

British Journal of Political Science

<http://journals.cambridge.org/JPS>

Additional services for *British Journal of Political Science*:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)

Subscriptions: [Click here](#)

Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)

Terms of use : [Click here](#)



Immigrants, Citizenship and Political Action in Europe

Aida Just and Christopher J. Anderson

British Journal of Political Science / Volume 42 / Issue 03 / July 2012, pp 481 - 509
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123411000378, Published online: 08 November 2011

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123411000378

How to cite this article:

Aida Just and Christopher J. Anderson (2012). Immigrants, Citizenship and Political Action in Europe. British Journal of Political Science, 42, pp 481-509 doi:10.1017/S0007123411000378

Request Permissions : [Click here](#)

Immigrants, Citizenship and Political Action in Europe

AIDA JUST AND CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON*

Little is known about how immigrants participate in politics and whether they transform political engagement in contemporary democracies. This study investigates whether citizenship (as opposed to being foreign-born) affects political and civic engagement beyond the voting booth. It is argued that citizenship should be understood as a resource that enhances participation and helps immigrants overcome socialization experiences that are inauspicious for political engagement. The analysis of the European Social Survey data collected in nineteen European democracies in 2002–03 reveals that citizenship has a positive impact on political participation. Moreover, citizenship is a particularly powerful determinant of un-institutionalized political action among individuals who were socialized in less democratic countries. These findings have important implications for debates over the definition of and access to citizenship in contemporary democracies.

In 2003, roughly 23 million people living in the member states of the European Union had been born outside of the country they resided in. From all over the world, they constituted between around 1 per cent (Lithuania, the Czech Republic) and 35 per cent (Luxembourg) of their host country's populations. While many of these immigrants moved to their adopted countries in the process of decolonization (like South Asians to Britain or North Africans to France), others came as guest-workers to help build and sustain European economies in the aftermath of the Second World War (e.g., Turks and Yugoslavs in Germany and Denmark) or arrived as refugees seeking to escape war and persecution from countries such as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.¹ Remarkably, at the dawn of the new millennium, foreign-born persons constituted more than 10 per cent of the total population in many European nations, with countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland, Germany and Sweden recording proportions of foreign-born residents as high as or even higher than those found in traditional immigration countries like the United States.²

* Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara (email: aidap@bilkent.edu.tr); Department of Government, Cornell University, respectively. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago, 2007, and at seminars at the University of Essex, the University of Oxford, the University of Trondheim, and the Politics of Change Workshop at the Free University of Amsterdam. The authors are grateful to the conference and seminar participants for their thoughtful comments on the earlier drafts, and also thank the *Journal's* anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions. The original version of this article was awarded best paper presented on European Politics and Society at the 2007 APSA meeting. Thanks also to Michael Jones-Correa for helpful hints along the way. The survey data were collected by the *European Social Survey* (ESS) project in 2002/03 and can be downloaded from <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>. The original collector of the data and the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for uses of this collection or for interpretations or inferences based upon such uses.

¹ Klaus F. Zimmermann, *European Migration: What Do We Know?* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

² Georges Lemaitre and Cécile Thoreau, 'Estimating the Foreign born Population on Current Basis' (Unpublished manuscript, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,

Undoubtedly, immigration leaves a mark on the political, economic and social life of both immigrant sending and receiving countries; conversely, receiving countries shape the lives immigrants lead.³ The rioting in French *banlieues*, protests in Denmark against cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, and lobbying in favour of new mosques in Germany or Muslim women's right to wear veils are only the most conspicuous examples of a growing awareness among immigrant communities across Europe that politics influences their rights and interests. Given the increasing dependence of European economies on foreign-born labour, legions of retirees on the horizon and the potential for conflict, one critical issue on the minds of voters and policy makers alike is the smooth and successful integration of foreign-born residents into the political fabric of receiving countries.

To date, the political impact of migration has been studied mainly with an eye towards the immigration-related attitudes and behaviour of native populations,⁴ or the immigration policies pursued by host governments.⁵ As a consequence, we know little about immigrants themselves – in particular, whether participation patterns vary between natives and migrants, or among migrants themselves.⁶ Alongside this, we have limited information about the

(*Fnote continued*)

Paris, 2006). The average foreign-born share of the population is about 5 per cent across all member states of the EU.

³ See, for example, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 4th edn (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Wayne A. Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield, eds, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 2nd edn (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).

⁴ See, for instance, Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, 'Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe', *International Organization*, 61 (2007), 399–442; Jack Citrin and John Sides, 'Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and the United States', *Political Studies*, 56 (2008), 33–56; John Sides and Jack Citrin, 'European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information', *British Journal of Political Science*, 37 (2007), 477–504; Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste and Cara Wong, 'Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations', *Journal of Politics*, 59 (1997), 858–81; Anthony Mughan and Pamela Paxton, 'Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, Policy Preferences and Populist Party Voting in Australia', *British Journal of Political Science*, 36 (2006), 341–58; Joel S. Fetzer, *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn and Markus Prior, 'Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities', *American Political Science Review*, 98 (2004), 35–49.

⁵ Jeannette Money, 'No Vacancy: The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Countries', *International Organization*, 51 (1997), 685–720; Jeannette Money, *Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); Erik Bleich, *Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking Since the 1960s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Marc Morjé Howard, 'The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy: Explaining Continuity and Change', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36 (2010), 735–51; Simon Hix and Abdul Noury, 'Politics, Not Economic Interests: Determinants of Migration Policies in the European Union', *International Migration Review*, 41 (2007), 182–205.

⁶ There is a small number of studies that focus on immigrant political engagement in one or a few European countries or cities; see, e.g. Marco Giugni and Florence Passy, 'Migrant Mobilization between Political Institutions and Citizenship Regimes: A Comparison of France and Switzerland', *European Journal of Political Research*, 43 (2004), 51–82; Ruud Koopmans, 'Migrant Mobilization and Political Opportunities: Variation among German Cities and a Comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30 (2004), 449–70; Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, 'Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? Postnationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claims-making of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany', *American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (1999), 652–96; Lise Togeby, 'It Depends ... How Organizational Participation Affects

sources of such differences – if they in fact exist – and whether they are due to individuals' status as citizens, their formative experiences or something else entirely.

Below, we address these issues by examining political participation in Europe: we focus on differences between citizens and non-citizens, and between foreign-born and native-born individuals. We argue that citizenship is a resource that enables immigrant political engagement, but that its power to shape political engagement varies systematically across individuals and types of participation. In particular, we expect citizenship to foster political engagement among immigrants whose socialization experiences in their country of origin would normally depress participation and for political actions that are more costly. Thus, understanding patterns of immigrant political action and the role citizenship can play in shaping these requires that we take into account the interplay of citizenship, immigrant socialization experiences and the nature of political actions. We test these arguments using the European Social Survey (ESS) data collected in nineteen European countries in 2002–03.

This article seeks to make several contributions to research on immigrant political participation and political incorporation. First, given that the quality of democratic life across Europe will increasingly depend on whether people have opportunities to express their grievances peacefully, contribute to collective policy deliberation and develop a stake in the political system, our research redirects attention away from natives and policy makers towards immigrants themselves. Secondly, on a theoretical level, we highlight the critical, but complex, role that citizenship plays in shaping immigrant participation and the variable effects it can have among different kinds of individuals and on different types of participation. Thirdly, by distinguishing theoretically and empirically between the effects of citizenship and of being foreign-born, we develop a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between socialization experiences and citizenship status in forming the patterns of political engagement among migrants. Finally, our analysis breaks new empirical ground by going beyond the single most heavily studied case of immigrant participation – the United States – a country that in many ways is an unusual case. Instead, we test existing arguments against a varied and extensive sample of European nations with diverse groups of foreign-born residents.

We proceed as follows: the next three sections present and elaborate our argument. We then describe our data and measures, present our results and conclude by offering suggestions for further research.

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRANT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: PRIOR STUDIES

Although European countries have long experienced significant migration, we know little about its consequences for countries' patterns of civic life. In good part, this is because research on immigrant political participation has focused on immigrants' voting behaviour (usually turnout or registration). To be sure, voting is a key consideration when it comes to the demand side of democratic politics, but the focus on voting has meant that scholars have paid limited attention to the role of citizenship: after all, since non-citizens do not have the right to vote in national elections, they are typically excluded

(Footnote continued)

Political Participation and Social Trust Among Second-Generation Immigrants in Denmark', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30 (2004), 509–28. Comparative research based on systematic empirical analyses of data from a large number of countries, however, remains very limited.

from the growing number of studies on immigrant electoral participation.⁷ This creates a disconnect between debates about citizenship laws, which revolve around the question of immigrant incorporation and integration, and empirical studies whose focus on electoral participation fails to capture the full range of participation by all immigrants.

The predominant focus on electoral participation is not surprising, considering that most studies of immigrant participation have concentrated on the United States, a country where native-born persons acquire citizenship at birth and foreign-born individuals usually arrive as non-citizens.⁸ But this has meant that most studies of immigrant political participation have examined a single case with a particular citizenship regime and, we would argue, an unusual history of migration among the advanced industrialized democracies. Conversely, the histories of immigration and citizenship policies across Europe vary quite distinctly, with some countries more heavily influenced by their colonial past and history of democratization, while others are more dependent on recent economic changes.⁹

As a result of the focus on the US case, scholars have centred their attention mainly on differences in electoral participation between native-born and foreign-born *citizens*, while, by design or perhaps unwittingly, ignoring the distinction between foreign-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens, or excluding non-citizens altogether.¹⁰ Focusing on the

⁷ See, e.g. Carol A. Cassel, 'Hispanic Turnout: Estimates from Validated Voting Data', *Political Research Quarterly*, 55 (2002), 391–408; Wendy K.T. Cho, 'Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and Non(Voting)', *Journal of Politics*, 61 (1999), 1140–55; Wendy K.T. Cho, James G. Gimpel and Joshua J. Dyck, 'Residential Concentration, Political Socialization, and Voter Turnout', *Journal of Politics*, 68 (2006), 156–67; Wendy K.T. Cho, James G. Gimpel and Tony Wu, 'Clarifying the Role of SES in Political Participation: Policy Threat and Arab American Mobilization', *Journal of Politics*, 68 (2006), 977–91; Loretta E. Bass and Lynne M. Casper, 'Impacting the Political Landscape: Who Registers and Votes among Naturalized Americans?' *Political Behavior*, 23 (2001), 103–30; Louis DeSipio, 'Making Citizens or Good Citizens? Naturalization as a Predictor of Organizational and Electoral Behavior among Latino Immigrants', *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 18 (1996), 194–213; John R. Arvizu and Chris Garcia, 'Latino Voting Participation: Explaining and Differentiating Latino Voting Turnout', *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 18 (1996), 104–28; James G. Gimpel, Wendy K. Tam Cho, and Tony Wu, 'Spatial Dimensions of Arab American Voter Mobilization After September 11', *Political Geography*, 26 (2007), 330–51; Benjamin Highton and Arthur L. Burris, 'New Perspectives on Latino Voter Turnout in the United States', *American Politics Research*, 30 (2002), 285–306; Robert A. Jackson, 'Differential Influences on Latino Electoral Participation', *Political Behavior*, 25 (2003), 339–66; Martin Johnson, Robert M. Stein and Robert Wrinkle, 'Language Choice, Residential Stability, and Voting among Latino Americans', *Social Science Quarterly*, 84 (2003), 412–24; Adrian D. Pantoja, Ricardo Ramirez and Garry M. Segura, 'Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos', *Political Research Quarterly*, 54 (2001), 729–50; Karthick S. Ramakrishnan and Thomas J. Espenshade, 'Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States', *International Migration Review*, 35 (2001), 870–909; Catherine Simpson Bueker, 'Political Incorporation Among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence of Source Country Effects', *International Migration Review*, 39 (2005), 103–40.

