


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Redefining the Nation: Shifting Boundaries of the ‘Other’ in Greece and Turkey

IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS

The emergence of Greek and Turkish nationalisms, key events in the decline of the Ottoman Empire, was conditioned by a set of divergent historical and political circumstances. Greek nationalism was – in its early stages – a primarily diaspora movement and an effect of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It aimed at spreading the ideals which had gained so much appeal among Europe’s progressive circles, liberate and simultaneously define the Greek nation. Turkish nationalism was born during the nineteenth century, as the consecutive territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire and a creeping *zeitgeist* change made clear to a part of Ottoman Turkish elite that the survival of the Empire as a multiethnic state was highly questionable and a Turkish nation-state had to be carved out of it. Membership of both nations varied over time as criteria for defining who is a Greek and who is a Turk changed.

Zimmer has suggested a useful analytical tool for explaining the ‘process-like nature of national identities’ as shifts of national identities. He introduced ‘voluntaristic’ and ‘organic boundary mechanisms’, which nationalists employ to define the national self and other in a rather constructivist or deterministic way. These are understood as Weberian ideal-types rather than as classification schemes. To define the nation inclusively or exclusively, one could variably utilize symbolic resources, such as political values/institutions, culture, history and geography. These provide the ‘symbolic raw material’ for the discursive construction of national identities in the public realm. Zimmer argued that this distinction could heal the weakness of the classical dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism when employed to explore national identity through public discourse. It could also help explain how the same symbolic resource could be used at different historical periods to address different political problems by expanding or contracting the concept of the ‘other’.¹

This study aims to explore the influence of voluntaristic and organic models on the formation of Greek and Turkish national identities. Following the model of Zimmer, it will more specifically examine how inclusive and exclusive boundary mechanisms have shaped Greek and Turkish national identity and variably affected the position of non-dominant groups. It will be argued that a shift from the predominance of

voluntaristic to that of organic models is observed in both cases. Both nationalisms initially used culture and political values on a voluntaristic basis for the construction of respective national identities. Eventually, however, the definition of the 'other' in both cases took increasingly organic dimensions. Coreligionists who did not wish to assimilate but insisted on maintaining their linguistic or ethnic identity were treated as 'others'. In Greece, this issue related to the treatment of its small ethno-linguistic minority groups, as well as the popular reaction to the immigration wave which transformed Greek society in the 1990s. The case of an Albanian immigrant pupil is explored to illustrate this process. In Turkey, as non-Muslim minorities had diminished and immigration had not reached significant dimensions, the role of the 'other' was eventually taken over by Turkey's Kurdish minority. To prove the point, the Nevruz events of March 2005 are used as an illustration. This study aims to identify a pattern of historic-political conditions which favour a shift from voluntaristic towards organic models. The demise of imperial order, the failure of grand nationalist projects, migration and incomplete liberalization efforts facilitate a shift towards exclusive conceptions of national identity, which also means increasing pressure towards immigrants and minorities.

Greek nationalism was a product of the European intellectual fermentation of the eighteenth century and in its early stages was heavily influenced by French republican nationalism. The convolution of French civic ideals and the *millet*² tradition did not allow ethnicity to become a defining element of Greek national identity during the Neohellenic Enlightenment and the Independence War years. In the work of Rigas Velestinlis,³ the boundary mechanism for the delineation of Greek national identity was voluntaristic and deduced its symbols from republican political values and institutions. The Ottoman territories comprised the common 'fatherland' (*patrie*), which would form the core of the new republic. The 'other' in the civic nation that Rigas envisioned was the Ottoman *ancien regime*, the despotic state which did not leave any room for individual autonomy and freedom. Christian, Muslim and Jewish adherents of French republican principles were invited to join forces, overthrow the Ottoman rule and establish a republic based on reason and a civic form of Hellenic civilization.⁴

This civic conceptualization of Greek national identity did not prevail, as *millet*-based divisions of the Ottoman society proved much stronger than the appeal of French republican ideals across the Ottoman *millets*. The boundary mechanism for the establishment of Greek national identity remained voluntaristic but only *within* the borders of the *Rum millet*. It became more restrictive, as culture and language were added to political values as key symbolic resources. All Balkan Christians were invited to join the Hellenic culture, learn Greek and thus become eligible for Greek citizenship. The importance of learning Greek is highlighted in several literary works of the Neohellenic Enlightenment. Some of them aimed specifically at the proliferation of Greek among non-Greek-speaking Christians. In the foreword of his tetralingual Greek–Vlach–Bulgarian–Albanian dictionary published in 1802, Daniel Moschopolitis extolled the virtues of Greek language and culture and invited all Balkan Christians to adopt them. He added that such a move would facilitate their upward social mobility within the *Rum millet*.⁵

Refocusing on the *Rum millet* meant that Christianity was restored as a basic identity criterion of the Greek nation. Therefore, the boundary drawn excluded not

only the despotic Ottoman Empire, but also its Muslim subjects. This fitted Ottoman social divisions and could be more easily popularized. According to Article 2§2 of the Constitution promulgated on 1 January 1822 at the First Revolutionary National Assembly in Epidaurus, 'the autochthonous residents of the Greek territory who believe in Jesus Christ are Greeks, enjoy all the civil rights without any limitation and difference'.⁶ Greek citizenship comprised thus an open invitation to all Ottoman Christians who were willing to join the revolutionary cause, regardless of their ethnic descent or mother tongue. Apart from the endurance of *millet* allegiances, this also reflected the diversity of the ethno-linguistic map of Ottoman Balkans.⁷ Through the appropriation of Greek language and culture, Balkan and Anatolian Christians could aspire to become full members of the Greek nation.

