DUAL ALLEGIANCES?
IMMIGRANTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE

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Abstract
While increased levels of migration in many European democracies have generated a growing body of research into the causes of anti-immigrant attitudes among native populations, we know surprisingly little about attitudes immigrants themselves hold towards immigration. How immigrants think about the issue of immigration is important because it affects the prospects of their political alliances and the effectiveness of advocacy on their behalf. We focus on two competing motivations that may underlie migrants’ attitudes about immigration: their kinship, solidarity, and shared experiences with other immigrants, but also their allegiance toward the host society. The former should lead to more favorable attitudes about immigration; the latter is likely to have the opposite effect. We examine these propositions using the European Social Survey (ESS) three-round cumulative data collected between 2002 and 2006 in 23 European democracies. We find that foreign-born individuals have more positive attitudes toward immigrants and immigration than natives. At the same time, we find that immigrants’ concerns about immigration are shaped by economic and political considerations in ways that are consistent with the literature on anti-immigration sentiment among native populations. Moreover, these effects are particularly strong among immigrants who have acquired citizenship status in their host society.

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Europe is struggling with the advent of global migration. In the aftermath of the Cold War, both through active attempts on the part of the European Union and because of pressures of migration from countries around the world, Europe’s stock of immigrant born populations increased by almost fifty percent between 1990 and 2005, representing 43.6 millions of individuals who are spread across the European continent (World Bank 2008).¹ Literally from all over the world, their proportion of the population ranges from less than five percent in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, or Finland, to more than 10 percent in countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Sweden – with proportions as high as or higher than those found in traditional immigration countries such as the United States. In a reversal from earlier centuries, Europe clearly has become a continent of immigration, with net gains in population primarily driven by increasing numbers of new arrivals (e.g. Franchino 2009).

These arrivals have upended many comfortable and well-worn practices and thinking. In particular, the exclusion of large populations of foreign citizens have questioned the commitment of many receiving countries to uphold core liberal democratic values of equal treatment (Freeman 1995) as well as international norms and rules (Soysal 1994), and thus have challenged governments to contend with the practicalities of absorbing immigrants. How migrants become incorporated into the political, social, and economic fabrics of host societies has long been a question for social scientists, and one that has taken on increasing importance with the above-mentioned changes in the real world. In particular, scholars have long sought to understand why some countries’ populations are more hospitable to foreigners, before and after they arrive, and why others seek to protect their shores from migrants.

Researchers have commonly assumed that hospitable natives facilitate the smooth and successful political integration of new arrivals so crucial for the quality and stability of democratic life in countries with sizable immigrant populations. As a consequence, previous literature has

¹ This has been variously translated as “Two souls alas! are dwelling in my breast; And each is fain to leave its brother” or “In my bosom two spirits are contending, each attempting to separate from the other.”
predominantly focused their attention on the effects that changing patterns of immigration may have on the attitudes and behavior of native populations or on the restrictiveness of immigration policies in Europe and elsewhere. Yet, how immigrants themselves relate to each other and to the issue of immigration is important, too, because it affects the prospects of their political alliances and the effectiveness of advocacy on their behalf. While immigrants and natives are part of the process of incorporation, we know little about how the opinions native-born populations hold about immigrants and immigration compare to those of foreigners, and we know even less about the patterns of immigration-related attitudes among immigrants themselves.

Below, we argue that migrants’ attitudes are marked by two competing motivations: their kinship, solidarity, and shared experiences with other immigrants, but also their allegiance toward the host society. The former should lead to more favorable attitudes about immigration; the latter may well have the opposite effect. In particular, we hypothesize that the formal incorporation via citizenship is associated with a more critical stance toward immigration, and this effect is particularly pronounced among foreign-born individuals who have a negative view of the state of the economy and right-with political orientations.