⁸ Unless they were born to American parents on American territory abroad (e.g., military bases, embassies, and the like).

⁹ Patrick Weil, 'Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty Five Nationality Laws', in T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds, *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.), 17–35; Marc Morjé Howard, *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

¹⁰ This is the case even in studies that examine a broader range of political activities (see Jane Junn, 'Participation in Liberal Democracy: The Political Assimilation of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in the United States', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 42 (1999), 1417–38). Jan E. Leighley and Arnold Vedlitz ('Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations', *Journal*

behaviour of naturalized citizens can produce empirical and theoretical ambiguities regarding the consequences of citizenship, however. An example of the confusion that can arise from conflating citizenship status and nativity can be found in a paper by Louis DeSipio,¹¹ which argues that the process of naturalization in the United States should encourage people to behave as good citizens. Here, citizenship acquisition is understood not merely as a change in legal status but also a process of mandatory socialization and learning. To test this idea, DeSipio focused on the differences in the political behaviour of naturalized and native-born citizens, while excluding all foreign-born non-citizens from the analysis. Although DeSipio expected the experience of naturalization to contribute positively to political participation, he found just the opposite – namely, that naturalized citizens actually participated less than native-born citizens.

This result, however, is not surprising in the light of other studies, which consistently reveal that foreign-born individuals participate at lower rates than native-born ones.¹² In fact, a number of reasons may explain the failure to detect the hypothesized effect of citizenship on political participation, but perhaps chief among them is the exclusion of non-citizens from the analyses, thereby precluding the possibility of empirically distinguishing between the impact of being foreign-born and that of naturalization/citizenship.¹³ For example, if foreign-born status has a more powerful (and perhaps negative) impact on political engagement than the expected positive effect of citizenship, then it would not be surprising that their combined effect – captured by a single variable (foreign-born citizens), rather than two – turns out to be negative.

(Footnote continued)

of Politics, 61 (1999), 1092–114) acknowledge the importance of citizenship, but also rely on native-born status as a proxy for citizenship, thus similarly leaving aside the fact that some foreign-born individuals are citizens.

¹¹ DeSipio, 'Making Citizens or Good Citizens?' We do not mean to single out this particular study. Instead, we use it to illustrate a larger point. It has been similarly suggested that citizenship acquisition in Canada should have a 'politicizing' effect on political participation (see Jerome H. Black, 'Immigrant Political Adaptation in Canada: Some Tentative Findings', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 15 (1982), 3–27), and this expectation is consistent with research showing that citizenship has a positive impact on partisanship acquisition (see Janelle S. Wong, 'The Effects of Age and Political Exposure on the Development of Party Identification among Asian American and Latino Immigrants in the United States', *Political Behavior*, 22 (2000), 341–71; Bruce E. Cain, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Carole J. Uhlaner, 'The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans', *American Journal of Political Science*, 35(1991), 390–422).

¹² Junn, 'Participation in Liberal Democracy'; Cho, 'Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and Non(Voting)'; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 'Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States', p. 888.

¹³ According to prevailing theorizing and evidence, this result is rooted in a lack of familiarity with the political system among individuals socialized in a different country and more shallow attachments to local community, associations and political parties. Moreover, foreign-born individuals usually have fewer emotional and material stakes in existing group tensions that express themselves in politics in their new home country. And there are practical reasons for the lower involvement of the foreign-born as well, as they are often preoccupied with settling into the new country and have less time for political involvement. Some assume that foreigners are less politically involved because they are more orientated towards politics in their homeland than are other immigrants. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that ties to a home country do not matter as much for political participation as attachment to the host country (Pei-te Lien, 'Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison between Asian and Mexican Americans', *Political Behavior*, 16 (1994), 237–64). Moreover, others demonstrate that Mexican immigrants in the United States who send money home are actually more politically involved in US politics than those who do not (Matt A. Barreto and José A. Muñoz, 'Reexamining the "Politics of In-Between": Political Participation Among Mexican Immigrants in the United States', *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 25 (2003), 427–47).

Speaking more generally, existing studies are ambiguous about the role that citizenship can be expected to play in shaping political engagement among foreign-born individuals, and no existing studies differentiate among all the different categories of citizens/non-citizens and native/foreign-born individuals.¹⁴

CONCEPTUALIZING THE INFLUENCE OF CITIZENSHIP ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Aside from the ambiguity that arises from conflating citizenship and native-born status, research into the connection between citizenship and political participation has occasionally conflated the two through the use of participation as an indicator of active – that is, ‘virtuous’ or ‘effective’ – citizenship.¹⁵ Blurring the distinction between citizenship as a legal category and as a set of behaviours is problematic, because citizenship provides people with opportunities to participate, but it does not guarantee that they will actually take advantage of these.¹⁶

To cut through these empirical and conceptual ambiguities, we start by conceptualizing citizenship as legal status.¹⁷ Based on the well-documented premise that participation requires resources, we treat the legal status of citizenship as a resource that facilitates political engagement. Citizenship contains instrumental and psychological dimensions.¹⁸ Instrumentally speaking, the state has always regulated political activity by defining which forms of participation are legal and who has the right to participate in them. The key ways in which it has done so is by defining membership in the political community through citizenship that gives individuals certain rights and protections not shared by non-citizens.¹⁹ Thus, citizenship is a resource provided by the state, and one that has the capacity to lower the legal risks and the potential costs of participation.

Most obviously, citizenship provides an admission ticket for voting.²⁰ The right to cast a ballot in elections should for obvious legal reasons be an overwhelmingly powerful marker between voters and non-voters (the cost of voting legally is much lower than the

¹⁴ While studies conducted in the United States and Denmark suggest that foreign-born citizens and non-citizens engage in a variety of political acts, the evidence is equivocal with regard to whether they do so at similar or different rates when immigrant experiences and socio-economic differences are accounted for. See Barreto and Muñoz, ‘Reexamining the “Politics of In-Between”’; Togeby, ‘It Depends ... Immigrants in Denmark’; Lien, ‘Ethnicity and Political Participation’; David Leal, ‘Political Participation by Latino Non-Citizens in the United States’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 32 (2002), 353–70.

¹⁵ See, for instance, Jan W. Deth, José Ramón Montero and Anders Westholm, eds, *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2007); Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul, ‘Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 34 (2008), 153–79.

¹⁶ Anders Westholm, José Ramón Montero and Jan W. van Deth, ‘Introduction: Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy in Europe’, in van Deth, Montero and Westholm, eds, *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies*, pp. 1–32, at p. 3.

¹⁷ Thomas L. Dynneson, *Civism: Cultivating Citizenship in European History* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001).

¹⁸ Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, ‘Citizenship and Immigration’.

¹⁹ Seyla Benhabib, ‘Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World’, in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds, *Political Science: State of the Discipline* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002), 404–32.

²⁰ In most countries, only citizens are eligible to vote. Citizens of EU member states have the right to vote in and stand for local elections in other EU member states if they reside there. However, this right is

cost of trying to vote illegally). However, citizenship's influence as a resource can be expected to go beyond the ballot box since it provides a number of other rights and protections that may be particularly influential in shaping non-electoral political action. Specifically, the costs of participation can vary considerably for citizens and non-citizens. While citizens might be fined for participating in an illegal protest, individuals lacking citizenship status might be deported or lose the chance ever to naturalize since many countries bar the criminally convicted from becoming citizens.²¹

Beyond its instrumental value, citizenship is also likely to provide a psychological boost to political engagement resulting from its role as a social identity. Speaking generally, citizenship defines who is and who is not a full member of the political community. We posit that the identity effects of citizenship may be particularly pronounced among immigrants because they acquire citizenship through a process of naturalization that requires learning about the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and professing loyalty to the democratic order of a country. As such, citizenship can also be conceptualized in psychological terms as a resource that encourages people to internalize the democratic ideals of active citizenship and, in doing so, makes cognitive engagement with politics less costly.²²

Thus, if citizenship is more than a legal entitlement to vote and functions as a resource that helps individuals to offset the costs of participation, we would expect citizens to engage in non-electoral forms of political action at higher rates than non-citizens, and foreign-born *citizens* (rather than merely residents) to participate as much as native-born citizens.²³ This implies that the influence of citizenship on political engagement is broader

(*Fnote continued*)

not conferred to non-EU citizens (also referred to as third-country nationals), nor does it apply to national elections.

²¹ Lisa Martinez ('Yes We Can: Latino Participation in Unconventional Politics', *Social Forces*, 84 (2005), 135–55, p. 144) finds that citizenship has a positive and statistically significant impact on Latino protest behaviour in the United States and suggests that non-citizens might associate protesting with higher costs, such as fear of deportation or imprisonment. Her models, and models reported in other studies, however, fail to control for a number of immigrant-specific variables, such as the amount of time foreign-born respondents have spent in the United States. These variables, as we show below, have important consequences for the impact of citizenship on non-electoral participation.