While culture and language were understood to be the key symbolic resources of Greek national identity, their content was disputed. Adamantios Korais, arguably the most influential intellectual of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, claimed that to reach its ancient glory the Greek nation had to rid itself of all Ottoman and Byzantine influences which had kept it apart from all intellectual developments in Western Europe, recover its ancient culture and establish a secular state under the name of 'Hellas'. The very reinvigoration of the terms 'Hellas' and 'Hellene' had major symbolic significance. In Korais' view Orthodoxy was not an indispensable condition of Greek national identity; on the contrary, it was an obstacle to the nation's modernization. In a similar vein, Korais championed a comprehensive language reform so that the vernacular Greek language would be relieved from all its medieval Ottoman and Byzantine influences. The new idiom called 'katharevousa' would be literally 'pure' of all foreign traces and adulterations.⁸

Korais' complete rejection of Greece's medieval heritage was not followed by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, the most influential Greek historian of the nineteenth century. In his *magnus opus* 'History of the Greek Nation', Paparrigopoulos attempted to reconcile ancient Greek and Byzantine historical legacies through the introduction of a 'Hellenic-Christian synthesis'.⁹ He also adopted the periodization of Greek history into ancient, medieval and modern, first suggested by the historian Spyridon Zambelios. In contrast to Korais, who had dismissed Orthodoxy, Paparrigopoulos subjugated Orthodoxy to Greek nationalism and made it a key element of Greek national identity. Despite the universalistic message of Orthodoxy which was then advanced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the newly-established Church of Greece facilitated the transformation of Orthodoxy into a cultural tool for the consolidation of Greek nationalism. In the nationalist visions of both Korais and Paparrigopoulos, language and culture remained major symbolic resources for the definition of Greek national identity. The delineation of the boundaries of Greek national identity remained voluntaristic *within* the borders of the *Rum millet*. This was necessary due to the launch of an ambitious nationalist project. The 'Great Idea' (*Megali Idea*), espoused the 're-civilization' of the Near East through the expansion of Greece. Through the recovery of Byzantine territories lost to the Ottomans, including its capital, and the restoration of a Hellenic Empire over the Ottoman territories, Greece would fulfil its *mission civilisatrice*. Greece's first Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis is considered to have introduced the concept. In the inaugural speech of the first Greek Constitution in January 1844 he fervently argued in front of the Greek Parliament in favour of the common destiny of Greeks

inside and outside the borders of the Kingdom of Greece. About 30 years later, Charles Tuckerman, the US Minister to Greece at the time, defined *Megali Idea* as follows:

Briefly defined the Great Idea means that the Greek mind is to regenerate the East – that it is the destiny of Hellenism to Hellenize that vast stretch of territory which by natural laws the Greeks believe to be theirs, and which is chiefly inhabited by people claiming to be descended from Hellenic stock, professing the Orthodox or Greek faith, or speaking the language.¹⁰

This project targeted all the Balkan and Anatolian Orthodox who were willing to adopt Hellenic culture and language. The complex and diverse reality of the Ottoman *Rum millet* was co-opted in favour of a nationalist ideology which hailed the renaissance of a Hellenic nation that aspired to a leading role, as well as a *mission civilisatrice* in South-eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The territorial expansion of Greece into Ottoman Balkan territories required a flexible approach towards local Christian populations, which often spoke Albanian, Bulgarian or Vlach. Co-opting these populations was a key element for the success of Greek expansionist strategies, so ethnic nationalism could not fit. Overlooking the element of language and ethnicity was in any case compatible with the *millet* legacy.

Naturally *Megali Idea* was also met with uncertainty and opposition in the Ottoman lands. Putting aside Ottoman reaction, competing Balkan nationalisms, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian and Albanian, fought for the loyalty of Ottoman Christians. Besides, the nationalist elite of the Kingdom of Greece could not yet claim ideological hegemony over the whole of Greek-speaking populations. The Ottoman Empire still hosted large, rich and educated Greek-speaking populations, some of whom met *Megali Idea* with suspicion. The Ecumenical Patriarchate and a part of the Ottoman Greek elite maintained their allegiance to their imperial *Orthodox* identity, which was irreconcilable with organic definitions of national identity. At least at the beginning, the Ecumenical Patriarchate spearheaded opposition to growing nationalisms within the *Rum millet*, as its spiritual and political authority was severely challenged.¹¹ The establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 precipitated the fragmentation of the *Rum millet* into several competing ethnic groups. In addition, the network of Athens-supported educational institutions proved a major –albeit sometimes insufficient– tool for the spread of Hellenic language, culture and national identity throughout the Ottoman Empire.¹²

The competition between the Hellenic and the *Rum* definitions of Greek national identity came to an abrupt end in the first decades of the twentieth century with the wars that led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. These marked the acceleration of the violent process of nation-state formation in the Ottoman domain. The defeat of the Greek military forces in Anatolia in August 1922, the 1923 Mandatory Population Exchange Agreement between Greece and Turkey and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne meant the end of *Megali Idea*, sealed the establishment of the hegemony of Hellenic national ideology over practically the totality of Greeks¹³ and triggered a transformation of Greek nationalism. Irredentism retreated to allow space for more introspective visions of Greek national identity.¹⁴ This meant that organic definitions of Greek national identity would gain impetus over voluntaristic ones. Cultural and

