status quo states, not of individuals whose security depends on transforming the existing order. What follows is the discussion of an alternative understanding of trust in world politics with 'security as emancipation rationality'.

2.2. *Cosmopolitan trust for transformation*

In the scholarly literature, it is often argued that trust is possible only within the limited boundaries of political communities where individuals share communitarian values (Fukuyama 1995; Soraka, Banting, and Johnston 2002). Uslander challenges this perspective by metaphorically arguing that 'trust solves bigger problems than getting people to hang out with people like themselves. It connects us to people with whom we *don't* hang out' (2002, 2, emphasis in original). Trust-building at the cosmopolitan level transcends local parochialisms, cultural-, religious-, and national-divisive lines, and short-term rational egoism. Cosmopolitan, or universal, trust means 'forging bonds of equal strength with all of humanity, not just with kith and kin' (Crepaz 2007, 116). *Cosmopolitan trust* is the belief that individuals will protect and promote each others' rights and freedoms. Being one of the fundamental ideas and practices for change in

world politics, cosmopolitan trust has a political objective which is to connect individuals in the global community of humankind. Cosmopolitan trust has both normative and non-normative (read: interest) dimensions. While there is a powerful belief that individuals will do the right by promoting others' freedoms, cosmopolitan trust works for certain interests. Interests promoted through the political relationships enabled by cosmopolitan trust are those of individuals. The core security interest of individuals is the protection of human freedoms, according to emancipatory security theory.

Security, as emancipation rationality, aims at problematizing oppressive political, economic, and social structures with the perspective of transforming them (Devetak 1995, 156). The security rationality based on order, which constitutes Bull's perspective, understands security as an instrument which serves the interests of dominant political actors within the existing structures. One of its alternatives is security as emancipation. Emancipation is 'the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others' (Booth 2007, 112). Security as emancipation varies, depending on the political context and the characteristics of insecurities that individuals are subjected to. However, the transcendental idea of emancipation is to increase the available choices. As Bilgin argues, 'critical approaches to security ... aim to raise peoples' awareness of their choices – those that were made in the past and those that are available at present' (2005, 48). It aims to develop ideas which might contribute to constructing emancipatory structures (political, social, and economic) which ensure extensive freedom of choice for individuals.

The central question of 'security as emancipation' rationality is: for whom do security policies work? Security as order, as in the EMP cooperation, may reinforce the authoritarian regimes in North African countries which limit the freedom of choice for individuals. It replicates the status quo. In contrast, security as emancipation challenges the existing oppressive structures with the perspective of constructing emancipatory ones. It operates on the basis of the basic principle of cosmopolitan justice: each individual is entitled to enjoy extensive freedom of choice without violating others' freedoms.⁴

The question is how cosmopolitan trust can be generated and put into practice. Cosmopolitan trust, like any other type of trust, cannot be demanded by the trustee, but should be offered by the trusting party (Saligman 2000, 20). Decision-makers in the EU can offer cosmopolitan trust to North African individuals, if the former adopts two ideational moves. First, actors should adopt emancipation as the norm of security rationality in order to facilitate cosmopolitan justice, which can be in the interest of European security. Cosmopolitan trust can be generated by actors who conceive cosmopolitan justice as their security interest based on the idea that 'the violation of individual rights in one place is felt everywhere'. Emancipation is built upon this principle. Booth argues that emancipation is a process that can be operationalized only if the security of individuals, which means increasing the number of choices for them, is conceived interdependently (2005). In other words, in the case of the EMP, the security of EU citizens depends on that of North African states' citizens and vice versa. If the norm of order is replaced by the norm of emancipation in security thinking, the violation of cosmopolitan justice in North Africa can be understood as a concern of European security by EU decision-makers. The practical implication of this thinking was adopted by the Commission of the European Communities:

Most Mediterranean countries are facing political instability, rapid population growth, large movement of population and high unemployment. These problems, especially in

the case of the Maghreb countries, are also our problems – such is their influence on the region's security and the potential migratory pressure on the Community. (1992)

Cosmopolitan trust toward individuals can be generated if decision-makers adopt the security rationality favored above by the commission. This factor can be identified as the interest dimension of cosmopolitan trust, although the normative dimension – individuals promoting each others' rights and freedoms – is equally crucial. This is the first ideational condition of cosmopolitan trust: changing the norm of security rationality. As will be discussed below, the positive indicators in parallel with emancipation are emerging in some elements of EU's policies in North Africa.