We examine these propositions using the European Social Survey (ESS) three-round cumulative data collected between 2002 and 2006 in 23 European democracies. We find that foreign-born individuals have more positive attitudes toward immigrants and immigration than natives. At the same time, we find that immigrants’ concerns about immigration are shaped economic and political considerations in ways that are consistent with the literature on anti-immigration sentiment among native populations. Moreover, these effects are particularly strong among immigrants who have acquired citizenship status in their host society. Thus, like native-born individuals, immigrants have economic and ideological motives when considering the consequences of and support for immigration, and these are especially pronounced among those who have become formally incorporated into the body politic via the route of citizenship. Taken together, these results reveal that immigrants’ attitudes about immigration are shaped by socio-tropic economic considerations and conditioned by the formal incorporation of foreigners into their host society.
Our paper is designed to contribute to research on political incorporation and public opinion about immigration in several ways. First, on a theoretical level, we seek to extend the study of anti-immigrant opinion by going beyond earlier studies of anti-immigrant attitudes that have focused exclusively on native-born individuals. Second, we add to existing studies of immigrant political incorporation by highlighting the complex role that formal political incorporation – citizenship – can have on immigrants’ attitudes. Third, by distinguishing theoretically and empirically between different kinds of immigrants on the basis of their experiences in both receiving and sending countries, we are able to extend the study of immigrant political behavior and develop a more comprehensive understanding of the role that different determinants play in shaping political attitudes among migrants. Finally, our analysis breaks new ground by going beyond the most heavily studied case of immigrant participation – the United States – and by putting existing arguments to a more demanding empirical test against a varied and extensive sample of European nations with diverse groups of foreign-born residents.

We proceed as follows: the next sections present and elaborate our argument; we then describe our data and measures, present our analyses and discuss our findings, and finally conclude by offering suggestions for further research.

Citizenship, Threat, and Attitudes Toward Immigration

Immigrants leave a mark on the societies they join; conversely, receiving countries shape the lives immigrants lead. While social scientists have paid increasing attention to the former, they have shown less interest in the latter. In particular, scholars have sought to understand the impact that migration has on the politics of receiving countries by focusing on the immigration-related attitudes and behaviors of native populations or the immigration policies that governments pursue. In contrast, less is known about how receiving societies affect migrants. And in particular, we are mostly in the dark about what immigrants themselves think of immigration – for example, whether they oppose immigration less than natives do, and whether some migrants are more accepting of immigration than others. What is more, we do not know much about the sources of such differences – if they in fact
exist – and whether they are due to varying individual experiences, immigrant formal incorporation into the host societies, or something else entirely.

The question of how conditions in receiving countries affect immigrants and how immigrants view immigration has both theoretical and empirical relevance. Politically, immigrants can be effective advocates on behalf of themselves and others like them. Yet, in addition to factors such as shared group interests and ideological values, the extent to which newcomers can forge stable political coalitions may depend on their attitudes towards each other (Rogers 2009; Sonenshein 2003; Oliver and Wong 2003). Conversely, a lack of support for immigration among newcomers can make it easier for those opposed to it to argue that those who benefit from it do not prize it. Thus, understanding how supportive immigrants are of immigration, whether their attitudes differ appreciably from natives and amongst themselves, and why, are important political questions in contemporary Europe and important empirical questions in political science.

Insights with respect to what and how immigrants think about immigration will allow us to draw inferences about the likely political behavior of immigrants, and the extent to which models of opinion formation regarding immigration extend from natives to immigrants. Here, we are particularly interested in the question of whether, in addition to formal membership in the political community, economic threat and ideology shapes the views of foreigners about immigration. Given the paucity of research on the question of what and how immigrants think about immigration, we rely on two guiding intuitions. First, we argue for the transferability of arguments about the impact of existing theories and evidence that immigration-related attitudes are driven by a complex set of factors. Most prominently, these include personal and collective threat in the form of economic competition and threats to political and cultural values. Second, we argue that the formal incorporation of foreign-born individuals via the route of citizenship plays an important role in conditioning how immigrants think of themselves vis-à-vis others in society, including natives and new arrivals. We briefly discuss each of these in turn.

Threat
One key argument that has frequently been made is that threat is a prime motivator behind anti-immigration attitudes. Perhaps most commonly, this threat has been examined with regard to labor market competition, in Europe and elsewhere (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Based on theories of economic self-interest, this argument implies that natives oppose the immigration of individuals who can be direct competitors in the labor market. In addition to labor market status and skills, personal economic circumstances – be they employment status, personal financial situation, income, and so on – have also been assumed to shape opinion formation on immigration. Thus, anti-immigration sentiment has long been assumed to find fertile ground among unemployed, underemployed, and other constituencies that are struggling economically (Fetzer 2000).