linguistic diversity became less tolerated, and this had its impact upon the treatment of minorities, linguistic and ethnic. Aiming to consolidate the Hellenization of recently annexed territories, a sweeping set of legislative measures renamed hundreds of towns and villages, changing their Bulgarian, Turkish or Albanian names into Greek. Slav Macedonians became victims of social discrimination and faced increasing assimilation pressures.¹⁵ The 1936–41 dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas and the Greek Civil War firmly established the preponderance of exclusive definitions of Greek national identity. It was in the Metaxas era that the claim of ethnic continuity from ancient to modern Greece became most explicit and a cult of ancient Greek civilization developed.¹⁶ The treatment of minority groups deteriorated sharply. The Second World War, Greece's occupation by Germany and the ensuing Civil War also contributed to the homogenization of the population. The vast majority of Greece's Jewish population perished in Nazi concentration camps or emigrated to Israel in the aftermath of the war.¹⁷ At the same time, minority groups, such as the Chams and Slav Macedonians, were expelled *en masse* on the grounds of their alleged collaboration with foreign occupation forces and/or the communist forces during the 1946–49 Civil War.¹⁸ This had major ramifications in the post-war treatment of minorities, which was also reflected in legislation. Article 19 of the Nationality Code, which was established by Legislative Decree 3370 in 1955, stated that a 'Greek citizen of non-Greek descent (*allogenis*) who left the Greek territory with no intent of return may be declared as having lost his Greek citizenship'. The article explicitly divided Greek citizens into two categories on the basis of their ethnic descent. Those of 'Greek descent' enjoyed a strong protection of their citizenship, while those who were deemed by state officials to be 'of non-Greek descent' faced the risk of losing their citizenship, regardless of their integration into the Greek nation. Through this Article thousands of members of Greece's minorities who had left the country for various reasons lost their Greek nationality. Following strong protests by human rights groups, the Article was abolished in 1998. Meanwhile, approximately 60,000 Greek citizens had lost their citizenship under its provisions, and the abolition had no retroactive effect.¹⁹

Things changed significantly in the 1990s, when Greek national identity was questioned under the pressure of three major events: the end of the Cold War, migration and European integration. The end of the Cold War meant that old nationalist disputes, which had remained frozen due to the bipolar division of Europe, could re-emerge. Greek society responded in a phobic manner to the revival of the Macedonian question following the demise of Yugoslavia.²⁰ In addition, the migration wave which swept Greece changed the country's social fabric. The influx of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Eastern and Southeastern Europe – particularly Albania – Asia and Africa resulted in the transformation of Greek society from being virtually mono-ethnic to become increasingly multiethnic and multicultural. For the first time since the homogenization brought about by wars and population exchanges in the early twentieth century, Greek society faced the challenge of accommodating large alien populations. Greece was transformed from a net exporter to a net importer of immigrant labour. The integration of these groups inevitably rekindled the discussion about the meaning of being Greek. Moreover, the process of European integration questioned Greek national identity from a totally different supranational perspective. It sparked discussions about the relationship of

Greece with the West and the Middle East and the complementarity of Greek and European identities.

The use of language and culture as symbolic resources of contemporary Greek nationhood was manifested in the case of the high-school student Odysseas Tsenai (Odhise Qenaj) that twice attracted media attention in the early 2000s and opened a nationwide debate on what it means to be Greek.²¹ A son of Albanian immigrants, living in the town of Nea Michaniona near Thessaloniki, Qenaj enrolled in a local state high school and became the best student in his class. The right to bear the Greek flag in national student parades – a relic of the Metaxas era – is reserved as a privilege for the best students of the ninth and twelfth grade. The prospect of him bearing the Greek flag in the student parade of 28 October 2000 provoked a fierce backlash within the local community. In their opinion, Qenaj could not carry the Greek flag because he was an ethnic Albanian and had no affiliation to it; he would never defend it in case of a war. Although the Minister of Education Petros Efthymiou supported the right of Qenaj to bear the flag, Qenaj finally opted not to antagonize the local community and withdrew. Even the intervention of the President of the Republic Konstantinos Stephanopoulos did not result in much support for him.²² The same situation occurred three years later in October 2003, when Qenaj again won the right to carry the Greek flag in the twelfth grade. Qenaj's classmates and the Parents and Guardians' Association of his high school objected to Qenaj's appointment and asked that the ministerial decision allowing foreign students to carry the Greek flag on national celebrations and parades be abolished. Eventually Qenaj withdrew again. As he said during a TV interview, he was forfeiting his right to bear the Greek flag because he had been put in a difficult position and simply wished to avert any possible incidents during the celebrations. He also expressed his disappointment that his case had divided the town community, which –he had thought– would have changed its position by now. In the meantime, Qenaj had been baptized an Orthodox. However, this decision did not alter the position of the local community which still viewed him as a foreigner.

Qenaj's double forfeiture of his right to bear the Greek flag reduced the tension but also showed the extent to which organic notions of national identity had spread in wide segments of Greek society. Despite the verbal support of high officials, local reaction did not dissipate and in the end prevailed. His appropriation of Greek language and culture, success in Greek public education, and signalled willingness to integrate into Greek society did not suffice. This was in stark contrast with the aforementioned argument of Moschopolitis who considered Greek language and culture as the touchstone for the integration of Balkan Christians into the Greek nation. Anti-immigrant fears were strong enough to convert Qenaj from a model immigrant teenager into a *sui generis* 'national threat'.

What is more interesting is Qenaj's attempt to signal his willingness to fully integrate into the local community by being baptized. His membership of the Orthodox Church would have facilitated his integration, had voluntaristic boundary mechanisms continued to apply *within* the borders of existing *millets*. Nevertheless, organic boundary mechanisms were now applying even against coreligionists. His conversion to Orthodox Christianity failed to change the attitude of the Nea Michaniona community. Being a son of an Albanian immigrant, he was deemed permanently unfit to become a Greek.²³ His case illustrates the extent to which

foreign immigrants have become 'otherized' by Greek popular nationalist discourses in the aftermath of the Cold War. It also underlines the strength of organic boundary mechanisms in the definition of Greek national identity, which clearly diverge from the *millet* legacy. In the Ottoman era, Albanian-speaking Orthodox were considered to be an indispensable part of the *Rum millet*.