²² Non-citizens may occasionally have important grounds to be politically involved in their host country. After all, regardless of their legal status, they are affected by their host country's domestic policies, not the least of which is anti-immigrant legislation (Barreto and Muñoz, 'Reexamining the "Politics of In-Between"'). Research also shows that non-citizens are often concerned with their host country's foreign policies towards their country of origin, thus motivating their political engagement (Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Harry Pachon, *Latinos and US Foreign Policy: Representing the "Homeland"?* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)). Since non-citizens are barred from expressing themselves in national elections, non-electoral participation may be an important channel for communicating their demands to policy makers. However, we do not believe that such occasional motivations on average outweigh the more systematic effects of citizenship we posit.

²³ As a consequence of the expected higher rate of participation by citizens, citizenship should also be associated with higher levels of civic skills acquired through the exercise of obligations and responsibilities, which are thought to contribute positively to people's civic orientations and political engagement through a process of socialization, education and interaction with government authorities (Pamela Johnston Conover, Ivor M. Crewe and Donald D. Searing, 'The Nature of Citizenship and Great Britain: Empirical Comments on Theoretical Themes', *Journal of Politics*, 53 (1991), 800–32; Pamela Johnston Conover, Donald D. Searing and Ivor Crewe, 'The Elusive Ideal of Equal Citizenship: Political Theory and Political Psychology in the United States and Great Britain', *Journal of Politics*, 66 (2004), 1036–68; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*).

than existing studies of immigrant electoral behaviour surmise and contributes positively to forms of participation that do not require formal membership in a nation state.

CITIZENSHIP, SOCIALIZATION AND THE VARIETIES OF POLITICAL ACTION

When considering the impact of citizenship as a resource on participation among immigrants, the question arises as to whether this presumed effect is uniform or whether it can be expected to vary across different types of political acts or individuals. We argue that it is unlikely that citizenship has a 'one size fits all' effect. Specifically, we posit that the resource of citizenship should be particularly potent in mobilizing more costly political acts and among individuals whose socialization experiences are inauspicious for political engagement.

Citizenship and Varieties of Participation

Given the variable costs associated with different political acts, we expect citizenship to facilitate immigrant engagement in more costly forms of participation. One way to identify such acts is to take a broad view of political engagement and to differentiate between those that are less costly because they are formalized, routinized and have a developed mobilization 'infrastructure' and those that are not. This distinction maps onto the empirical and theoretical categorization of political acts into conventional, institutionalized political acts (mostly orientated towards electoral processes²⁴ and unconventional, uninstitutionalized forms of participation that take place outside of electoral politics and often involve more spontaneous, episodic and disruptive political acts.²⁵ Because uninstitutionalized acts, by definition, are less formalized and routinized, often require more effort and co-operation, and run the risk of being less socially acceptable, they are more costly than institutionalized activities. As a result, if citizenship is a resource for political mobilization, we expect it to be a more powerful catalyst in shaping uninstitutionalized political acts than conventional activities.

Citizenship and Varieties of Socialization Experiences

The difficulty of specifying the effects of citizenship on political participation among foreign-born individuals empirically lies partially in the complex task of disentangling the effects of citizenship from the effects of being a foreigner – that is, people's socialization experiences. At the level of individuals, this comes down to differentiating between citizenship on one hand and place of birth on the other. The conceptual distinction between nativity and citizenship status suggests a fourfold typology among a country's residents: (1) native-born citizens (the largest share of population in most countries), (2) native-born non-citizens (present in countries without *jus soli*), (3) foreign-born citizens (who can be either naturalized residents or foreign-born offspring of citizens) and (4) foreign-born non-citizens. This distinction is important for empirical reasons as well because it raises the question of whether citizenship

²⁴ Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase with Klaus Allerbeck, Barbara Farah, Felix Heunks, Ronald Inglehart, M. Kent Jennings, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Alan Marsh and Leopold Rosenmayr, *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979); Edward N. Muller, 'A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence', *American Political Science Review*, 66 (1972), 928–59.

²⁵ Max Kaase, 'Mass Participation', in M. Kent Jennings and Jan W. van Deth with Samuel Barnes, Dieter Fuchs, Felix Heunks, Ronald Inglehart, Max Kaase, Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Jacques Thomassen, eds, *Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1989), pp. 23–64.

(or the lack thereof) exerts an effect on participation patterns once we have accounted more fully for what it means to be a foreigner. Below we focus on a factor that has been identified as a likely source of differences in the patterns of political engagement among the foreign-born: socialization experiences in the country of origin.

Regardless of whether one has become a citizen, being an immigrant means having been born into and having lived in a different political environment. These experiences are bound to leave a mark, and researchers have sought to trace how much and what kind of an impact they leave. Studies have shown that standard explanations, such as the socio-economic model of political participation, are helpful but insufficient for understanding why immigrants engage in politics. In particular, since foreigners are socialized in a political system that is different from the one they currently inhabit, explaining their participation patterns more fully requires accounting for these experiences.²⁶

A critical factor shaping the experiences of foreign-born individuals prior to their arrival has long been thought to be the level of democracy in the country of origin. Less democratic regimes are usually associated with less exposure to democratic norms, a weaker sense of civic responsibility, and fewer skills and less knowledge necessary for political engagement in liberal democracies.²⁷ Moreover, scholars tend to assume that arrivals from less democratic countries typically have lower levels of political trust due to their previous experiences with state-sponsored oppression.²⁸ Conversely, previous exposure to democratic governance is expected to facilitate immigrant adaptation and their political integration into a democratic host country.²⁹ Thus, because the skills and knowledge necessary for political involvement learned from an early age in full-fledged democracies are likely to be systematic factors shaping participation, we hypothesize that immigrants from more democratic countries face a lower hurdle of political involvement than immigrants from less democratic ones.³⁰

²⁶ Karthick S. Ramakrishnan, *Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005); Cho, Gimpel and Wu, 'Clarifying the Role of SES in Political Participation'.

²⁷ Stephen White, Neil Nevitte, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Patrick Fournier, 'The Political Resocialization of Immigrants', *Political Research Quarterly*, 61 (2008), 268–81; Jerome H. Black, Richard Niemi and Bingham G. Powell, 'Age and Resistance to Political Learning in a New Environment: The Case of Canadian Immigrants', *Comparative Politics*, 20 (1987), 73–84; Ramakrishnan, *Democracy in Immigrant America*, p. 91.

²⁸ John Harles, *Politics in the Lifeboat: Immigrants and the American Democratic Order* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America: A Portrait* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, 'Political Participation and Political Trust in Amsterdam: Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25 (1999), 703–26; Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1951).

²⁹ Jerome H. Black, 'The Practice of Politics in Two Settings: Political Transferability Among Recent Immigrants to Canada', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 20 (1987), 731–53; Black, Niemi and Powell, 'Age and Resistance to Political Learning in a New Environment'; Ada Finifter and Bernard Finifter, 'Party Identification and Political Adaptation of American Migrants in Australia', *Journal of Politics*, 51 (1989), 599–630; Bueker, 'Political Incorporation among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin'; Paul Wilson, *Immigrants and Politics* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973).

³⁰ Occasionally, researchers have suggested that those raised in undemocratic environments may in fact be more politically involved in the receiving (democratic) country because they have a greater appreciation for democratic rights and opportunities to influence politics. For example, some point to the fact that Cuban Americans participate at higher rates than other Latino immigrants (Alejandro Portes and Rafael Mozo, 'The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis', *International Migration Review*, 19 (1985), 35–63; Arvizu and

An important question in the context of our hypothesized effect of democratic socialization experiences is whether citizenship is an equally valuable resource among individuals with differential predispositions to participate in politics because of experiences in their countries of origin. We posit that such a resource is likely to be particularly useful for individuals who are less inclined to engage in politics in the first place. That is, viewed from the perspective of citizenship as a resource discussed above, we posit that the two – citizenship and socialization – interact, such that citizenship serves to moderate the impact of socialization experiences on engagement. Specifically, given the hurdle that socialization experiences in autocratic societies pose to democratic engagement, citizenship should help to offset the negative impact that growing up under an autocratic regime may have on participation.

DATA AND MEASURES

The individual-level data analysed below come from the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 2002–03. The ESS is a biennial academically-driven social survey that has been conducted since 2002 and now covers more than thirty countries. Funded by the European Commission, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in each participating country, the project is known for its high standards of methodological rigour in survey design and data collection.³¹ Hour-long face-to-face interviews are carefully designed for optimal comparability of survey questions across countries following rigorous translation protocols and pre-testing. To ensure high representativeness of national populations, the survey relies on strict random probability sampling that is based on full coverage of the eligible residential populations of 15 years old or older who are resident within private households, regardless of nationality, citizenship, language or legal status. The target minimum response rate is 70 per cent, and minimum effective sample sizes (completely responded units) are 1,500 or 800 where the

(*Note continued*)

Garcia, 'Latino Voting Participation'; DeSipio, 'Making Citizens or Good Citizens?'), or the behaviour of East Europeans who came to the United States and Canada during the Cold War (Andrew M. Greeley, *Ethnicity in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance* (New York: Wiley, 1974); Black, 'The Practice of Politics in Two Settings'). These contrasting perspectives may not be incompatible if the majority of immigrants from less democratic countries are political refugees. Having migrated for political reasons, refugees may possess a keener sense how politics impacts their daily lives (Ramakrishnan, *Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation*, p. 88; Portes and Mozo, 'The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic Minorities in the United States'). Moreover, some argue that those who qualify for refugee assistance from government may develop greater skills and experience from interacting with government agencies and a greater stake in domestic politics as it relates to their continued receipt of such benefits (Ramakrishnan, *Democracy in Immigrant America*, p. 88). Yet others insist that even individuals who migrate from less to more democratic countries primarily for economic reasons might have an appreciation of democracy. For instance, Barreto and Muñoz ('Reexamining the "Politics of In-Between"', p. 432) claim that Mexicans who arrived in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s were escaping not only a depressed economy but also a polity in which one-party rule had been the norm for 70 years (see also Douglas S. Massey, 'Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis', in Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz and Josh DeWind, eds, *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), pp. 34–52).

³¹ Miki Caul Kittilson, 'Research Resources in Comparative Political Behavior', in Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 865–99.

total population is smaller than 2 million inhabitants.³² Since we are particularly interested in foreign-born respondents who constitute a minority of those surveyed and because a portion of our analyses focuses on foreign-born respondents only, we sought to verify that our samples of foreigners from different countries closely match the characteristics of the populations under investigation.