There can be many reasons which hinder the generation of cosmopolitan trust. Rational egoism, reluctance to take risks, and short-termism can be identified as a few of them. However, this study focuses on fear (more specifically, fear of uncertainty) as an obstacle to the generation of cosmopolitan trust. The centrality of fear in the conception of world politics has attracted many students of IR to thinking about the dynamics and effects of this 'primordial feeling' (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Blits 1989; Huysmans 2006; O'Driscoll 2007; Weber 2006). Fear in world politics does stem not only from the ability of others to inflict harm on actors; it can also be thought of in relation to uncertainty. This is 'Hobbesian fear', as briefly mentioned above. According to Hoffman (2004), Hobbesian political philosophy is underlined by a 'fear of the unknown'. Limited knowledge generates uncertainty in actors' minds about how to interpret and respond to insecurities. Under the fear of uncertainty, actors may choose to employ less risky policies in order to reduce this fear. For example, as will be discussed below, the EU has refrained from a more effective democratization agenda in North Africa due to the unforeseeable destabilizing effects of democratization. In other words, authoritarian governments are 'safer' for the EU. In short, cosmopolitan trust can be generated if the fear of unknown is transcended. This is the second ideational condition of cosmopolitan trust.

If the decision-makers adopt these two ideational moves, political relationships, enabled by cosmopolitan trust, can be generated. Cosmopolitan trust works in political relationships as follows: if decision-makers offer cosmopolitan trust to individuals, they develop and promote policies which can ensure individuals' rights and freedoms. Decision-makers will encourage civil society actors to join the decision-making and shaping structures. In the EMP, EU decision-makers can adopt policies which aim to facilitate political reforms in other states for more individual freedoms. Cosmopolitan trust of EU decision-makers toward North African individuals means that the EU recognizes the agency of these individuals in politics through North African civil society organizations. Policies, enabled by cosmopolitan trust, which empower these organizations can challenge authoritarian regimes, and therefore, result in political reforms.

3. The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: replication of the status quo and the potential for emancipation

3.1. The EU's competing security rationalities in North Africa

The deteriorating political and economic conditions in North Africa, since the late 1980s, were perceived as a security threat by the EU in the post-Maastricht era (Calabrese 1997, 89–90). The nature of the new challenges stemming from the southern neighborhood was not only military, but also political, economic, and social. These new threats included 'hard' security issues, including the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean region, and also 'soft' security issues, such as

economic instability, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and irregular migration.⁵ In 1992, the Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities (1992) warned the European decision-makers that ‘the signs are already apparent in environmental deterioration, social and political unrest and the existing conflicts around the world. But they could reach unimaginable proportions’. Possible effects of instability in the Mediterranean region on security in the EU constituted the primary concern of the EU decision-makers. The main problem the EU faces is how to deal with instability.

The primary concern of the EU was and is the ‘domino effect’, in the words of Manuel Marin, former commissioner of economic external relations with southern Mediterranean countries (quoted in Willis 1996, 20). The “domino effect” in this particular context basically means that ‘the South poses a threat to the North, primarily in its capacity of exporting “chaos” and “instability” to the North’ (Lia 1999, 32). In order to prevent the domino effect, the EU and other actors, including NATO, initiated the confidence-building measures (CBMs). Within the EMP framework, the CBMs aimed at ‘the creation of conditions that justify a higher degree of trust and confidence that enhance the knowledge on actions and intentions of a rival’ (Brauch 2000, 30). The CBMs focused on the military aspect.

However, it is widely argued that insecurities in the Mediterranean region are complex, interdependent, and trans-national. A security initiative should address this complexity and focus especially on non-military security problems, as the EU’s threat perception has been increasingly dominated by ‘soft’ security issues (Spencer 1997, 24). To that aim, given the failure of the CBMs, the EU policies shifted from CBMs to partnership-building measures (PBMs) (Marquina 2000, 73). The PBMs cover an area from economy to societal dialog, from common anti-terrorism measures to the creation of free trade zone. In other words, the PBMs are a means to an end: the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean political structure, which is not threatening the EU in neither military nor non-military terms. The EU initiated the Barcelona Process in 1995 as a stabilizing security strategy through PBMs which refer to ‘any kind of measure geared to enhance mutual knowledge and mutual trust in every possible field, so that further types of exchanges and cooperation are facilitated’ (Aliboni 1998, 7). In other words, they are important trust-building tools.

However, from the beginning, EU policies in North Africa have suffered from a problem called the ‘joint stability trap’. According to the ‘joint stability trap’, the EU is trapped between promoting political reforms in North Africa and preserving order (Huber 2004). As will be discussed below, uncertain consequences of democratization in North Africa, such as empowering the Islamists, have prevented the EU from embarking on a comprehensive political reform process. Another dimension of this dilemma is the dependence of the EU on North African regimes, particularly in the area of irregular immigration control and energy flow from North Africa to Europe. A tougher stance on human rights violations and democratic reforms in North Africa may result in losing the cooperation of pro-EU regimes. Therefore, the EU has mitigated this dilemma by making a choice in favor of order, rather than transformation and reform, although political reforms for more democracy in North African countries have been frequently mentioned in the EMP documents.

There are clearly contradictory perspectives in the EU’s Mediterranean policies. As will be discussed below, the EU’s security policies in North Africa are characterized by two types of security rationality, rather than a dichotomy between interests and norms. Two security rationalities motivate two types of political relationships: one is enabled by rationalist trust and the other by cosmopolitan trust.