On the other hand, it needs to be mentioned that the Qenaj case served as a rallying point for politicians, intellectuals and civil society groups who favoured a redefinition of Greek national identity along more voluntaristic lines. Pointing at the emerging multiethnic and multicultural character of post-Cold War Greece, they argued that Greek society should become more inclusive of those immigrants who had joined it and adopted its culture and language. In the Qenaj case, both sides used language and culture as essential symbolic resources of Greek national identity. While the Nea Michaniona community expressed an organic understanding of Greek national identity, voluntaristic understandings of Greek national identity were expressed by a diverse group of politicians, intellectuals and civil society groups. Given the increasing diversification of Greek society and rising participation of immigrants' children in Greek public education, the issue remained in public discourse. It attracted again a lot of attention when the newly-elected PASOK government announced in late 2009 its intention to reform the Greek Nationality Code with the aim to facilitate the acquisition of Greek citizenship by immigrants. The amended Nationality Code came into force in March 2010.

A parallel shift from voluntaristic to organic definitions of national identity is also observed in the case of Turkey. Since the late Ottoman years, symbolic resources have been employed for both inclusive and exclusive definitions of Ottoman and Turkish identity. Early Ottoman reformers espoused Ottomanism, a voluntaristic, civic version of institutional Ottoman patriotism based on common political values and geography. Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims would be treated as equal citizens and members of a religion- and ethnicity-free Ottoman nation. This was suggested by the *Tanzimat* reforms, in particular the Imperial Rescript (*Hatt-ı Hümayun*) of 1856, which clearly stated in its first article:

The guarantees promised on our part by the Imperial Rescript of the Rose Bower and the laws of the *Tanzimat* to all the subjects of my Empire, without distinction of class or religion, for the security of their persons and their property and the preservation of their honour, are today being confirmed and consolidated, and efficacious measures shall be taken in order that they may have their full and entire effect.²⁴

The most outspoken representative of Ottomanism was Prince Sabahaddin. He advocated a federalized, decentralized Ottoman state, where the Ottoman sultan would become a symbolic head of state, the equivalent of the British monarch.²⁵ Ottomanism remained the official state policy and maintained its appeal among Ottoman liberals who thought that an Ottoman religion- and ethnic-blind citizenship was not a chimerical target and was the only possible way to forestall the imminent disintegration of the Ottoman *patrie* along national lines.²⁶

Organic boundary mechanisms were applied by pan-Islamism, which advocated the unification of all Muslims under the Ottoman Sultan in his function as Caliph,

and pan-Turkism, which aimed to unite all Turkic peoples under the same state. One of the thinkers whose work contributed to the rise of pan-Islamism was Namık Kemal, a leading figure of the Young Ottoman movement and one of the most influential Ottoman intellectuals of the nineteenth century. While he was profoundly influenced by Enlightenment ideas, Namık Kemal did not consider Islam to be responsible for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, he viewed the restoration of true Islamic faith as the foundation of an Ottoman renaissance. In his writings, Namık Kemal popularized the terms ‘*vatan*’ and ‘*millet*’, giving to them the equivalent meaning of *patrie* and *nation*.²⁷ In his play ‘*Vatan yahut Silistre*’, the Danubian provinces of the Ottoman Empire become a part of the Ottoman *patrie*. Namık Kemal urged Ottoman citizens to rally around the *vatan* and defend it against foreign invasion. Yet what he understood as Ottoman citizen differed from Ottomanism. His appeal primarily extended to Ottoman Muslims. Thus he applied a voluntaristic boundary mechanism *within* the Muslim *millet*, while he excluded Ottoman Christians on the basis of their religion. In Namık Kemal’s Ottoman *patrie*, Ottoman Christians would be tolerated, but they would not form a constituent part of the Ottoman nation.²⁸

Pan-Turkism, which aimed to unite all Turkic peoples under Ottoman sovereignty, found its staunchest supporters in Ismail Gaspiralı and Yusuf Akçura, both Russia-born Tatar intellectuals. In Akçura’s famous essay on the future path of Turkish nationalism ‘*Üç Tarz-i Siyaset*’ (Three Ways of Politics), he clearly rejected Ottomanism and concomitantly the voluntaristic use of boundary mechanisms for the shaping of Ottoman national identity.²⁹ In his later works, he declared his preference of pan-Turkism as the foundational element of Turkish national identity. Organic boundary mechanisms focusing on Turkic culture and history were employed with the aim to exclude not only non-Muslim Ottomans, but also non-Turkish Ottoman Muslims.

Ottomanism remained the line advocated – in public, at least – by the leaders of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. Yet it was soon abandoned in view of subsequent political and military developments. The outbreak of the Balkan Wars resulted in heavy territorial losses for the Empire against the Balkan Christian nation-states. Ottomanism was abandoned, and the transformation of the Ottoman state into a Turkish nation-state became the new task. Turkish nationalists took the chance to put forward their national homogenization programme through massacres and displacements of non-Muslims.³⁰ Under the pressure of military defeat, organic definitions of national identity gained an advantage. Culture and language remained major symbolic resources of Turkishness. This became clear in the policies of the Young Turk governments, especially following the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in October 1912.