We did so by conducting two additional analyses. First, we calculated the percentages of foreign-born respondents in the ESS sample and compared these to data measuring the actual percentages of foreign-born individuals collected by the European Union's statistical agency, *Eurostat*. The Pearson correlation between the percentages of foreign-born individuals in the surveys and foreign-born residents according to *Eurostat* census figures in the countries included in our study was 0.98, indicating an extremely close fit between survey and official statistics. Secondly, using a question about respondents' country of origin, we investigated the extent to which our samples of foreign-born respondents were representative of populations in the countries under investigation by calculating the percentages of individuals from different regions of the world.³³ The Pearson correlation between the percentages of foreign-born individuals in our surveys from specific regions and the *Eurostat* data on foreign-born residents in the countries from these regions was 0.90, indicating yet again a very close fit between survey and official statistics.

In addition to providing high-quality data, the ESS is among the very few cross-national data collection efforts that sample non-citizens and ask questions related to people's citizenship, country of origin and length of stay in the receiving country alongside standard questions about political participation (it is also the only set of surveys that ask these questions in identical format across a range of countries). The relevant survey items and macro-level variables were available for nineteen European countries:³⁴ Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.³⁵

Dependent Variables

Our dependent variables are designed to measure non-electoral political engagement in several ways to account for the varieties of actions people engage in but also for the fact that the frequency with which people engage in any one act is relatively low. First, we constructed an additive index from the number of such activities respondents reported having engaged in over the course of the last year: contacting politicians or government officials; working for a political party; action group or another organization; wearing or

³² Further information on the ESS methodology is available on the ESS website and from the Norwegian Science Data Services (<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/> and <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>).

³³ We differentiated individuals by the following regions of origin: Africa, Asia, the Balkans, East Central Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, Australia and New Zealand, and Western Europe. For more details about individual countries, please contact the authors.

³⁴ Pooling data across countries is particularly useful for the purpose of our analyses because the number of foreign-born respondents in any one national survey is relatively small, making it difficult to estimate multivariate models of participation with much precision.

³⁵ We dropped Poland and Hungary from the sample because they lacked variation on the citizenship variable: in Poland, all respondents were coded as citizens; in Hungary, there were only three (native-born) non-citizens.

displaying a campaign badge or sticker; signing a petition; boycotting or buying products for political; ethical or environmental reasons; donating money to political organizations; and participating in lawful demonstrations and illegal protest activities. This measure captures (non-electoral) political engagement in a very broad way; it allows individuals to choose their preferred form of participation and provides us with a wide variety of political acts that individuals can choose to engage in. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more political action.³⁶

Since we hypothesize that the impact of citizenship will vary across types of political engagement, we also follow the extant literature and separate the overall index of participatory acts into institutionalized and uninstitutionalized forms of political engagement.³⁷ Institutionalized participation in politics is an additive index of the following five activities respondents reported having engaged in: contacting a politician or a government or local government official; working in a political party or action group; working in another organization or association; wearing or displaying a campaign badge or sticker; and donating money to political organizations. Uninstitutionalized participation is based on the following five activities: signing a petition; boycotting or buying products for political, ethical or environmental reasons; and participating in lawful demonstrations or illegal protest activities. Both measures of participation range from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating higher levels of political engagement.

Consistent with prior research, we find that overall levels of participation are quite low; the mean score on the political action index is 1.36 (on a 0–10 scale). Thus, individuals on average engage in (slightly more than) one kind of political activity. Looking at the underlying distribution of reported acts, about 44 per cent of respondents said that they had engaged in none of the activities, and another 34 per cent had been involved in only one or two, with the remaining 22 per cent of respondents engaging in more than two activities.

Independent Variables

Our key independent variables – citizenship and foreign-born status – are derived from two survey questions: ‘Are you a citizen of this country?’ and ‘Were you born in this country?’ Using responses to these questions, we created four dichotomous variables that classified respondents as foreign-born citizens, foreign-born non-citizens, native-born citizens and native-born non-citizens. Pooling the data across countries generates a sample of 3,174 foreign-born respondents, 1,752 of whom (55.27 per cent) are foreign-born citizens and 1,418 (44.73 per cent) foreign-born non-citizens.³⁸

To capture immigrant socialization experiences, we rely on two variables: level of democracy in the respondent’s country of origin and an individual’s duration of stay in the host country. Virtually all prior studies have measured democratic origin by categorizing respondents with regard to whether they come from a democratic or undemocratic country. Such a simple categorization misses considerable variation in immigrants’ political experiences, and it

³⁶ Considering the diversity of countries and participatory acts, these items scale quite well, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69 among all respondents and 0.73 among foreigners (for details on question wording and variable coding, see Appendix).

³⁷ We follow the distinction made by Barnes and Kaase (*Political Action*); see also Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 4th edn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).

³⁸ Because native-born non-citizens constituted only a very small number of cases (206), we dropped them from the analysis for statistical reasons.

confounds a number of factors that may be associated with a country's level of democracy. To overcome these shortcomings and provide a more fine-tuned indicator of democratic socialization, we measure democracy in the country of origin with the help of three survey questions and a measure of democracy from the Polity IV dataset.³⁹

To identify respondents' country of origin, they were asked, 'Were you born in this country?' If the answer was 'No', the follow up question was 'In which country were you born?' To identify when respondents arrived in the host country, those who were born abroad were asked, 'How long ago did you first come to live in this country?' We then matched information about the immigrant's country of origin and the time of migration with Polity IV data that measure the level of formal democracy (the extent to which citizens can express preferences about alternative policies and leaders, constrain executive power, and are guaranteed civil liberties in their daily lives) in the country of origin at the time of their departure (see Appendix for further details). To facilitate interpretation of the results, we rescaled the original polity variable so that the resulting variable of democracy in the immigrant's country of origin ranges from 0, indicating that someone was socialized in a 'strongly autocratic regime', to 20, which indicates that someone came from a 'strongly democratic regime'.⁴⁰

Control Variables

Our multivariate analyses include a range of control variables past research has identified as consistent micro- and macro-determinants of political engagement: at the level of individuals, we include a standard set of demographic variables (age, gender, marital status) as well as indicators of people's socio-economic resources and status (income, education and employment). Moreover, we control for immigrant-specific experiences, such as how recently a respondent had arrived in the host country and whether a respondent immigrated from a member state of the European Union (EU). Finally, we include respondents' religiosity and religious denomination, as well as measures of social connectedness and residential stability. At the macro-level, we take into account host countries' political and economic characteristics, such as a level of economic prosperity and growth, the extent of state intervention in the economy, and a country's experience with democratic governance. In addition, we control for immigration-specific contextual characteristics, such as the size of the foreign-born population and the country's citizenship policy regime. Details on control variables and coding procedures are listed in the Appendix.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

A first look at the data reveals that, on average, citizens participate more in politics than non-citizens: the mean values on the political action scale are 1.38 for citizens and 1.08 for non-citizens. This difference applies to both institutionalized (citizens: 0.56; non-citizens: 0.37) and uninstitutionalized political acts (citizens: 0.82; non-citizens: 0.72). Moreover, *native-born* citizens report roughly the same overall engagement in politics as *foreign-born* citizens both overall (1.38 on the political action scale) and with regard to institutionalized (native-born citizens: 0.56, foreign-born citizens: 0.53), and uninstitutionalized participation (native-born citizens: 0.82, foreign-born citizens: 0.86).

³⁹ Polity IV is a widely used dataset of regime characteristics that provides comparative data for virtually all countries in the world on an annual basis between 1800 and 2007.

⁴⁰ The original polity score ranges from -10 to +10.

TABLE 1 *Descriptive Statistics of Political Participation by Citizenship and Nativity Status in Nineteen European Countries, 2002–03*

| Variables | Native-born citizens | | Foreign-born citizens | | Foreign-born non-citizens | | Range | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|------|-----------------------|------|---------------------------|------|-------|-----|
| | Mean | SD | Mean | SD | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
| Political Action | 1.38 | 1.71 | 1.38 | 1.81 | 1.08 | 1.58 | 0 | 10 |
| Institutionalized Action | 0.56 | 0.96 | 0.53 | 0.97 | 0.37 | 0.75 | 0 | 5 |
| Un-institutionalized Action | 0.82 | 1.09 | 0.86 | 1.16 | 0.72 | 1.08 | 0 | 5 |

Source: The European Social Society (ESS), 2002–2003.

To isolate with greater statistical precision the relative effects that citizenship, immigrant status and other factors have on patterns of participation, our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we establish a baseline for the impact of citizenship on participation across all countries and all respondents. Comparing native-born and foreign-born respondents enables us to see whether observed differences between these groups are due to citizenship or having been born abroad. As a second step, we focus exclusively on foreign-born individuals to examine whether citizenship exerts an independent effect on political action, and whether it interacts with immigrant experiences in country of origin in shaping their political engagement in their new homeland. Finally, to ensure that any differences in the levels of political participation among foreign-born individuals are indeed due to citizenship status rather than some unobserved heterogeneity that drives both citizenship acquisition and political participation, we present two-stage instrumental variable estimations designed to address the potential problem of omitted-variable bias.

Citizenship, Foreign Birth and Political Participation: Baseline Models

Because the analysis requires that we combine information collected at the level of individuals and at the level of countries, the dataset has a multi-level structure (one level, the individual, is nested within the other, the country). To avoid a number of statistical problems associated with such a data structure (clustering, non-constant variance, underestimation of standard errors, etc.),⁴¹ we estimated multi-level mixed-effects maximum likelihood models with random intercepts (to allow for cross-country heterogeneity in levels of participation), random slopes for our citizenship variables (to allow for cross-country variability in the magnitude of citizenship coefficients) and respondents clustered at the level of countries.

To assess the impact of citizenship on participation across all countries and all respondents in our base-line model, we included two dummy variables for foreign-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens, using native-born citizens as the comparison group. The results, shown in Table 2, indicate that political engagement among foreign-born individuals is systematically lower than among native-born citizens, and is particularly low for

⁴¹ Cf. Tom A. B. Snijders and Roel Bosker, *Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1999); for applications in political science, see Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones, 'Modeling Multilevel Data Structures', *American Journal of Political Science*, 46 (2002), 218–37.