3.2. *The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation through rationalist trust*

The EU and its North African partners have been able to develop rationalist trust as the basis of their cooperation. This type of trust is a consequence of a rational calculation to achieve certain interests. The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has served the security interests of the EU and North African authoritarian regimes, as defined in terms of order as the norm of security thinking. However, this cooperation based on rationalist trust has been complicit with the failure of democracy promotion and the marginalization of civil society actors in favor of authoritarian North African regimes.

3.2.1. *The failure of democracy promotion*

As discussed earlier, the main threat perception of the EU in relation to its neighborhood is the 'domino effect'. In particular, the Southern European countries' concerns 'of a perceived threat to the fabric of societies unaccustomed to large scale immigration and, more broadly, fear of the spill over or milieu effects of Islamic radicalism and conflict in the Muslim south' (Lesser 1995, 24). While the main European interest is to keep the region stable, democratization becomes less a goal in itself than a preservation of order (Jünemann 2004, 7). Contrary to the EU's discourse in favor of democratization and political reforms in North Africa, security as order has been enabled by rationalist trust between partners whose cooperation prevents the destabilizing effects of democratization.

It can be argued that democracy is a recurrent theme in the Euro-Mediterranean conferences, official documents, and financial policies. Although democracy and respect for human rights were identified as the foundation stones of the first basket in the Barcelona Document, the EU's democracy promotion policies have seldom gone beyond mere rhetoric. For example, in the 'Valencia Action Plan' (Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs 2002), no specific policies were adopted for democracy promotion in North Africa. In spite of the commission's communication which focused on democracy promotion in the European neighborhood (Commission of the European Communities 2003), in the 2004 Dublin Council, the partners simply 'reaffirmed' that the bases of the EMP are democracy and respect for human rights. In the European Neighborhood Policy, which was initiated in 2004 as a complementary political process in the EU's northern and southern neighborhood, democracy promotion and respect for human rights have achieved a greater political profile, especially through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans signed by the partners.

However, the non-democratic situation in the southern Mediterranean countries, which is highly problematic, has not been challenged effectively by the EU. In 2008, the Freedom House Report identified the partners of the EU in the Maghreb as 'not free', with the exception of Morocco, which is 'partly free' (Freedom House 2008). The Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2008 Report criticized North African countries on the basis that these countries 'use the threat of terrorism', have 'ill treatment of prisoners' and engage in 'harassment of human rights defenders' (HRW 2008). However, 'the EU has not attached any political conditionality to the aid, trade or financial relations' (Stavridis and Hutchence 2003, 71). This is because of adopting a pro-active policy as a democracy promoter for the EU risks' stability in the region (Chourou 2003, 35).

The inability of the EU to introduce conditionality in the EMP and the ENP does not mean that the EU has no democracy promotion agenda, as will be discussed below. The ENP has, indeed, been structured on the basis of democracy and human rights promotion, although, according to the research conducted by Maier and

Schimmelfenning (2007), it has had very limited impact on the region. The primary rationality of the cooperation renders democracy promotion secondary to security as order because democratization can be a source of instability in the region, and therefore, of insecurity for the EU (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). For the EU, 'regime stability in the target countries [of the EMP] is the real priority because these regimes can guarantee no upset in the international status quo, which would threaten EU interests in the area' (Cavatorta et al. 2008, 365). On the basis of this position, the North African regimes 'have sought consistently to turn the EU reform initiative into one focused on stability and consolidation' (Aliboni 2004). Therefore, the Euro-Mediterranean political structure is constructed and reconstructed through cooperation based on rationalist trust between European and North African states. Both sides have gains from order. Actors and agents who can upset order in the region have been marginalized.

3.2.2. *The marginalization of North African civil society in the EMP*

The integration of civil society into the structures of the EMP was a novel initiative. Its goal was to ensure the participation of peoples, both by encouraging democratization in the south and by reinforcing a 'sense of ownership' across the Mediterranean. In other words, civil society was granted a 'pivotal role' in the framework of PBMs where the bottom-up approach is the principle (Panebianco 2003, 11). However, uncertainty of the EU about the destabilizing effects of democratization, including social unrest and the rise of Islamist movements, has resulted in the appeasement of the authoritarian governments of which cooperation is essential for European security.

Concessions to partners began with the 'Barcelona Declaration' (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995), which stated that only those civil society actors who operate 'within the framework of national laws' are granted participation. However, what Northern Mediterranean partners disregard is the fact that national laws in the south do not constitute a firm ground for the freedom of association, which is the basic principle to have independent civil society movements. From Morocco to Lebanon, even legally constituted civil society organizations have been subjected to continuous harassment from the police and other governmental agencies (EMHRN 2007). The oppression of civil society movements has sometimes amounted to arbitrary detentions, imprisonment, even disappearances.⁶ The examples of harassment to all types of civil society movements can be detailed (see Gunert 2004). None of these issues have so far had place in the EMP.