The trouble with this argument about threats to economic self-interest is that it has been difficult to find unequivocal or even consistent empirical support for it. For example, while more skilled individuals are generally more pro-immigration than less skilled ones, researchers disagree on whether high skilled individuals are always more pro-immigration, as Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) argue, or whether their preference for immigration is tempered by competition for particular skills, as (Mayda 2006) suggests. Evidence for the narrow self-interest hypothesis – conceptualized and operationalized beyond labor market competition – has been mixed in other studies as well. Thus, Citrin and collaborators (Citrin et al. 1997; Sides and Citrin 2007) have found that personal economic circumstances play little role in shaping immigrant’s opinions about immigration in the United States. Instead, sociotropic concerns about the state of the national economy are major determinants of anti-immigration sentiment, while others still have argued that economic self-interest is activated as a driver of anti-immigration sentiment only in difficult times (Money 1999; see also Fetzer 2000). Taken together, it seems fair to characterize the debate over economic threat and anti-immigrant attitudes as stronger on theoretical priors and more mixed on the evidence about exactly how and when economic threat operates as a determinant of attitudes toward immigration. At a minimum it suggests that economic threat should matter, and that this threat can be assumed to manifest itself in egocentric or socio-tropic ways.

Aside from economic threat, political and cultural threats have been posited as a prime determinant of immigration-related attitudes. Specifically, scholars have argued that natives
commonly perceive immigrants as constituting a cultural threat – that is, a threat to traditional values and practices. A voluminous literature has documented the success and strategies of extreme right-wing parties that position themselves as defenders of the national community and culture against foreigners (e.g., Betz and Immerfall 1998; Hainsworth 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). While part of their appeal is to those who are marginal in the labor market, another part is geared toward highlighting traditional or conservative values that fuel opposition to social change, including the addition of new migrants. In contrast, left voters and parties have increasingly positioned themselves as the defenders of tolerance and multiculturalism, pursuing policies that are geared toward incorporation of foreign-born residents and social cohesion. As a consequence, the gap in immigration-related attitudes between those on the left and those on the right has widened over the past two decades (Semyonov et al. 2006), and has been found to be particularly pronounced among those who are more tuned in to politics (McLaren 2001).

Taken together, there is thus evidence to suggest that economic, cultural, and political threats are likely motivations behind immigration-related attitudes. The question, though, is whether these threats also work to shape such attitudes among immigrants themselves. A priori, it is plausible to assume that they do, and there is some evidence that is consistent with this assumption. Specifically, while not squarely focused on the question of immigration, a parallel literature on inter-ethnic competition among minority groups in the United States suggests a link between economic threat perceptions and attitudes about new arrivals. At various times during the course of U.S. history, competition for public jobs and the almost exclusive nature of ethnically-based businesses in immigrant communities have often strained the relationships between African-Americans on one hand and Irish, Asians, Latinos, and even blacks from the Caribbean on the other (Diamond 1998; Vaca 2004; Skerry 1995; Joyce 2003; Morawska 2009, esp. Ch3). As a consequence, political alliances among these groups have often been shaky and short-lived, and efforts to extend policy benefits, political influence, or electoral support to other immigrant groups limited and conditional (Morawska 2009; Gay 2006; Kim 2000; Kaufmann 2007; see also Oliver and Wong 2003; Rogers 2009). This has been surprising to many observers who expected that minority status, vulnerability to discrimination, as well as material and legal disadvantages would provide a firm basis for cooperation among various
immigrant groups, and suggests the need to develop more comprehensive models of immigration-related attitudes and political engagement among immigrants.

**Citizenship**

One question we are particularly interested in is whether attitudes toward immigration among foreign-born residents, and the role that economic and other threats play in shaping these, are conditioned by the formal incorporation of migrants into the political community via the path of citizenship. We argue that citizenship aligns the attitudes of native-born and foreign-born residents. This implies that foreign-born citizens will be less enthusiastic about immigration than foreign-born residents who have not been naturalized. Moreover, we hypothesize that the impact of threat will be strengthened among citizens – that is, that citizenship encourages the expression of less positive attitudes about immigration among foreign-born residents who are threatened.