TABLE 2 *Political Participation in Nineteen European Countries, 2002–03*

| Independent variable | Political action | | Institutionalized political action | | Uninstitutionalized political action | |
|--|------------------|--------|------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| Foreign-born citizen | -.266*** | (.069) | -.074† | (.039) | -.191*** | (.039) |
| Foreign-born non-citizen | -.687*** | (.101) | -.250*** | (.051) | -.447*** | (.064) |
| Discriminated against | .665*** | (.038) | .298*** | (.022) | .371*** | (.024) |
| Crime victim | .365*** | (.022) | .147*** | (.013) | .217*** | (.014) |
| Satisfaction with democracy | -.001 | (.004) | .003 | (.002) | -.004† | (.002) |
| Age | .035*** | (.003) | .017*** | (.002) | .017*** | (.002) |
| Age squared | -.000*** | (.000) | -.000*** | (.000) | -.000*** | (.000) |
| Income | .067*** | (.013) | .040*** | (.007) | .028*** | (.008) |
| Education | .264*** | (.007) | .112*** | (.004) | .152*** | (.004) |
| Male | .016 | (.018) | .137*** | (.011) | -.116*** | (.012) |
| Married | .026 | (.020) | .056*** | (.012) | -.030* | (.013) |
| Unemployed | -.031 | (.022) | -.013 | (.013) | -.017 | (.014) |
| Urban | .014† | (.008) | -.028*** | (.005) | .041*** | (.005) |
| Residential stability | -.001 | (.001) | .001*** | (.000) | -.002*** | (.000) |
| Social connectedness | .106*** | (.006) | .058*** | (.004) | .050*** | (.004) |
| Religiosity | .018*** | (.004) | .012*** | (.002) | .007** | (.002) |
| Christian | -.087*** | (.022) | -.009 | (.013) | -.081*** | (.014) |
| Muslim | -.228* | (.090) | -.072 | (.052) | -.149** | (.057) |
| Other religions | .312** | (.102) | .096 | (.060) | .220*** | (.064) |
| Foreign-born from an EU country | .407*** | (.070) | .063 | (.040) | .351*** | (.044) |
| Foreign population size (%) | .011 | (.017) | -.006 | (.007) | .017 | (.013) |
| Citizenship policies in host country | .020 | (.040) | .006 | (.016) | .012 | (.030) |
| New democracy | -.349 | (.291) | -.037 | (.113) | -.310 | (.218) |
| GDP per capita (in 1,000 of \$'s) | .014 | (.013) | .010* | (.005) | .004 | (.010) |
| Economic growth (%) | -.025 | (.050) | -.007 | (.019) | -.017 | (.037) |
| Government expenditure (% of GDP) | .010 | (.022) | -.003 | (.009) | .013 | (.016) |
| Constant | -1.610*** | (.493) | -.901*** | (.195) | -.706† | (.367) |
| Standard deviation of random slope: foreign-born citizen | .207 | (.061) | .114 | (.033) | .103 | (.039) |
| Standard deviation of random slope: foreign-born non-citizen | .308 | (.076) | .137 | (.045) | .197 | (.048) |
| Standard deviation of random intercept | .281 | (.047) | .108 | (.018) | .211 | (.035) |
| Standard deviation of residuals | 1.571 | (.006) | .920 | (.004) | .992 | (.004) |
| Number of observations | 32,070 | | 32,389 | | 32,178 | |
| Number of groups | 19 | | 19 | | 19 | |
| Wald χ^2 (df) | 3,789.56(26)*** | | 2,209.01(26)*** | | 3,947.17(26)*** | |

Immigrants, Citizenship and Political Action in Europe

Note: Results are mixed-effects maximum likelihood estimates using STATA 11.0's xtmixed command. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed). 'Native-born citizens' is the reference category for foreign-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens; 'non-religious' – for Christians, Muslims and other religions.

foreign-born non-citizens. This finding is consistent across different types of political action and suggests that the key difference is between foreign-born non-citizens on the one hand and citizens (both native and foreign-born) on the other.⁴²

Our analysis so far shows that citizenship matters for political engagement when we compare foreign-born citizens, foreign-born non-citizens and native-born citizens. This is an important baseline for pursuing the question of whether citizenship matters. However, statistically speaking, the estimates do not show conclusively whether participation rates among foreign-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens are significantly different from each other, nor do they shed any light on the question of whether citizenship continues to have a positive impact on participation once we take into account immigrant experiences and characteristics more fully.⁴³ To do so, we turn to a more detailed analysis of foreign-born individuals.

Citizenship and Immigrant Participation

To examine the effects of citizenship on political participation among first-generation immigrants, and to see whether citizenship is more than just a placeholder for other individual differences, such as immigrant socialization experiences, we focus exclusively on foreign-born respondents as a next step. We estimate models similar to those reported in Table 2, with several additions: first, we now include a measure of citizenship; secondly, we control for the length of time respondents have lived in the country; thirdly, we include our measure of democratic socialization in the country of origin; and, finally, we include an interaction term of democratic socialization and citizenship to gauge the presumed conditional effect of citizenship on participation among individuals raised in less democratic environments. The results of these estimations are shown in Table 3.

They reveal that citizenship is positively related to political participation, but that its impact should not be considered in isolation. First, citizenship is not the only determinant of immigrant political action. Our results indicate that duration of stay in the receiving country also powerfully shapes political participation among the foreign-born. Specifically, we find that more recent immigrants engage in fewer political acts than foreigners who arrived many years ago. Thus, immigrants, regardless of citizenship, learn participation in the sense that prolonged exposure to the host country steadily builds capacity for political engagement.

Secondly, our results show that the impact of citizenship on political participation is conditioned by immigrant political socialization before arrival in the host country, and this is especially true for less institutionalized political acts. We find that the interaction term for citizenship and the level of democracy in the country of origin is negative, indicating that the positive effect of citizenship on political participation is systematically smaller among individuals who grew up in democratic countries. This means that the added benefit of

⁴² We sought to ensure the robustness of these inferences by examining whether our results were sensitive to the inclusion of any particular country; this was not the case.

⁴³ Variables such as discrimination and criminal victimization may capture some of these experiences if they are more prevalent among immigrants than native-born individuals. Our data show that 15 per cent of foreign-born individuals report being a member of a group that is being discriminated against, while about 5 per cent of native-born individuals agree that this is the case. And about 21 per cent of native-born respondents report being the victim of a crime within the past five years, while about 22 per cent of foreign-born individuals say they have been the victim of a crime. Regardless of these statistics, because immigrants and non-immigrants share these experiences, they do not serve to separate these groups exclusively.

TABLE 3 *Political Participation among Foreign-Born Individuals in Nineteen European Countries, 2002–03*

| Independent variables | Political action | | Institutionalized political action | | Uninstitutionalized political action | |
|---|------------------|--------|------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| Citizen | .433* | (.170) | .124 | (.085) | .312** | (.116) |
| Democracy level in country of origin | .010 | (.009) | -.001 | (.005) | .010† | (.006) |
| Citizen x Democracy in country of origin | -.018† | (.010) | -.000 | (.005) | -.017** | (.006) |
| Recent immigrant | -.205*** | (.038) | -.051* | (.020) | -.153*** | (.025) |
| Discriminated against | .339*** | (.091) | .206*** | (.049) | .132* | (.060) |
| Crime victim | .410*** | (.074) | .130*** | (.040) | .273*** | (.049) |
| Satisfaction with democracy | -.044*** | (.014) | -.015* | (.007) | -.030*** | (.009) |
| Age | .028* | (.012) | .010 | (.006) | .020** | (.008) |
| Age squared | -.000** | (.000) | -.000 | (.000) | -.000*** | (.000) |
| Income | .083* | (.041) | .013 | (.022) | .068* | (.027) |
| Education | .240*** | (.022) | .101*** | (.012) | .142*** | (.014) |
| Male | -.008 | (.063) | .066* | (.034) | -.072† | (.041) |
| Married | -.198** | (.069) | -.060 | (.037) | -.147*** | (.045) |
| Unemployed | .098 | (.074) | .033 | (.040) | .065 | (.048) |
| Urban | .056* | (.028) | .001 | (.015) | .051** | (.018) |
| Residential stability | .001 | (.003) | .002 | (.002) | -.001 | (.002) |
| Social connectedness | .077*** | (.021) | .044*** | (.011) | .038** | (.014) |
| Religiosity | .004 | (.012) | .003 | (.006) | .001 | (.008) |
| Christian | -.263*** | (.076) | -.089* | (.041) | -.187*** | (.050) |
| Muslim | -.275* | (.123) | -.117† | (.066) | -.154† | (.080) |
| Other religions | -.020 | (.199) | -.030 | (.107) | .009 | (.131) |
| Foreign-born from an EU country | .288** | (.102) | .057 | (.055) | .236*** | (.067) |
| Foreign population size (%) | -.043** | (.015) | -.029*** | (.007) | -.016 | (.010) |
| Citizenship policies in host country | .020 | (.035) | .009 | (.016) | .018 | (.022) |
| New democracy | -.542† | (.309) | -.082 | (.127) | -.431* | (.213) |
| GDP per capita (in 1,000 of \$'s) | .040*** | (.011) | .023*** | (.005) | .018** | (.007) |
| Economic growth (%) | -.007 | (.041) | -.009 | (.018) | -.006 | (.026) |
| Government expenditure (% of GDP) | .005 | (.019) | -.010 | (.008) | .009 | (.012) |
| Constant | -1.000† | (.528) | -.383 | (.259) | -.538 | (.335) |
| Standard deviation of random slope: citizen | .266 | (.079) | .061 | (.050) | .217 | (.056) |
| Standard deviation of random intercept | .150 | (.062) | .065 | (.029) | .081 | (.049) |
| Standard deviation of residuals | 1.553 | (.022) | .839 | (.012) | 1.020 | (.014) |
| Number of observations | 2,628 | | 2,650 | | 2,639 | |
| Number of groups | 19 | | 19 | | 19 | |
| Wald X ² (df) | 458.81(28)*** | | 255.42(28)*** | | 464.30(28)*** | |

Note: Results are mixed-effects maximum likelihood estimates using STATA 11.0's xtmixed command. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed). 'Non-religious' is the reference category for Christians, Muslims and other religions.

citizenship is less valuable to individuals who hail from more democratic countries and more valuable to those who grew up in undemocratic ones.⁴⁴

Instrumental Variable Estimations of the Effects of Citizenship on Participation

While the results so far unanimously provide consistent evidence for our hypotheses, they are not ironclad. One particular difficulty with assessing the impact of citizenship on political participation is that people may self-select into the process of naturalization.⁴⁵ By this we mean that individuals who decide to seek citizenship may also be more motivated to participate in politics compared to immigrants who choose not to naturalize. As a result, the positive impact of citizenship on political participation could be spurious and instead result from some other characteristics – such as intrinsic individual motivations to engage in politics – that operate on both naturalization and political participation, rather than from citizenship *per se*.