Another problem which hinders active participation of civil society in the Euro-Med cooperation is governmental control over financial aid to civil society through Mediterranean Economic Development Area (MEDA) I, MEDA II, and the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Europe's Mediterranean partners, which are regimes with authoritarian tendencies, have control over the 'democracy funds', although from time to time the EU challenges this situation, as will be discussed below. This has created serious obstacles for the flourishing of civil society in North Africa because 'when regimes maintain direct or indirect control over large capital inflows [including European Investment Bank's credits] during structural adjustment, they appear capable of resisting demands for a truly transformative political pluralism' (Dillman 2002, 82).

The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), which is the largest forum of NGOs in the area receiving considerable 'democracy fund' itself, severely criticizes governmental control over funding civil society through vetoing the fund.

One of the most well-known and interesting events was the imprisonment of Hafez Abu Saadeh, General Secretary of the Egyptian Organization of the Human Rights, who was accused of accepting EU funds without official permission (International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 2001, 14). In 2000, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a professor of sociology, the founder of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies and the Secretary General of the Egyptian Independent Commission for Electoral Review, was arrested on the basis of a similar allegation. Professor Ibrahim was sentenced to two-year long imprisonment for 'tarnishing Egypt' in 2008.⁷

The ambivalence of the EU toward the problems faced by the North African civil society activists and movements has been criticized by the commission. In 'Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process' (Commission of the European Communities 2000), the commission calls for invoking the conditionality clause for the MEDA aid. It repeats the same clause while defining the role of the EU in the promotion of democracy and human rights in third countries (Commission of the European Communities 2001). However, conditionality has not been attached to financial aid. Opposition to this situation, finally, came out in the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum in Marseilles (2008), which has been the most critical civil forum to the EMP: 'civil society is subject to unacceptable mistrust and their members to intolerable suppression. Moreover, the participation of civil society representatives in the institutions of the Partnership is now questioned'.

The last criticism, the questioning of civil society in the EMP by state authorities, deserves attention. When it was first formed in 1995, the Euro-Med Civil Forum consisted of two structures. The first forum was funded by the commission; the second one was completely independent, including a broad range of civil society actors across the Mediterranean. However, the independent forum was simply ignored by the ministers and was never summoned again, while the first civil forum, which is too close to be a 'watchdog', was kept as the Euro-Med Civil Forum (Jünemann 2003). Even the commission, which is the funding body of the civil forum, stopped sending representatives to the discussions taking place within the forum in 2001, which furthered the marginalization of civil society (Reinhardt 2002). In 2004, the clause of 'wide circle of civil society participation' was removed from the Euro-Med ministerial conferences' conclusions, as attention shifted away from civil society participation to areas of immigration and intercultural dialog (Malmvig 2007, 82). The Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum in Luxembourg (2005) offered a plan for 'real involvement of civil society', but it has been ignored so far. The Euro-Med cooperation based on rationalist trust has excluded a vital element of change in world politics for the sake of security as order.

3.3. The emancipatory potential in the EMP: cosmopolitan trust for security

If rationalist trust characterizes the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, does it mean that cosmopolitan trust of EU decision-makers toward North African individuals oppressed by political, economic, and social structures in North Africa is unlikely and utopian? Cosmopolitan trust toward individuals reveals the emancipatory potential in the EMP and the ENP by prioritizing alternative political agendas and practices embedded in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The operationalization of cosmopolitan trust depends on replacing order with emancipation as the norm of security rationality and transcending fear of unknown consequences of political reforms.

3.3.1. *Changing the norm of EU security thinking*

EU policies are often explained by the dichotomy between normative/norms and realist/interests policies, particularly in the Euro-Mediterranean context (Smith 2008; Stavridis and Hutchence 2003). While the pro-democracy and human rights policies of the EU are identified by the normative power of EU, the cooperation with authoritarian states in North Africa is explained through the realist EU which acts in accordance with its interests. However, this dichotomy is misleading. One of the objectives of this study is to show that the EU's policies in the Mediterranean region are characterized by two security rationalities, each of which is derived from particular norms and interests. The dichotomy is not between normative and realist or between norms and interests, but between two alternative security rationalities underlined by two different norms. If this is the case, what is the reason of the dichotomy between normative and rational arguments?

The dichotomy between normative and rational approaches results from equating rationalism with materialism. In contrast, beliefs and desires are essential components of rationality, along with material interests (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 58–9). Different ideas, beliefs, and desires constitute alternative rationalities. Richard Youngs, one of the few scholars in EU studies problematizing the normative/rationalist divide, argues that 'the way in which certain norms have been conceived and incorporated into external policy reveals a certain security-predicated rationalism' (2004, 421). The norm of emancipation, such as order, can underlie security thinking. In practice, this principle means that cosmopolitan justice can constitute a security interest of EU if security as emancipation rationality is prioritized by the EU decision-makers. As a result, cosmopolitan trust toward North African individuals can be generated.