We base these expectations on several empirical regularities that emerge from the extant literature about what kinds of individuals choose to become naturalized. While the acquisition of citizenship is surely the product of a complex set of conditions and considerations, a number of qualitative and quantitative studies of naturalization have a consistent set of findings. Specifically, citizenship acquisition has been found to be both a marker of the extent to which immigrants have assimilated culturally and economically, but also an indicator of instrumental considerations linked with the desire to have access to important benefits and resources bestowed only on citizens (Yang 1994a, 1994b; Bloemraad 2006; Portes and Mozo 1985; Portes and Curtis 1987; DeSipio 1987, 1996; Grebler 1966; Garcia 1981; see also Jones-Correa 1998, 2001; Bueker 2005; Wong and Pantoja 2009).

Thus, the acquisition of citizenship is a mark of self-selection into an identity – an expression of kinship with the host country – as well as a quest for access to a legal status that provides formal protections and material benefits (political rights, wider employment opportunities, welfare benefits, visa-free travel, etc.). Both kinds of motivations would lead us to assume that the beliefs of foreign-born individuals who choose to become citizens are more similar to those of the majority group (native-born citizens) and that they would be willing to express worry about economic and other
threats emanating from immigration. Thus, there is good reason to suspect that citizenship is associated with lower levels of enthusiasm for immigration and a more concerned outlook, which also makes the impact of threat factors particularly pronounced.

**Hypotheses**

Taken together, we thus expect foreign-born individuals to be motivated by competing considerations. On one hand, we expect them to express more positive views about immigration than native-born individuals by virtue of their own experiences, instrumental reasons, as well as solidarity and kinship with other immigrants. Thus:

**Hypothesis 1.** Foreign-born individuals should hold more positive views about immigration than native-born individuals.

At the same time, immigrants do not live in a vacuum and are not immune to motivations of self-interest or the realities of political and economic life in their new homeland. Thus, economic threats and political beliefs should move attitudes about immigration as well.

**Hypothesis 2.** Economic threat should be associated with lower support for immigration and more negative views about immigration among foreign-born individuals.

**Hypothesis 3.** Foreign-born individuals who place themselves on the political Right should have more negative views about immigration than foreign-born individuals on the Left.

While solidarity with other immigrants is likely to make foreign-born individuals more favorable toward immigration, citizenship exerts the opposite pull. Specifically, we expect foreign-born citizens to assume a systematically more critical stance toward immigration. Put simply,

**Hypothesis 4.** Foreign-born citizens are expected to express more negative views about immigration than foreign-born individuals who are not citizens.

**Hypothesis 5.** The negative impact of economic threat and right-wing ideology on attitudes toward immigration among foreign-born individuals should be more pronounced among those who have acquired citizenship.

**Data and Measures**
To test these hypotheses, we use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) three-round cumulative file collected between 2002 and 2006. This collaborative project is the only set of cross-national surveys that include questions designed specifically for foreign-born respondents, and also ask people about their attitudes towards immigration, their economic situation, as well as a set of important socio-demographic characteristics. What is more, it is the only set of surveys that ask these questions in identical format across a broad range of countries. The relevant survey items and a sufficient number of cases necessary for multivariate estimations were available for 23 European countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Because the analysis requires that we combine information collected at the level of individuals and at the level of countries, the dataset has a multi-level structure (one level, the individual, is nested within the other, the country). Ignoring the multi-level nature of the data could create a number of statistical problems (clustering, non-constant variance, underestimation of standard errors, etc.) (cf. Snijders and Bosker 1999; for applications in political science, see Steenbergen and Jones 2002). We therefore estimate multi-level maximum likelihood models with random intercepts to allow for cross-country heterogeneity in levels of support for immigration and respondents clustered at the level of countries.

**Dependent Variables**

Following previous research (Sides and Citrin 2007, Citrin and Sides 2008), we relied on two dependent variables to measure people’s attitudes towards immigration: perceptions of immigration consequences and beliefs about the appropriate level of immigration in one’s country. To measure the first one, the ESS asked respondents whether immigration is bad or good for their country’s economy, whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life, and whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live. Using answers to these questions, we calculated an average for each respondent and recoded the resulting index so that it ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values representing more support for immigration.
Our second dependent variable deals with the preferred level of immigration and is similarly based on three survey items. The ESS asked respondents to what extent their host country should allow people of the *same* race or ethnicity as most people in their country, people of a *different* race or ethnicity, and finally, people from *poorer countries outside Europe* to come and live there. Using the response categories ‘allow none’, ‘allow a few’, ‘allow some’, and ‘allow many’ for each of these questions, we created an index, which represents an average value for each individual, and recoded it so that it ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more support for immigration (for details on question wording and variable coding, see appendix).