There are two ways of addressing this possibility. First, to guard against spurious inferences in a traditional regression setup, it is important to control for important potentially confounding factors. This is a strategy we pursued in the estimations reported in Table 3. As the results showed, controlling for a host of attitudinal and demographic characteristics of individuals as well as the country-context in which they are located did not render the coefficients for citizenship insignificant.

As a second estimation strategy, we re-examined our models with the help of a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach. This approach can be used for a number of different reasons, but is employed here specifically because of its demonstrated ability to address the potential problem of omitting an unobserved but relevant explanatory variable.⁴⁶ Ignoring such a variable produces biased and inconsistent estimates; fortunately, these can be corrected

⁴⁴ When we compare the impact of traditional explanations of political participation (socio-economic characteristics and civic attitudes) *vis-à-vis* more immigrant-specific variables, we find that the power of traditional explanations is not diminished by accounting for immigrants' experiences. This demonstrates that understanding the immigrant experience complements rather than replaces existing explanations of political action. Interestingly, the ease with which citizens are able to acquire citizenship, as measured by the citizenship policy index, does not affect immigrants' political engagement.

⁴⁵ Highton and Burris, 'New Perspectives on Latino Voter Turnout in the United States', p. 290; Zai Liang, 'Social Contact, Social Capital and the Naturalization Process: Evidence from Six Immigrant Groups', *Social Science Research*, 23 (1994), 407–37; see P. Lim, Colleen Barry-Goodman and David Branham, 'Discrimination that Travels: How Ethnicity Affects Party Identification for Southeast Asian Immigrants', *Social Science Quarterly*, 87 (2006), 1158–70; Carole J. Uhlaner, Bruce E. Cain and D. Roderick Kiewiet, 'Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s', *Political Behavior*, 11 (1989), 195–231, p. 212; Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 'Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity', p. 735; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 'Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States', p. 876. This perspective is consistent with previous research that employed citizenship as a proxy for commitment to host country (Black, 'The Practice of Politics in Two Settings'; Black, Niemi and Powell, 'Age and Resistance to Political Learning in a New Environment').

⁴⁶ Christopher F. Baum, *An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata* (College Station, Tex.: Stata Press, 2006), chap. 8. Although it may seem at first glance that we have a case for a selection model, our theoretical model and data are not amenable to such statistical techniques. Specifically, a Heckman selection model operates on the assumption that only those who select themselves into a particular condition (e.g. citizenship) in the first stage have variation on the dependent variable in the second stage (e.g. political participation). The problem in the context of this study of political participation is that this assumption is applicable only to those forms of behaviour that are restricted to citizens (such as voting in national elections). This is not the case with non-electoral participation that is available to both citizens and non-citizens, and which is the focus of our analysis. Therefore, a Heckman selection model (or related approaches) is not applicable here.

using the IV approach, assuming that valid instruments can be identified.⁴⁷ Substantively, this will allow us to avoid the possible entanglement of our independent and dependent variables due to the potential selection of individuals with particular characteristics into acquiring citizenship.

We argue that geographic distance between an immigrant's country of origin and the new homeland as well as familial ties to the host country can be used as such instruments. Naturalization studies suggest that geographic distance between sending and receiving countries encourages citizenship acquisition because of a reduced likelihood of return migration. Conversely, greater geographical proximity presents more opportunities for immigrants to maintain frequent, continuous ties with their nearby homelands; this lowers the cost of return journeys, generating fewer incentives for immigrants to fully integrate in their host societies.⁴⁸

Having native-born parents also facilitates naturalization, as this allows foreign-born children to demonstrate blood ties to their host societies. Citizenship acquisition by descent – that is, on the basis of one's parents' or grandparents' nationality (also referred to as *jus sanguinis*) – is an important and in many countries the primary route to formal membership in a nation state.⁴⁹ All countries (including those that rely on *jus solis*) have provisions for citizenship acquisition by descent. For example, US government regulations specify that children born abroad can acquire US citizenship if: (1) both parents are citizens of the United States, and one of them resided in the United States before the birth of the child; or if (2) one parent is a citizen of the United States who resided in the United States for at least five years before the birth of the child.⁵⁰ Similarly, most European countries grant citizenship to foreign-born children if at least one parent is a citizen of that country.⁵¹ This suggests that a foreigner with at least one parent who is a national of a host country is more likely to hold citizenship of that country, and having both parents who are native to the host country increases the chances of this even more.⁵²

While geographic distance and native-born parents matter for naturalization, we know of no theories of immigrant political participation arguing that these factors directly influence immigrant political participation. Thus, we have theoretical and empirical reasons to justify the selection of our instruments; however, we still need to demonstrate that our instruments meet the assumptions for the IV approach to provide consistent estimates. The assumption that the instruments are statistically independent from the disturbance process cannot be verified in the data directly.⁵³ However, since our model is

⁴⁷ Valid instruments have a significant partial correlation with citizenship, controlling for all the other determinants of political participation, while being uncorrelated with the error term in the model of political participation.

⁴⁸ Philip Q. Yang, 'Explaining Immigrant Naturalization,' *International Migration Review*, 28 (1994), 449–77, pp. 457–8; see also Bueker, 'Political Incorporation among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin'.

⁴⁹ Weil, 'Access to Citizenship'.

⁵⁰ The United States Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service, *Citizenship Laws of the World* (The US Office of Personnel Management: Washington, DC, 2001).

⁵¹ This process, however, is not automatic – parents must register a child and request citizenship within a specific period of time (e.g., within five years in Belgium, or before the age of 22 in Switzerland).

⁵² Unfortunately, the ESS survey does not include a question measuring parents' citizenship status – only their nativity status – and the foreign-born status of parents is of course only a proxy for parents' citizenship. But given that many native-born parents might have acquired citizenship by birth or naturalization, this variable allows us to capture citizenship acquisition by descent at least to some extent.

⁵³ Baum, *An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata*, p. 191.

TABLE 4 *Predicting Citizenship among Foreign-born Individuals in Nineteen European Countries, 2002–03*

| Independent variables | Citizenship | |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Low democracy | High democracy |
| Geographical distance from country of origin | .009* (.004) | .001 (.005) |
| Foreign-born parents | -.075*** (.017) | -.257*** (.016) |
| Included exogenous individual-level regressors | Yes | Yes |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Number of observations | 1,307 | 1,319 |
| Partial R^2 for excluded instruments | .022 | .149 |
| F -statistic for test of excluded instruments | 14.65 | 126.48 |
| F p -value | .000 | .000 |

Note: The results are OLS coefficient estimates and their robust standard errors (in parentheses): * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

over-identified, we can provide evidence that the instruments are adequate by reporting test statistics below.⁵⁴

Geographic distance is measured using geodesic distances between an immigrant's country of origin and the new home country based on the dyadic country dataset developed by the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). In our dataset, this variable ranges from 0 for immigrants who come from contiguous countries to 19,147 kilometres for the most distant country of origin. To measure familial ties to one's host country, we rely on two survey items asking whether the respondent's father and mother were born in this country. The variable 'foreign-born parents' ranges from 0 if both parents are native-born to 2 if both parents are foreign-born, with 1 indicating that one parent was born abroad and another is a native to the host country.⁵⁵

We report the results of the two-stage IV estimations in Tables 4 and 5 below. The first stage is designed to predict citizenship status among foreign-born respondents using our instruments while controlling for all variables specified in the model of political participation. Since the IV approach does not allow for multi-level modelling, we follow standard prescriptions in the statistical literature by also including country fixed effects to account for cross-country heterogeneity that might be influencing political participation, and estimate our models using robust standard errors.⁵⁶ The second stage then employs an instrumented citizenship variable as an independent variable in the model of political participation among foreign-born individuals. These estimations also include country fixed effects but drop substantive macro-level controls previously used in multi-level models due to collinearity.

⁵⁴ For a similar approach, see Matthew Gabel and Kenneth Scheve, 'Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables', *American Journal of Political Science*, 51 (2007), 1013–28.

⁵⁵ For more information, see the variable description in the Appendix.

⁵⁶ See Kevin Arceneaux and David W. Nickerson, 'Modeling Certainty with Clustered Data: A Comparison of Methods', *Political Analysis*, 7 (2009), 177–90. Note that, due to the inclusion of country fixed effects, identification in this model comes from within-country variation in immigrant background.

TABLE 5 *Instrumental Variable Estimates of Political Participation among Foreign-born Individuals in Nineteen European Countries, 2002–03*

| Independent variables | Political action | | Institutionalized action | | Uninstitutionalized action | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|
| | Low democracy | High democracy | Low democracy | High democracy | Low democracy | High democracy |
| Citizenship (Instrumented) | 2.775* (1.142) | .192 (.293) | .440 (.570) | .114 (.158) | 2.195** (.718) | .065 (.186) |
| Democracy level in country of origin | .001 (.013) | .016 (.069) | .003 (.006) | .021 (.037) | -.001 (.009) | -.006 (.048) |
| Recent immigrant | .268 (.204) | -.221*** (.067) | .039 (.100) | -.084* (.034) | .201 (.128) | -.139** (.046) |
| Discriminated against | .532** (.176) | .367* (.183) | .188* (.085) | .257* (.103) | .334** (.112) | .108 (.117) |
| Crime victim | .283* (.126) | .517*** (.114) | .025 (.063) | .203*** (.061) | .253** (.083) | .309*** (.076) |
| Satisfaction with democracy | -.033 (.021) | -.053* (.021) | -.019† (.010) | -.010 (.012) | -.015 (.014) | -.044** (.014) |
| Age | .050** (.018) | .024 (.018) | .021* (.009) | -.001 (.009) | -.030* (.012) | .024* (.012) |
| Age squared | -.001*** (.000) | -.000† (.000) | -.000* (.000) | -.000 (.000) | -.000** (.000) | -.000* (.000) |
| Income | .029 (.079) | .066 (.066) | .015 (.038) | .021 (.035) | .018 (.053) | .047 (.044) |
| Education | .184*** (.041) | .246*** (.031) | .106*** (.022) | .091*** (.017) | .082** (.027) | .154*** (.021) |
| Male | .119 (.108) | -.055 (.096) | .101* (.050) | .049 (.050) | .029 (.073) | -.111† (.064) |
| Married | -.314* (.123) | -.081 (.100) | -.100† (.059) | -.016 (.051) | -.211** (.081) | -.076 (.067) |
| Unemployed | .080 (.118) | .120 (.111) | .056 (.054) | .021 (.058) | .029 (.081) | .094 (.075) |
| Urban | .108† (.061) | .084* (.040) | .001 (.030) | .009 (.021) | .089* (.039) | .076** (.027) |
| Residential stability | .003 (.005) | -.005 (.004) | .003 (.003) | .000 (.002) | -.000 (.003) | -.005 (.003) |