Cosmopolitan trust has been the foundation of certain policies because security as emancipation rationality has never been abandoned in the EMP; however it has been highly neglected. Since the launch of the Barcelona Process of 1995, which accepted democracy and human rights as the foundations of the EMP, democracy and human rights promotion have always had space in the EMP documents, sometimes with tangible results. Association agreements with Morocco included democracy and human rights clauses which resulted in the funding of 48 civil society projects in Morocco (Haddadi 2004, 73–89). Because of the violation of democratic norms and human rights, the initiation and adoption of the association agreement with Algeria was suspended between 1997 and 2002. Tunisian governments' objections could not prevent the financial aid of the EU to the most powerful Tunisian civil society organization (Youngs 2003, 421–3).

The ENP has provided a new legal and political framework for democratization and the protection of human rights in North Africa. The commission's annual reports about the political situation in North African states are now integrated into the ENP decision-shaping; the action plans in the ENP are not only more detailed and concrete about democracy promotion, but also more specific about the compliance of political practices in North African states with the UN and European conventions (Maier and Schimmelfenning 2007, 43). The EU has never overlooked the importance of the transformation of political structures for security in the EU. These developments make cosmopolitan trust a practical idea, rather than simply wishful thinking. However, security as order has also prevailed, along with realist trust in the EMP cooperation. One of the most important reasons for this is the fear of uncertainty.

3.3.2. *Transcending the EU's fear of uncertainty in the southern neighborhood*

In the 'joint stability trap', the EU has often chosen stability because the future consequences of democracy promotion are uncertain. This uncertainty can be analyzed through the words of Pervin (1997, 295) who argued that in relation to the Arab–Israel peace process, democratization has bestowed greater power to the movements which are opposed to peace. As discussed above, one of the EU's main concerns is religious fundamentalism and terrorism in North Africa. Democratization may weaken pro-European authoritarian governments in favor of Islamist movements. This is a risk that the EU has not taken so far. Rationalist trust in the EMP cooperation has by and large worked for these regimes. By focusing on this threat, North African regimes have oppressed various opposition movements without effective criticism or political sanction by the EU (Lia 1999, 50).

Fear of uncertainty is one of the most important challenges for building cosmopolitan trust which may lead to the transformation of existing political, economic, and social structures. How can the EU transcend its fears about the uncertain consequences of democratization? Rustow defines democracy as a stalemate in the ongoing conflict of opposing groups which see democracy as a condition of surviving together: 'democratization is the by-product of a stalemate situation of an inconclusive struggle, in which the main protagonists may seek democracy to end the struggle' (quoted in Lia 1999, 50). In other words, democracy is not the product of the best democrats. Through the interaction of opposing sides, it is learnt whether the parties of interaction are democratic or not. Security as order rationality damages the democratization process in North Africa not only because it overlooks reforms, but also because it weakens the opposition movements, Islamist or non-Islamist, in favor of authoritarian governments. However, in this understanding, what is highly neglected by EU decision-makers is the fact that authoritarianism had fed into radicalization in many North African countries (Storm 2009).

Fears about democratization can be dealt with through a more effective inclusion of North African civil society in the EMP as addressees of cosmopolitan trust by the EU. Firstly, the inclusion of civil society should ensure wider participation of social groups. In other words, civil society activities should cover more than 'museums without borders', which restrict civil society activities to the elite level. The EMP cooperation has established innovative mechanisms, such as the Euro-Med heritage, the Euro-Med youth, and the Euro-Med audiovisual, in which its actors from northern and southern Mediterranean can interact. However, it is questionable to what extent this elite-level civil society participation can generate political reforms. Active civil society participation is a necessary condition of bottom-up democratization.

Secondly, in order to generate wider civil society participation, governmental control over financial aid should be lessened by reestablishing organic links between North African civil society organizations and the commission. This was the general practice at the beginning of the EMP. It should be reinstituted in order to prevent unfortunate cases, such as Professor Ibrahim's, described earlier. Meanwhile, the EU should introduce conditionality to reform civil society legislation in North African countries in accordance with the European-level freedom of association law.

Thirdly, a special 'Barcelona Visa' which was previously proposed by the European Parliament should be issued to civil society actors (Reinhardt 2002). 'Museums without borders' should be supported by 'civil society without borders'. The freedom of movement for North African civil society can contribute to establishing stronger

links with European civil society actors. This can create the opportunity to share experiences.

4. Conclusion

Stemming from the above, the following conclusions can be obtained. Firstly, trust is central in world politics where actors aim to build security. However, in order to understand the patterns of trust, different security rationalities should be discussed as underlying elements of trust-building: what types of norms dominate the security thinking? This article specifically conceptualized two types of trust with two types of security rationality. *Rationalist trust* is the belief of an actor that others will prefer returning its cooperation rather than exploiting it. It operates at the state level in international society in order to achieve particular ends defined in accordance with security interests of states. If states define security in terms of protecting order, as theorized by Bull, rationalist trust becomes a tool for the protection of the status quo, rather than for change and transformation which can increase security for individuals and social groups. Moreover, inter-state trust might be a source of insecurity for individuals, as discussed in the case of the EMP.