Culture was elevated to the basic principle of Turkish nationalism by Ziya Gökalp. Born in the city of Diyarbakır, Gökalp, who had Kurdish ethnic origins, is considered the intellectual father of republican Turkish nationalism. In the words of Parla, he was ‘the official ideologue of the Committee of Union and Progress and the unofficial ideologue of the Kemalists’.³¹ His theory of cultural Turkish nationalism evolved in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, when it was becoming increasingly clear that Ottomanism was bound to fail. Gökalp attempted to compromise Turkish nationalism with modernity and Islam by differentiating between civilization

(*medeniyet*), culture (*hars*) and religion (*din*). He defined civilization in technological and political terms. Culture was the set of values and beliefs which define a people and restricted religion into its essential content. The Turkish nation should adopt Western civilization and rediscover its own Turkish culture, which had faded under the influence of Arab culture. Islam had to be dissociated from Arab culture and restricted to the private sphere.³²

With Gökalp, culture becomes the essential symbolic resource for the definition of Turkishness. However, the boundary mechanism of Turkish national identity differs from Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. It remains voluntaristic in the case of Muslims, while it becomes organic in the case of non-Muslims. Full integration and citizen rights were available to all Muslim citizens of republican Turkey regardless of their ethnic or linguistic origins, provided they adopted the two key symbolic resources of Turkish national identity, Turkish language and culture. The highest ranks of government and bureaucracy were amenable to Turkish citizens of Kurdish, Arab, Circassian, Albanian or Laz descent, who had internalized the principles of Kemalist republican nationalism and were willing to adopt Turkish national identity. Nonetheless, those who wished to maintain their ethnic or linguistic identity encountered state discrimination.³³ The resettlement of non-Turkish-speaking Muslims in Anatolia was carefully planned so that their languages would be assimilated into Turkish. In addition, emphasis was given on the honour and benefits of being a Turk and speaking Turkish.³⁴ The suppression of several Kurdish uprisings in the early republican years provided evidence of republican Turkish resolve to continue the homogenization programme of all its non-Turkish Muslim ethnic and linguistic groups. Recognizing equal citizenship rights for all Muslims was also a familiar reverberation of the Ottoman *millet* system, yet Islam had lost its primacy in republican nation-building policies, and citizenship could now be based exclusively on republican Turkish principles.

Anti-minority policies which followed in the republican period were a continuation and elaboration of analogous measures taken in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.³⁵ However, this was not the case for members of the three officially recognized non-Muslim minorities, Armenians, Greeks and Jews, as well as Assyrians, Catholics and Protestants. An organic understanding of Turkish national identity was the guiding principle behind measures referring to the non-Muslim minorities which had remained in republican Turkey. Non-Muslims were deemed non-assimilable and persistently suspected as 'internal enemies' (*iç düşmanlar*). Even in cases where some minority members expressed their will to assimilate to Turkish culture and language, this was not welcomed by state authorities. Republican state policies aimed to minimize the role of non-Muslims in Turkish economy and eventually force them into emigration.³⁶ In 1934, the 'Resettlement Law' (*İskân Kanunu*) aimed to forcefully relocate the Jews from Thrace and the Marmara region to Istanbul. Similar measures were also taken for the small surviving Armenian populations of Anatolia. Campaigns such as the 'Citizen speak Turkish' (*Vatandaş Türkçe konuş*) campaign aimed to eliminate the public use of minority languages. In 1942 an extraordinary Property Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) was imposed, allegedly to tax wartime profiteering. Its real aim though was the economic decimation of the vibrant non-Muslim merchant class of Istanbul.³⁷ About a decade later, on 6–7 September 1955, a pogrom against Istanbul Greeks on the pretext of the bombing of Kemal

Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki dealt a heavy blow to both the Greek population of Istanbul and the democratic face of republican Turkey.³⁸ Such state policies embedded the 'otherizing' of Turkey's non-Muslim minorities. Various terms were coined to display their inferior status: 'local foreigners' (*yerli yabancılar*), 'citizens of foreign origin' (*yabancı uyruklu vatandaşlar*), 'guest citizens' (*misafir vatandaşlar*). These terms appeared in court decisions and other official documents.³⁹ In the long run, this also resulted in the stigmatization of the term 'minority' in Turkish public discourse.

While the policy of marginalizing non-Muslims largely met with success, the assimilation of Turkey's Muslim minorities came under question. Since the 1960s, the Kurdish nationalist movement has succeeded in forestalling the assimilation of a large number of Turkish citizens of Kurdish descent and developing a Kurdish national identity. A part of it, the Kurdish Workers Party (*Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan* – PKK) has challenged Turkish sovereignty in the south-eastern and eastern provinces of Turkey. The response of the Turkish state to the rise of Kurdish nationalism involved the use of Islamic culture as symbolic resource of Turkishness. The elaboration of a 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*) highlighted the role of Islamic culture in the formation of Turkish national identity. This culture, which was perceived as the common heritage of all the Muslims of Turkey, comprised the key cementing factor of an all-inclusive Turkish nation. This model was matched by an intensification of repression against those Kurds who refused to assimilate.

The improvement of EU–Turkey relations and Turkey's wish to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership helped bring an end to the systematic persecution of the Kurdish minority. The new social environment allowed for substantial reforms, which included liberalization in minority rights legislation and the opening of a debate on Turkish national identity. Views advocating a voluntaristic basis for Turkishness gained impetus and culminated with the publication of a report advocating a civic understanding of Turkish national identity, based not on Turkish ethnic descent but on citizenship of the Republic of Turkey (*Türkiyelilik*).⁴⁰ These efforts aimed to heal the mounting tension between Turks and Kurds and sparked an unprecedented public debate on the topic. While the reform process slowed considerably after 2005, the launch of *TRT Şeş*, a Kurdish-language state television channel, in January 2009 provided evidence that the reform process was not derailed. In fact, in early 2009 the Turkish government announced a new initiative, the 'Kurdish Opening' (*Kürt Açılımı*). This comprised a set of measures aiming to promote Kurdish minority rights. Among several measures discussed, a partial amnesty was included. On 19 October 2009, a group of 34 PKK members were allowed to enter Turkey without being arrested. Yet later the initiative seemed to lose traction due to stiff opposition by the major opposition parties and the opposition of a large part of Turkish public opinion. The closure of the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (DTP) by the Constitutional Court on 11 December 2009 introduced a serious additional obstacle.