TABLE 5 (Continued)

| Independent variables | Political action | | Institutionalized action | | Uninstitutionalized action | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|------------------|
| | Low democracy | High democracy | Low democracy | High democracy | Low democracy | High democracy |
| Social connectedness | .071* (.034) | .082** (.030) | .050** (.016) | .034* (.015) | .026 (.023) | .048* (.022) |
| Religiosity | -.011 (.020) | .022 (.018) | -.004 (.010) | .011 (.009) | -.009 (.013) | .010 (.012) |
| Christian | -.075 (.151) | -.227* (.104) | -.067 (.068) | -.065 (.053) | -.011 (.106) | -.164* (.073) |
| Muslim | .118 (.213) | .092 (.405) | -.071 (.096) | .036 (.164) | .173 (.150) | -.126 (.266) |
| Other religions | -.017 (.356) | -.315 (.323) | .058 (.199) | -.183 (.161) | -.061 (.225) | -.138 (.200) |
| Foreign-born from an EU country | 1.005* (.512) | .227† (.136) | .104 (.251) | .049 (.076) | .827* (.327) | .180* (.089) |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | -3.105* (1.399) | -.126 (1.566) | -.805 (.688) | -.282 (.843) | -2.157* (.896) | .194 (1.059) |
| Number of observations | 1,307 | 1,319 | 1,321 | 1,327 | 1,315 | 1,322 |
| Hansen <i>J</i> -statistic | .313 | .737 | .018 | .448 | .788 | 2.677 |
| χ^2 (1) <i>p</i> -value | .576 | .391 | .892 | .503 | .375 | .102 |

Note: The results are IV coefficient estimates and their robust standard errors (in parentheses): † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Citizenship is instrumented using geographical distance from foreigner's country of origin and foreign-born parents. 'Non-religious' is the reference category for Christians, Muslims and other religions.

Since our key hypothesis focuses on the interactive effects of citizenship and democratic socialization on political participation, we had to make one additional modification to our original model specification. Both stages in the IV models are estimated simultaneously; as a result, we cannot test for interaction effects with the help of a multiplicative term, given that the instrumented citizenship variable is produced between the two stages. An alternative way of dealing with independent variables that are hypothesized to have an interactive effect with another independent variable on the dependent variable of choice is to stratify the sample into two subsamples.⁵⁷ Therefore, we split our sample between immigrants from less and more democratic regimes using the median value of the democracy score (17.6 on a scale from 0 to 20) in our dataset to ensure that both samples were of similar size. If our interaction hypothesis is correct, we should observe a positive and statistically significant effect of citizenship among respondents from less democratic countries, but a smaller or insignificant effect among those from more democratic regimes.

The first stage of the IV estimations, reported in Table 4, indicates that both instruments have the anticipated signs and are significantly correlated with citizenship.⁵⁸ We find that, controlling for all predictors of political participation as well as country fixed effects, immigrants from more geographically distant countries of origin are more likely to enjoy citizenship status, as are foreigners who have native-born parents. The magnitude of coefficients, however, depends on whether immigrants come from less or more democratic regimes: while having two foreign-born parents significantly reduces citizenship acquisition among new arrivals from highly democratic countries, geographic distance is particularly important for naturalization among foreigners from less democratic regimes.

To systematically assess the validity of our instruments, we rely on several test statistics. First, the *F*-statistic for testing excluded instruments is equal to 14.6 for immigrants from countries with low levels of democracy, and 126.48 for those who arrived from highly democratic countries. Despite this difference, in both cases the *F*-statistic is significant at less than 0.001, indicating that our instruments are jointly significant. Furthermore, the Hansen *J*-test statistic in all models recorded in the second-stage estimations reported in Table 5 is statistically insignificant, indicating that the instruments are appropriately uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage estimations. Taken together, the results indicate that the selected instruments are relevant and statistically independent from the disturbance process, satisfying the key requirements of valid instruments of the IV approach.

The results of the second-stage estimations, shown in Table 5, are fully in line with our expectations and the multi-level results reported above. As before, we find that citizenship has a positive effect on immigrant political action, but this effect exists only among immigrants from less democratic regimes. Moreover, the positive impact of citizenship is particularly pronounced in the model of uninstitutionalized acts, while it falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance when it comes to predicting institutionalized participation in politics. Hence, our results indicate that the impact of citizenship on immigrant political engagement is not spurious but genuine and in the causal direction

⁵⁷ Eric A. Hanushek and John E. Jackson, *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists* (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 1977), p. 101; see also Karen Long Jusko and W. Phillips Shiveley, 'Applying a Two-Step Strategy to the Analysis of Cross-National Public Opinion Data', *Political Analysis*, 13 (2005), 327–44.

⁵⁸ The statistical significance of geographic distance is significantly reduced by the inclusion of a control for whether a foreigner comes from one of the EU-15 countries – a variable designed to distinguish between more and less desirable immigrants.




Fig. 1. Marginal effects of citizenship status on political action among foreign-born from countries with low and high levels of democracy
 Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals




Fig. 2. Marginal effects of citizenship status on uninstitutionalized political action among foreign-born from countries with low and high levels of democracy
 Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

posited above: citizenship indeed encourages foreigners from less democratic countries to be more involved in uninstitutionalized political acts.

How much does citizenship matter? To assess our results in greater detail, we calculate the marginal effect of citizenship on political participation among foreign-born individuals at various levels of democracy in their countries of origin. Figure 1 plots the magnitude of this effect for the political action variable and Figure 2 for uninstitutionalized acts, using the instrumental variable estimations reported in Tables 4 and 5. The white bars indicate the

levels of political engagement among foreign-born citizens and the black bars participation by foreign-born non-citizens; the vertical lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals.⁵⁹

Calculations of the substantive effects reveal that our key variables of interest indeed have a sizeable impact on immigrant political participation. Specifically, Figure 1 indicates that the political action score for an immigrant who grew up in a country with a low level of democracy *and who is a citizen* exceeds the score of a similar individual who is not a citizen by 2.774 points (+2.647 vs. -0.127). In contrast, the gap in the levels of political action between citizens and non-citizens is reduced to only 0.192 for immigrants from highly democratic countries: the score for citizens is 1.121, while non-citizens are close behind with a value of 0.929 on the political action scale. The pattern for uninstitutionalized acts is very similar: while immigrants from less democratic regimes participate at a level of 2.078, non-citizens have a significantly lower score of -0.117. In contrast, the difference between citizens and non-citizens from more democratic countries is only 0.064 (0.761 vs. 0.697). In short, citizenship has a positive effect on non-electoral participation among foreign-born respondents, but it is substantively and statistically significant only among those who arrived from less democratic regimes.

DISCUSSION

Across the European democracies, few issues have been more sensitive, explosive or politically effective in changing party electoral fortunes and arousing public passions than the topic of immigration and citizenship, perhaps because it touches raw nerves closely connected to a country's identity and sovereignty.⁶⁰ On one hand, sceptics of immigration fear that changing the racial, ethnic and religious composition of European societies introduces new social tensions, particularly in hard economic times and when immigrants are poorly integrated into their host societies. On the other hand, proponents of immigration believe that ethnic and racial heterogeneity enrich the cultural fabric of societies and bring important economic benefits such as a younger and more flexible labour force necessary to replace ageing populations. Considering that migration to Europe is unlikely to recede,⁶¹ migrant integration in their host countries will remain a pressing issue for governments and citizens alike.

In recent years, a number of European countries have debated the question of how to treat migrants, and in particular, how to define citizenship. Virtually every country in the EU-15 has revisited – though not necessarily revised – its citizenship laws.⁶² A prominent example is Germany, which in 1999 fundamentally redefined who was eligible for citizenship by moving from a pure *jus sanguinis* to a mixed form of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* and for the first time giving individuals born in Germany, but not necessarily to German parents, the right to citizenship.⁶³ This change took place against the background

⁵⁹ We hold other variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their medians; all country dummies, except Switzerland, are set to zero.

⁶⁰ Marc Morjé Howard, 'Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research', *Perspectives on Politics*, 4 (2006), 443–55, p. 450.

⁶¹ Gary P. Freeman, 'Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States', *International Migration Review*, 29 (1995), 881–913; Christian Joppke, 'Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration', *World Politics*, 50 (1998), 266–93; Hein de Haas, 'Turning the Tide? Why Development Will Not Stop Migration', *Development and Change*, 38 (2007), 819–41.

⁶² Howard, 'Comparative Citizenship', p. 451.

⁶³ Simon Green, 'Beyond Ethnoculturalism? German Citizenship in the New Millennium', *German Politics*, 9 (2000), 105–24; Marc Morjé Howard, 'The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New

of increased migration from the former Soviet bloc since the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as the presence of a large proportion of residents from Turkey whose children had been born and raised in Germany. In sharp contrast, the 1990s saw the tightening of citizenship laws in France, where Charles Pasqua, the French minister for the interior, introduced a law in 1993 that, among other things, made it more difficult for immigrant children born in France to become French citizens.⁶⁴ Similarly, some aspects of citizenship laws became more restrictive in Ireland and Italy.⁶⁵

Defining who is eligible for or entitled to citizenship is more than an academic or moral question, however. In a democracy, it also affects who has the right to choose the government, stand for office and influence policy making. To better understand the consequences that granting citizenship has on immigrant political participation in European democracies, we focused on several important but unanswered questions: do foreign-born respondents differ with respect to their political engagement from native-born ones? Does it matter what kinds of political acts we examine? Do the patterns of participation for citizens diverge from those of non-citizens once we control for whether people are born in another country? And, finally, are differences in participation among foreigners due to citizenship or something else?

Thus, our study sought to shed light on an understudied question – the role of citizenship versus immigrant status for political participation – but also aimed to put prior, but contested, arguments about socialization experience to a more stringent test across a wider range of cases and outside the US context. We argue that, when it comes to political engagement, it is useful to conceptualize citizenship as a legal and psychological resource that facilitates and encourages participation. Moreover, we posit that it is important to distinguish the impact of having or lacking citizenship from the effect of having been born and raised in a foreign country. Our results show that citizens – regardless of whether they are foreign-born or native-born – participate in politics at higher rates than non-citizens.