In contrast, *cosmopolitan trust* exists when state and non-state actors believe that individuals as the members of global community of humankind protect and promote each others' rights and freedoms. It is built toward individuals, although it operates at both state and non-state level. Through the concept of cosmopolitan trust, trust-building can be a transformative force in world politics by producing security for a wider group of individuals, since the underlying rationality of cosmopolitan trust is 'security as emancipation'. Cosmopolitan trust toward individuals oppressed by political structures becomes a political force that reveals ideas and practices which can emancipate individuals from oppression.

Secondly, both rationalist and cosmopolitan trusts characterize political relationships in the EMP depending on conflictive security interests and values. The EU has defined instability as a source of insecurity in North Africa. The main question the EU faces is how to deal with instability: through protecting the status quo or through generating reforms challenging authoritarianism in North Africa. The EU's policies suffer from this tension. The EU has dominantly dealt with instability in North Africa by keeping order in the region through cooperation with authoritarian regimes. Order has been understood as a source of security by the EU. This is why it has improved cooperative relationships with these regimes, neglecting an effective democratization agenda in the EMP and integrating civil society to the EMP decision-shaping and -making. This cooperative relationship is enabled by rationalist trust to achieve a particular end: protecting the status quo as a source of stability.

One of the findings of this analysis is that policies of security aiming to keep order do not necessarily generate security for individuals in North Africa. However, this does not reflect the whole picture. The EU has also developed a thinking which conceives authoritarianism as a source of instability. By making ideals as security interests and transcending the fear of the unknown consequences of political reforms, policies which strengthen civil society and challenge authoritarian regimes in North Africa have recently been adopted. This relationship is based on cosmopolitan trust of the EU toward individuals who are oppressed by authoritarian regimes. Freeing individuals from oppression, which constitutes emancipation, is also understood by the

EU as security. The tension between two types of security rationalities has resulted in two types of relationships based on two types of trust.

Notes

1. The North African countries that the article refers to are Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. The reports of Freedom House and Human Right Watch were used to define these countries as authoritarian and 'not free' with Morocco being 'partly free.' Libya is excluded from the analysis because it is not a member of the EMP.
2. This argument was developed through the meetings of the David Davies Memorial Institute, 'Trust in World Politics?' Interdisciplinary Discussion Group, Aberystwyth University.
3. Booth and Wheeler define order as 'a situation in which the goals of the actors are predictably maintained through shared norms and values manifested in common institutions'. See Booth and Wheeler (2008, 15–6).
4. This is the Kantian version of cosmopolitan justice, see Cavallar (1999).
5. For the discussion of EU's threat perception in the Mediterranean region, see Blunden (1994), Pace (2007), and Winrow (2008).
6. For the oppression in Tunisia, for example, see Open Letter to Chris Patten with regard to the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement by Amnesty International, Avocats Sans Frontiers, EMHR, FIDH, Human Rights Watch, Reporters without Borders (2001). Available at <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/tn2904a.pdf>.
7. Interview with Professor Ibrahim, see <http://www.democratiya.com/interview.asp?issueid=8>.

Notes on contributor

Ali Bilgic holds a PhD from Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University. He is currently a post-doctoral researcher in *the European Commission Seventh Framework Programme, Converging and Conflicting Ethical Values in the Internal/External Security Continuum in Europe* (INEX) at Department of International Relations, Bilkent University. His research interests lie in critical approaches to security, normative theories in IR, European security, and immigration.

References

- Aliboni, R. 1998. *Building blocks for the Euro-Mediterranean charter on peace and stability*. EuroMesCo Paper No. 7. Rome: Euromesco Publishing.
- Aliboni, R. 2004. *Common languages on democracy in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*. EuroMesCo Paper No. 31. Rome: Euromesco Publishing.
- Bilgin, P. 2005. *Regional security in the Middle East*. London: Routledge.
- Bleiker, R., and E. Hutchison. 2008. Fear no more: Emotions and world politics. *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 1: 115–35.
- Blits, J.H. 1989. Hobbesian fear. *Political Theory* 17, no. 3: 417–31.
- Blunden, M. 1994. Insecurity on Europe's southern flank. *Survival* 36, no. 2: 134–48.
- Booth, K. 2005. Introduction. In *Critical security studies and world politics*, ed. K. Booth, 21–5. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Booth, K. 2007. *Theory of world security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Booth, K., and N. Wheeler. 2008. *The security dilemma: Fear, cooperation, and trust in world politics*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brauch, H.G. 2000. From confidence to partnership building measures in Europe and the Mediterranean: Conceptual and political efforts revisited. In *Euro-Mediterranean partnership for the 21st century*, ed. H.G. Brauch, A. Marquina, and A. Biad, 27–58. London/New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press.
- Brennan, G. 1997. *Democratic trust: A rational choice theory view*. Working Paper No. 29. Exeter: University of Exeter.
- Bull, H. 1977. *The anarchical society*. London: Macmillan.
- Bull, H. 1999. Justice in international relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures. In *Hedley Bull on international society*, ed. A. Hurrell and K. Alderson, 206–45. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