Opposition to minority rights reform was often linked to organic understandings of Turkish national identity and remained popular in social discourse. These coincided with rising anti-Kurdish sentiment in the 1990s, linked to the peak of PKK activity and military operations in south-eastern Anatolia. Incidents in which high tension between Turks and Kurds were observed became increasingly common.

At times, this seemed to present a serious threat to Turkey's social stability and cohesion. Not only PKK sympathizers but all Kurds became targets of Turkish nationalist groups. Incidents of anti-Kurdish violence expressed a wider feeling of resentment in Turkish society⁴¹ This was further strengthened by developments in Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion. The prospect of Kurdish autonomy or independence in Northern Iraq raised fears for Turkish territorial integrity.⁴² In addition, persistent EU interest in the recognition and full respect of Kurdish minority rights in Turkey also antagonized Turkish nationalists who attempted to present Turkey's Kurdish question as an EU tool for the destabilization of Turkey. Last but not least, steps towards better protection of Kurdish minority rights in the context of Turkey's EU accession process caused a reaction among a large part of Turkey's population. Under these circumstances, organic boundary mechanisms were employed to 'otherize' a Muslim group for the first time in republican Turkish history. As Turkey's non-Muslims had fallen into numerical and social insignificance, Kurds substituted them in Turkish nationalist discourse. They represented the new 'other', the new 'internal enemy' (*iç düşman*)⁴³ of Turkish nationalism.

A manifestation of the popularity of organic understandings of Turkish national identity was a new trend observed in March 2005. *Nevruz* (*Newroz* in Kurdish), the traditional celebration for the beginning of spring, has often become the setting for Kurdish nationalist demonstrations.⁴⁴ The March 2005 festivities devolved into violent clashes with the police in several Turkish cities when some demonstrators appeared with PKK flags and portraits of the PKK's incarcerated leader Abdullah Öcalan. The incident which attracted the biggest attention took place in Mersin, a city in southern Turkey with a large Kurdish immigrant population. During a demonstration a small group of Kurdish children attempted to burn a Turkish flag but were stopped by a plain-clothes police officer. On the following day, the Turkish military intervened. A statement of the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök addressed to the 'Great Turkish Nation' noted:

The innocent activities organized to celebrate the arrival of spring have been turned by a group devoid of values ... into an attack against the Turkish flag, the symbol of the sublime Turkish nation. ... In its long history, the Turkish nation has gone through good and bad days, treasons as well as victories. However, it has never faced such a heinous act committed by its own *pseudo-citizens* in its own homeland.⁴⁵

The government and opposition leaders fully supported the statement of the Chief of Staff, and a nationwide rally around the Turkish flag was launched. A video recording of the incident was repeatedly broadcast by national electronic media with the aim to raise popular wrath and participation in demonstrations aiming to restore the respect due to Turkey's national symbol. The Higher Council for Radio and Television (*Radio-Televizyon Üst Kurulu* – RTÜK) requested that all television channels display a Turkish flag on their programmes. Flag rallies were organized while thousands of Turkish flags were displayed in flats, cars and public buildings for many days.⁴⁶

At the same time, anti-Kurdish sentiment reached a peak and frequently turned into violence. Violent demonstrations were organized by far-right groups in Mersin

and several other Turkish cities with significant Kurdish populations. On 6 April 2005 five young members of the leftist association TAYAD distributing leaflets protesting against prison conditions were barely saved from lynching in Trabzon by a mob which thought that they were Kurds about to desecrate the Turkish flag. On several occasions, the offices of the pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi* – DEHAP) were attacked by mobsters in several cities, while Kurdish immigrants in western Turkey became the target of nationalist wrath. In August 2005, five Kurds were almost lynched following a row with locals in Seferihisar, a small town in western Turkey. In September 2005, in the western Anatolian town of Bozüyük, members of far-right groups ambushed two buses carrying Kurdish activists aiming to organize a demonstration in support of the imprisoned leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan. One of the buses was set on fire and tens of people suffered injuries. Numerous similar incidents of a smaller scale raised serious concerns about peace and social stability.⁴⁷

While the level of anti-Kurdish violence was alarming, the language introduced by the military statement had also wider implications. The expression 'pseudo-citizen' (*sözde vatandaş*) was reminiscent of the terms 'local foreigner' (*yerli yabancı*) or 'foreign citizen' (*yabancı vatandaş*) which were often used for non-Muslim minorities in state documents.⁴⁸ This underlined a new rising attitude against the Kurds. In republican Turkey, Kurds were usually invited to jettison their distinct ethnic and linguistic features and join mainstream national identity. A voluntaristic definition of Turkish national identity was applied. Kurds were seen as 'prospective Turks' (*müstakbel Türkler*) in terms of their ability to assimilate into mainstream Turkish national identity, as long as they adopted the Turkish nation's symbolic resources, language, culture and Kemalist political values. Now they were increasingly seen as the 'enemy within' and 'pseudo-citizens'.⁴⁹ As organic understandings of Turkish national identity were no longer directed towards non-Muslim citizens only, the Kurds were seen as unfit to become real Turkish citizens in the eyes of not only extreme nationalists, but also military bureaucrats. This contradicted decades-long state policies which favoured the homogenization of Turkey's Kurdish population into the mainstream national identity and highlighted the appeal of organic boundary mechanisms for defining Turkish national identity.