We also argue that a fuller understanding of immigrant political participation and the impact of citizenship on foreign-born individuals requires that we distinguish the experiences individuals have as immigrants from the effects we observe as a consequence of citizenship. Our results lead us to conclude that, while citizenship quite naturally divides voters from non-voters, its positive impact on participation beyond casting ballots is contingent on the type of political activity and the level of democratic socialization immigrants experience in their country of origin. Specifically, we find that citizenship has a particularly powerful effect in boosting uninstitutionalized participation in politics,

(*Note continued*)

Citizenship Law', *German Politics*, 17 (2008), 41–62. According to the German Nationality Act of 2000, children born in Germany to foreign parents acquire German citizenship at birth if at least one parent has had a legal residence permit in Germany for at least eight years. Children who acquire German citizenship in this way are allowed to hold dual citizenship until they reach maturity; they are required to choose between their German and foreign citizenship by the age of 23 (Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging* (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. 93).

⁶⁴ Amelie Constant, 'Immigrant Adjustment in France and Impacts on the Natives', in Klaus F. Zimmermann, ed., *European Migration: What Do We Know?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 263–302, at p. 275. These measures, however, were largely reversed in 1998 by the new Socialist government and policies have stayed the same since then (Castles and Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration*, p. 92; Howard, *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*, p. 152).

⁶⁵ Howard, 'Comparative Citizenship', pp. 450–1.

especially among individuals who were socialized in less democratic countries. This suggests that granting immigrants citizenship indiscriminately is unlikely to be sufficient for fostering political engagement among foreign-born residents. Instead, the effects of citizenship are most apparent among those immigrants whose socialization experiences are least auspicious for democratic engagement and for acts of participation that are least institutionalized.

This conclusion may not be politically congenial to everyone. But recall that our results also show that citizenship has the strongest effect among individuals socialized under undemocratic regimes and thus counteracts the negative traces that the country of origin may leave on immigrant participation. Thus, citizenship matters and enhances participation, but not for everyone and not for every kind of political act. Whether these results generalize outside of the European context and whether they hold true for all immigrants socialized under undemocratic regimes or across immigrant generations are of course questions in need of further investigation. Moreover, given the variety in citizenship regimes, research on immigrant political behaviour would also benefit from more detailed studies of whether particular naturalization policies or democratic socialization procedures are more effective in mobilizing immigrant political engagement than others. For example, we would speculate that citizenship regimes that contain a heavier component of teaching civic skills and knowledge are more effective in inculcating new citizens with the resources to become politically engaged.

Moreover, little is known about how political organizations, especially labour unions and ethnic community institutions, as well as the nature of migration and residential concentration of foreigners affect their involvement in politics across European countries. And while citizenship is one conceptual lens through which to view patterns of immigrant incorporation, we hasten to add that non-citizens are not all created equal. While some foreign-born non-citizens – for example, citizens of EU member states – have various political, economic and social rights, others – third-country nationals – do not, and this may well affect how they become politically engaged. These are rich but complex questions that deserve further investigation.

We conclude that, while governments cannot control immigrant socialization experiences in their country of origin, they are not completely powerless when it comes to shaping the civic engagement of immigrants. Our results suggest that there is good reason to believe that citizenship can counteract particularly detrimental effects of growing up in less democratic countries; as well, they imply that giving immigrants time to adjust to their new environment and facilitating their learning about democratic governance might be a promising and straightforward way of producing a high quality of civic life in contemporary democracies.

APPENDIX: MEASURES AND CODING

Political Action. Based on the following survey questions: ‘There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? (1) Contacted a politician, government or local government official, (2) Worked in a political party or action group? (3) Worked in another organization or association? (4) Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker? (5) Signed a petition? (6) Taken part in a lawful public demonstration? (7) Boycotted certain products? (8) Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons? (9) Donated money to a political organization or group? (10) Participated in illegal protest activities?’ The additive index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more politically active respondents.

Institutionalized Action. Based on the following survey questions: ‘There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last

12 months, have you done any of the following? (1) Contacted a politician, government or local government official, (2) Worked in a political party or action group? (3) Worked in another organization or association? (4) Donated money to a political organization or group? (5) Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker? The additive index ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating more politically active respondents.

Uninstitutionalized Action. Based on the following survey questions: 'There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?: (1) Taken part in a lawful public demonstration? (2) Boycotted certain products? (3) Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons? (4) Participated in illegal protest activities? (5) Signed a petition?' The additive index ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating more politically active respondents.

Citizen. Based on survey question: 'Are you a citizen of [country]?' 1: 'Yes', 0 'Otherwise'.

Foreign-born. Based on survey question: 'Were you born in this country?' 0: 'Yes', 1: 'No or no answer'.

Foreign-born Citizen. Based on two survey questions: 'Are you a citizen of [country]?' and 'Were you born in [country]?' Respondents who answered 'Yes' to the first question and 'No' or gave no answer to the second were coded 1, Otherwise 0.

Foreign-born Non-citizen. Based on two survey questions: 'Are you a citizen of [country]?' and 'Were you born in [country]?' Respondents who answered 'No' or gave no answer to both questions were coded 1, Otherwise 0.

Native-born Citizen. Based on two survey questions: 'Are you a citizen of [country]?' and 'Were you born in [country]?' Respondents who answered 'Yes' to both questions were coded 1, Otherwise 0.

Recent Immigrant. Based on survey question: 'How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?' 5 'within last year', 4 '1–5 years ago', 3 '6–10 years ago', 2 '11–20 years ago', 1 'more than 20 years ago'.

Democracy in Country of Origin. Based on the following survey questions: 'Were you born in [country]?' If a respondent answered 'No', then the follow-up question was: 'In which country were you born?' – and 'How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?' Information about immigrant country of origin and the timing of immigrant arrival was matched up with the polity scores from the Polity IV dataset <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/>. Since the ESS survey was conducted in 2002 and the timing of immigrant arrival is a categorical variable that captures only approximate number of years in host country, those who arrived more than twenty years ago were assigned an average value of their origin country 1972–81 polity score, those who arrived 11–20 years ago an average 1982–91, those who arrived 6–10 years ago an average 1992–96 score, those who arrived 1–5 years ago an average 1997–2001 score, and those who arrived within the last year a 2002 score. This generated a variable measuring the level of democracy in immigrant country of origin that ranges from 0 'least democratic regime' to 20 'most democratic regime' (recoded from the original polity measure that ranges from –10 to +10).

Geographic Distance from Country of Origin. We used the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) dyadic country data on geodesic distances to measure geographic distance between foreigner's host country and country of origin in the ESS data (in thousands of kilometres). We relied on the CEPII 'simple distance' measure calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population). For more information, please see <http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm>.

Foreign-born Parents. Based on two survey items measuring whether respondent's father and mother are native-born. The variable ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 means that both parents are native-born, 1 'One parent is foreign-born' and 2 'Both parents are foreign-born'.

Discrimination. Based on survey question: 'Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?' 1 'Yes', 0 'No'.

Crime Victim. Based on survey question: 'Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?' 1 'Yes', 0 'No'.

Satisfaction with Democracy. Based on survey question: 'And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?' 0 'Extremely dissatisfied', 10 'Extremely satisfied'.

Age. Number of years.

Income. Based on survey question: 'Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?' 0 'Very difficult on present income', 1 'Difficult on present income', 2 'Coping on present income', 3 'Living comfortably on present income'.

Education. The highest level of education achieved: 0 'Not completed primary education', 6 'Second stage of tertiary education'.

Male. 1 'Male', 0 'Female'.

Married. 1 'Married', 0 'Otherwise'.

Unemployed. 1 'Not in paid work', 0 'Employed or self-employed'.

Urban. Based on respondent's description: 0 'Farm or home in countryside', 1 'Country village', 2 'Town or small city', 3 'Suburbs or outskirts of big city', 4 'A big city'.

Residential Stability. Number of years in current area of residence.

Social Connectedness. Based on survey question: 'How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?' 1 'Never', 2 'Less than once a month', 3 'Once a month', 4 'Several times a month', 5 'Once a week', 6 'Several times a week', 7 'Every day'.

Religiosity. Based on survey question: 'Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?' 11-category variable, ranging from 0 'Not at all religious' to 10 'Very religious'.

Religious Denomination. Based on two survey items: 'Have you ever considered yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?' If 'Yes' 'Which one?' Response categories were used to create dummy variables for Christians, Muslims, other religions and non-religious.

Foreign-born from an EU Country. Based on the following survey questions: 'Were you born in [country]?' If a respondent said 'No', then the follow up question was, 'In which country were you born?' Response categories were coded as 1 if a foreigner reported that he or she was born in a country that was an EU member state at the time of the survey (2002–03) and 0 'Otherwise'.

Foreign Population Size. Percentage of total population. Source: Eurostat 2001 Census data.

Citizenship Policies in Host Country. Citizenship Policy Index.⁶⁶ Additive index based on three indicators: (a) citizenship by birth 0 'Not allowed' 1 'Allowed'; (b) residency requirement for naturalization: countries that require at least ten years are coded 0 'Difficult'; those that require six to nine years of residence are coded 1 'Medium', and those that require five years or less are coded 2 'Easy'; (c) acceptance of dual citizenship for immigrants: 0 'No' 1 'Yes'. The resulting variable ranges from 0 'Restrictive citizenship policies' to 6 'Liberal citizenship policies'.

New Democracy. Dichotomous variable: respondents from two newer democracies in our sample – the Czech Republic and Slovenia – were assigned a value of 1, otherwise 0.

GDP per Capita. Based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2000 international dollars (in 1000s) in 2002. Source: *World Bank Development Indicators*, World Bank (2005) CD-ROM.

Economic Growth. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP in 2002. Source: *World Bank Development Indicators*, World Bank (2005) CD-ROM.

Government Expenditure (% of GDP). General government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 2002. It includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditure on national defence and security, but excludes government military expenditure that is part of government formation. Source: *World Bank Development Indicators*, World Bank (2005) CD-ROM.

⁶⁶ Howard, *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*, see also Howard, 'Comparative Citizenship. Citizenship' and Marc Morjé Howard, 'Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies in the Countries of the EU', *International Migration Review*, 39 (2005), 697–720.