- Buzan, B. 1991. *People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. 2nd ed. London: Longman.
- Buzan, B. 2001. The English school: An underexploited resource in IR. *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 3: 471–88.
- Calabrese, J. 1997. Beyond Barcelona: The politics of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. *European Security* 6, no. 4: 86–110.
- Cavallar, G. 1999. *Kant and the theory and practice of international right*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Cavatorta, F., R.S. Chari, S. Kritzing, and A.G. Arana. 2008. EU external policy-making and the case of Morocco: “Realistically” dealing with authoritarianism? *European Foreign Affairs Review* 13, no. 3: 357–76.
- Chourou, B. 2003. A challenge for EU’s Mediterranean policy: Upgrading democracy from threat to risk. In *A new Euro-Mediterranean cultural identity*, ed. S. Panebianco, 23–46. London: Frank Cass.
- Commission of the European Communities. 1992. *From the single act to Maastricht: The means to match our ambitions*. COM(92)2000. Brussels: European Communities.
- Commission of the European Communities. 2000. *Reinvigorating the Barcelona process*. COM(2000) 497. Brussels: European Communities.
- Commission of the European Communities. 2001. *The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratization in third countries*. COM(2001) 252. Brussels: European Communities.
- Commission of the European Communities. 2003. *Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament, wider Europe – neighbourhood: A new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours*. COM(2003) 104. Brussels: European Communities.
- Crepaz, M.M.L. 2007. *Trust beyond borders*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Dees, R.H. 2004. *Trust and toleration*. London: Routledge.
- Deutch, M. 1958. Trust and suspicion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, no. 4: 265–79.
- Devetak, R. 1995. Critical theory. In *Theories of international relations*, ed. S. Burcill, R. Devetak, A. Linklater, M. Paterson, C. Reus-Smith, and J. True, 155–80. London: Palgrave.
- Dillman, B. 2002. International markets and partial economic reforms in North Africa: What impact on democratization? In *The European Union and democracy promotion: The case of North Africa*, ed. R. Gillespie and R. Youngs, 63–86. London: Frank Cass.
- Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities. 1992. *Opinion on economic cooperation with the Maghreb countries*. CES(92)1041. Luxembourg: European Communities.
- Euro-Mediterranean Conference. 1995. *Barcelona Declaration*. Barcelona: European Communities.
- Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. 2002. *Valencia Action Plan*. Final Version. Valencia: Euromed.
- Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network. 2007. *Freedom of association in the Euro-Mediterranean Region 2007 Report*. Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network.
- Fearon, J., and A. Wendt. 2002. Rationalism v. constructivism. In *Handbook of international relations*, ed. W. Carlsneas, T. Risse, and B.A. Simmons, 52–72. London: Sage.
- Freedom House. 2008. Freedom House Country Report 2008. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7452> (accessed January 3, 2010).
- Fukuyama, F. 1995. *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Gunert, A. 2004. Loss of guiding values and support: September 11 and the isolation of human rights organizations in Egypt. In *Euro-Mediterranean relations after September 11: International, regional and domestic dynamics*, ed. A. Jünemann, 133–52. London: Frank Cass.
- Haddadi, S. 2004. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership and Morocco: Diverging political agenda? In *Euro-Mediterranean relations after September 11: International, regional and domestic dynamics*, ed. A. Jünemann, 73–89. London: Frank Cass.
- Hardin, R. 2001. Conceptions and explanations of trust. In *Trust in society*, ed. K.S. Cook, 3–39. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- Hoffman, S. 2004. Thoughts on fear in global society. *Social Research* 71, no. 4: 1–15.
- Hoffman, A. 2005. *Building trust: Overcoming suspicion in international conflict*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Hollis, M. 1998. *Trust within reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huber, B. 2004. *Governance, civil society and security in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Lessons for a more effective partnership*. EuroMesCo Paper No. 39. Rome: Euromesco Publishing.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2008. Human Rights Watch Country Report 2008. <http://hrw.org/englishwr2k8/docs/2008/01/31/morocc17617.htm#> (accessed January 12, 2010).
- Huysmans, J. 2006. *The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.
- International Federation for Human Rights. 2001. *The defence of human rights in the Euro-Mediterranean region and the issue of funding human rights NGOs*. Beirut: FIDH.
- Jünemann, A. 2003. The Euro-Med civil forum: Critical watchdog and intellectual mediator. In *A new Euro-Mediterranean cultural identity*, ed. S. Panebianco, 84–107. London: Frank Cass.
- Jünemann, A. 2004. Security building in the Mediterranean after September 11. In *Euro-Mediterranean relations after September 11: International, regional and domestic dynamics*, ed. A. Jünemann, 1–20. London: Frank Cass.
- Kohn, M. 2008. *Trust: Self-interest and the common good*. London: Oxford.
- Kydd, A. 2005. *Trust and mistrust in international relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lesser, I.O. 1995. Growth and change in Southern Europe. In *Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the challenges of the Mediterranean*, ed. J.W. Holmes, 11–30. Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation.
- Lewis, D.J., and A. Weigert. 1985. Trust as a social reality. *Social Forces* 3, no. 4: 967–85.
- Lia, B. 1999. Security challenges in Europe's Mediterranean periphery – Perspectives and policy dilemmas. *European Security* 8, no. 4: 27–56.
- Luhmann, N. 1988. Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. In *Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations*, ed. D. Gambetta, 94–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Maier, S., and F. Schimmelfenning. 2007. Shared values: Democracy and human rights. In *Governing Europe's neighbourhood: Partners or periphery?* ed. K. Weber, M.E. Smith, and M. Baun, 39–57. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Malmvig, H. 2007. Security through intercultural dialogue? Implications of the securitization of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue between cultures. In *Conceptualizing cultural and social dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean area – A European perspective*, ed. M. Pace and T. Schumacher, 71–86. London: Routledge.
- Mansfield, E., and J. Snyder. 1995. Democratization and war. *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1: 79–97.
- Marquina, A. 2000. Review of initiatives on confidence building measures and confidence and security building measures in the Mediterranean. In *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st century*, ed. H.G. Brauch, A. Marquina, and A. Biad, 61–76. London/New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press.
- O'Driscoll, C. 2007. Fear and trust: The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes and the war on terror. *Millennium: Journal of International Politics* 36, no. 2: 149–70.
- Pace, R. 2007. EU enlargement and security in the Mediterranean region. In *The security dimensions of European Union enlargement: Wider Europe, weaker Europe?* ed. D. Brown and A.J. Shepherd, 35–52. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Panebianco, S. 2003. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership in perspective: The political and institutional context. In *A new Euro-Mediterranean cultural identity*, ed. S. Panebianco, 1–20. London: Frank Cass.
- Pervin, D. 1997. Building order in Arab–Israeli relations. In *Regional orders: Building security in a new world*, ed. D.A. Lake and P.M. Morgan, 271–96. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Reinhardt, U.J. 2002. *Civil society co-operation in the EMP: From declarations to practice*. EuroMesCo Paper No. 15. Rome: Euromesco Publishing.
- Saligman, A.D. 2000. Trust and civil society. In *Trust and civil society*, ed. F. Tankiss and A. Passey, 12–30. Hampshire, NY: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press.