Opinions defending a more inclusive, voluntaristic understanding of Turkish national identity were also strong. They became particularly pronounced in the context of Turkey's EU accession process and its need to comply with the 'Copenhagen Criteria', which included protection of minority rights. Their public appeal became, however, a function of the reform process and EU–Turkey relations. The deceleration of Turkey's EU accession negotiations had an impact on the Turkish government's willingness to confront deep-rooted nationalist sensitivities by championing significant reforms in the field of minority rights, as well as a new multicultural citizenship. Repeated efforts of the AKP government to reach a breakthrough in the Kurdish question only highlighted the pressing nature of the problem. The launch and withering of the government's 2009 'Kurdish Opening' manifested its intentions as well as its limitations.

Following the model suggested by Zimmer, this study has explored the shift from voluntaristic to organic boundary mechanisms for the definition of Greek and Turkish national identities and concomitantly the definition of the 'other' in both

nationalist discourses. These processes shared significant commonalities. At the beginning of nationalist awakening, which took place in the Ottoman imperial setting, Greek and Turkish national identities were defined on a voluntaristic basis initially *across* the Ottoman *millet*s, but eventually *within* their respective limits. This was a result of the long-lasting *millet*-based identification of Ottoman populations, which French republican values could not overwhelm. In addition, it was a result of the aim to maximize the appeal of their irredentist claims against populations which had strong religious but uncertain national affiliations. The adoption of the national language and culture could make up for linguistic and ethnic, but not for religious diversity. With the transition from the imperial to the nation-state era and the collapse of grand nationalist projects though, both nationalisms reduced their ambitions and scope, became introverted and increasingly exclusive. Symbolic resources such as language and culture were invoked as organic boundary mechanisms for the definition of national identity. Ethnic and linguistic minorities, which had been appealed to in the process of nationalist irredentism, and immigrant groups became targets of assimilation policies. Even the *millet* legacy proved unable to forestall the 'otherization' of coreligionists who claimed a distinct linguistic and/or ethnic background. Under these conditions, a pattern of historic-political conditions emerges which favours a transition from voluntaristic towards organic models.

First, the end of the imperial era reduces the scope of nationalist projects within narrower borders. Nationalists lose interest in promoting the proliferation of national language and culture beyond the borders of their nation-states, while symbolic resources are employed to identify the nation on an organic basis. The impact of the failure of grand nationalist projects is similar. The failure of the *Megali Idea* and pan-Islamism meant that Greek and Turkish nationalist projects would have to limit their territorial ambitions and would not have to assimilate disparate populations whose common characteristic was often only religion. Transition towards an organic understanding of national identity was also helped by the population movements which highlighted the end of the imperial era. The expulsion of minorities and massacres, which were often the result of clashing nationalist projects, reduced the diversity of nascent nation-states.

Moreover, migration and incomplete or ongoing liberalization efforts often become triggers for the articulation of organic understandings of national identity in public discourse. The emergence of sizeable immigrant populations in mono-cultural societies which gradually transform into multicultural ones have often met with the reaction of segments of the majority. These rally around symbolic resources of nationhood such as language and culture which are applied in an organic fashion. This is similar to the effect of incomplete democratic consolidation efforts, which is linked with improved protection of minority rights. Expanding the score of minority rights can also lead to a similar reaction to the extent that this initiative has not gained legitimacy in wide segments of the society.

While organic understandings of national identity are strong in both Greece and Turkey, public views championing voluntaristic models of national identity have also been pronounced. These have become stronger due to the process of Europeanization in both countries and the challenges posed by European integration. In Greece, the issue was raised during civil society campaigns on the recognition of the novel multicultural and multiethnic character of Greek society

and the rights of immigrants and minorities. In Turkey, these views gained impetus with the EU reform process in the early 2000s, which entailed sweeping changes in human and minority rights legislation. It culminated with the publication of the report which advocated a civic redefinition of Turkish national identity and the ensuing public debate. Given the current dynamics of national identity formation, voluntaristic models of defining Greek and Turkish national identities may become stronger in the near future. Such a development could be facilitated by the evolution of the European integration project and the forging of a civic, value-based European identity. This could resolve questions arising from the need to recognize Greece's transformation into a multiethnic and multicultural society, as well as full citizenship rights to the members of Turkey's minorities. While far from complete, the reform of the Greek Nationality Code and the 'Kurdish Opening' allude to that trend.

Notes

1. O. Zimmer, 'Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Approach to National Identity', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol.9, No.2 (2003), pp.177–81.
2. The *millet* system could be defined as the organizational framework of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and its religious communities.
3. Rigas Velestinlis was a writer, revolutionary and a leading figure of Neohellenic Enlightenment.
4. V. Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization and Orthodoxy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), pp.62–3.
5. P.M. Kitromilides, 'Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans', in M. Blinkhorn and T. Veremis (eds.), *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990), pp.26–7.
6. Interestingly there was no differentiation between Orthodox and Catholic Christians, despite the identification of the *Rum millet* with Orthodoxy.
7. Rigas himself was of Vlach extraction, while many of the leading figures of the Greek War of Independence were 'Arvanitai', Albanian-speaking members of the *Rum millet*, who lived in large parts of Southern and Western Greece.
8. V. Roudometof, 'From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453–1821', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol.16, No.1 (1998), pp.25–6.
9. K. Paparrigopoulos, *History of the Hellenic Nation* [Ιστορία Του Ελληνικού Έθνους] (Athens: Hermes [Ερμής], 1970).
10. C.W. Tuckerman, *The Greeks of Today* (New York: Putnam, 1872), p.120, cited in R.S. Peckham, 'Map Mania: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece: 1870–1922', *Political Geography*, Vol.19, No.1 (2000), p.85.
11. J.S. Koliopoulos and T. Veremis, *Greece, the Modern Sequel: From 1821 to the Present* (London: Hurst & Co., 2002), pp.145–8.
12. On this, see Kitromilides, 'Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans', pp.45–51, and S. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), pp.106–7.
13. On the transformation process of the *Rum millet* into the modern Greek nation, see R. Clogg, 'The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire', in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), and F. Benlisoy and S. Benlisoy, 'Millet-I Rum'dan Helen Ulusuna', in M.Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001).
14. Greek irredentist claims over Cyprus and southern Albania (or northern Epirus) were not able to maintain 'Megali Idea' in the key position it enjoyed in Greek national ideology until 1922.

15. A. Karakasidou, 'Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece: The Slavo-Macedonian "Non-Minority"', in R. Clogg (ed.), *Minorities in Greece: Aspect of a Plural Society* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002), pp.130–36.
16. Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece, the Modern Sequel*, p.136.
17. S. Bowman, 'Jews', in Clogg (ed.), *Minorities in Greece*.
18. U. Özkırmılı and S.A. Sofos, *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey* (London: Hurst and Co., 2008), pp.160–61.
19. N. Sitaropoulos, 'Freedom of Movement and the Right to a Nationality vs. Ethnic Minorities: The Case of Ex Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code', *European Journal of Migration and Law*, Vol.6, No.3 (2004), pp.205–6.
20. A. Triandafyllidou, 'National Identity and the "Other"', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.21, No.4 (1998), pp.604–7.
21. For more on this, see R. Tzanelli, "'Not My Flag!'" Citizenship and Nationhood in the Margins of Europe', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.29, No.1 (2006, pp.27–31).
22. Stephanopoulos quoted the famous definition of Hellenicity by Isocrates, according to which 'the name of the Greeks has come to characterize not an ethnic group but a mindset, and Greeks are called those who are participants in our culture and not our common ethnic descent'. See K. Kantouris, 'Clamour About Odysseas' ... Odyssey' [Κατακραυγή για την ... Οδύσσεια του Οδυσσέα], *Ta Nea* [Ta Nea], 30 Oct. 2000.
23. This was in stark contrast with the open invitation which Greek nationalism extended in the nineteenth century to Albanian-speaking Christians to join Greek language, culture and national identity.
24. B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd edition (Oxford, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.134.
25. *Ibid.*, p.204.
26. The legacy of the *millet* system had made the use of civic-political values as symbolic resources extremely difficult when it referred to forging a new nation across the millet divides.
27. E.J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, New edition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.68.
28. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp.336–40.
29. Y. Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976).
30. M. Belge, 'Türkiye'de Zenofobi ve Milliyetçilik', in T. Bora (ed.), *Milliyetçilik* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), p.186.
31. K. Ünüvar, 'Ziya Gökalp', in Bora (ed.), *Milliyetçilik*, p.30.
32. Z. Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Istanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2001), pp.37–53.
33. M. Saatçi, 'Nation-States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol.8, No.4 (2002), pp.557–9.
34. A. Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), pp.286–90.
35. T. Bora, "'Ekalliyet Yılanları": Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Azınlıklar', in Bora (ed.), *Milliyetçilik*, pp.911–13.
36. A. Aktar, *Türk Milliyetçiliği, Gayrimüslimler ve Ekonomik Dönüşüm* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2006).
37. A. Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2000), pp.140–41.
38. For more on these events, see D. Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6–7 Eylül Olayları* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2006).
39. B. Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama* (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004b), pp.74–6.
40. On this, see B. Oran, 'Azınlık Hakları ve Kültürel Haklar Raporu'nun Bütün Öyküsü', *Birikim*, No.188 (2004, pp.17–25), and I.N. Grigoriadis, 'Türk or Türkiyeli? The Reform of Turkey's Minority Legislation and the Rediscovery of Ottomanism', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.43, No.3 (2007), pp.427–30.
41. Kurds were often accused of corrupting morality in the areas they migrated to, masterminding all criminal activities in Turkey, exercising terror and violence on peaceful Turkish populations and eventually aiming to marginalize the Turks in their own country through the increase of their population into a majority due to higher birth rates. For more information on these opinions, see T. Bora, "'Kitle İmhaları Yok Etmek Lazım" – Gelişen Anti-Kürt Hıncı Üzerine', *Birikim*, No.191 (2005), pp.36–43. A comprehensive account of the course of Turkish ethnic nationalism in the 1990s can be found in T. Bora and K. Can, *Devlet ve Kuzgun-1990'lardan 2000'lere MHP* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004).

42. Bora, “‘Kitle İmhalarla Yok Etmek Lazım’”, pp.43–5.
43. M. Yeğen, ‘Türklük ve Kürtler: Bugün’, *Birikim*, No.188 (2004), pp.32–5.
44. After failing to suppress the celebrations, Turkish authorities attempted to control and appropriate the celebrations by claiming that they were essentially ‘Turkic’. On the invention of the Nevruz tradition, see L.K. Yanık, “‘Nevruz’ or ‘Newroz’? Deconstructing the ‘Invention’ of a Contested Tradition in Contemporary Turkey’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.42, No.2 (2006, pp.285–6).
45. Ankara Bürosu, ‘Genelkurmay: Bayrak Sevgimizi Sınamayın-Türk Milleti Böyle Alçaklık Görmedi’, *Milliyet*, 23 March 2005.
46. I.N. Grigoriadis, ‘Upsurge Amidst Political Uncertainty: Nationalism in Post-2004 Turkey’, *SWP Research Paper 2006*, No.11 (2006), p.13.
47. M. Çelikkan, ‘Kürt Sorunu’, *Radikal*, 26 March 2005; İstanbul Bürosu, ‘Olaylar Artıyor Yetkililer Bakıyor’, *Radikal*, 9 Sept. 2006.
48. Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar*, pp.74–6.
49. On this also see, M. Yeğen, *Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde Vatandaş: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), pp.74–82.