- Smith, K.E. 2008. *European Union foreign policy in a changing world*. 2nd ed. London: Polity Press.
- Smith, S. 1991. Mature anarchy, strong states and security. *Arms Control* 12: 325–39.
- Soraka, S., K. Banting, and R. Johnston. 2002. Ethnicity, trust and welfare. In *Diversity, social capital and the welfare state*, ed. F. Kay and R. Johnston, 279–303. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Spencer, C. 1997. Building confidence in the Mediterranean. *Mediterranean Politics* 12, no. 2: 23–48.
- Stavridis, S., and J. Hutchence. 2003. The foreign policy of a civilian power? The EU in the Mediterranean. In *A new Euro-Mediterranean cultural identity*, ed. S. Panebianco, 61–74. London: Frank Cass.
- Storm, L. 2009. The persistence of authoritarianism as a source of radicalization in North Africa. *International Affairs* 85, no. 5: 997–1013.
- Sztompka, P. 1999. *Trust: A sociological theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- The Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum. 2005. *Final declaration of the Euro-Med civil forum*. Annex I. Luxembourg: Euromed.
- The Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum. 2008. *Final declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean civil forum*. Marseille: Euromed.
- Uslaner, E.M. 2002. *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallace, D., and P. Rothaus. 1969. Communication, group loyalty and trust in the prisoner dilemma game. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, no. 3: 370–80.
- Weber, C. 2006. An aesthetics of fear: The 7/7 London bombings, the sublime, and Weareno-
tafraid.com. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 3: 683–710.
- Wendt, A. 1999. *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wheeler, N. 1992. Pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society: Bull and Vincent on humanitarian intervention. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3: 463–89.
- Willis, M. 1996. The Islamist movements of North Africa. In *Security challenges in the Mediterranean region*, ed. R. Aliboni, G. Joffe, and T. Niblock, 3–26. London: Routledge.
- Winrow, G.M. 2008. Energy security in the broader Mediterranean. *European Security* 17, no. 1: 161–83.
- Youngs, R. 2003. European approaches to security in the Mediterranean. *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 3: 414–31.
- Youngs, R. 2004. Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU's external identity. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, no. 2: 415–35.