**Independent Variables**

Two measures of current economic evaluations — socio-tropic and egocentric — are available in the ESS data. To capture the first, we relied on the question: “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?” The original variable, ranging from 0 to 10, was re-coded so that higher values indicate more dissatisfaction with economy. The egocentric item is based on people’s reports about their current household’s income. Respondents were able to indicate that they are either ‘living comfortably on present income’ (0), are ‘coping on present income’ (1), or that it is ‘difficult on present income’ (2), or ‘very difficult on present income’ (3).

In addition to assessments of current macro-economic conditions and personal financial situation, we employ individual-level measures of respondents’ skill levels and employment status, as manual workers and the unemployed are usually expected to be particularly vulnerable to economic competition from foreigners. Employment status is a dichotomous measure (1=unemployed; 0 otherwise). Further, following Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), our measure of manual skills is based on the ISCO88 classification. It is coded as a dichotomous variable as well, with 1 categorizing respondents with an elementary (1st or 2nd level) skills occupation, and 0 those with a highly skilled job (3rd, 4th, 5th skill level).vi Political ideology is measured using a standard left-right self-placement item, where higher values on a 0-10 scale indicate more right-wing political orientations.

To identify foreign-born individuals in our sample and to distinguish between citizens and noncitizens among them, we relied on two straightforward ESS questions “Were you born in
“Are you a citizen of [country]?” and “Are you a citizen of [country]?” Both are dichotomous variables, with 1 indicating a positive response, and zero a negative one. Further, we employed a number of survey items to capture immigrant-specific experiences in sending and receiving countries. First, we controlled for the level of democracy and economic development in the immigrant’s country of origin at the time of his or her arrival because immigrants from poorer and less democratic countries might have a better understanding why people migrate, the difficulties this involves, and thus can be expected to be more sympathetic towards migration. Newcomers’ attitudes may also be affected by their exposure to, and their personal or group situation in, a receiving country. We therefore included measures of how recently a foreigner arrived to his or her new homeland, whether the respondent belongs to a minority ethnic group, and whether he or she reports belonging to a group that is being discriminated against. In addition, we included measures of social connectedness, urban residence, and life satisfaction, as well as standard demographic variables, suggested in previous research: education, age, and gender. Finally, to account for security concerns posed by migration, we also control for whether respondents or members of their household have been victims of a crime in the recent past.

At the level of countries, we include the percentage of the foreign-born population and GDP per capita, as suggested in previous research (Schneider 2008; Mayda 2006), as well as a control for whether a country is a new democracy, since political tolerance has been shown to be greater in stable democracies that have endured over time (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Finally, we included a measure of immigrant heterogeneity in the host country to account for potentially higher levels of inter-group competition and hence lower support for continued migration (Details on variable coding are listed in the appendix) in countries with greater immigrant heterogeneity.

**Results**

A first look at the data reveals that, on average, foreigners have more favorable attitudes towards immigration than native born respondents (all differences are statistically significant at least at the .05 level): the mean values are .60 for foreigners and .50 for natives on the 0 to 1 scale measuring how favorably people perceive the consequences of immigration, and .51 vs. .59, respectively, on the scale capturing beliefs about the appropriate levels of immigration. Furthermore,
foreign-born citizens express less favorable views toward immigration than foreign-born non-citizens: the respective mean values are .56 and .65 (immigration consequences), and .57 vs. .61 (preferred levels of immigration). The results of multivariate estimations (not reported here but available upon request) also show that native-born status and citizenship have negative and statistically significant effects on people’s attitudes towards new arrivals. These results clearly support our initial hypothesis that foreign-born individuals should hold more positive views about immigration than native-born individuals, and provide ground for the notion that naturalized citizens are located somewhere in the middle between native-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens.

To examine the determinants of immigration attitudes among foreigners in greater detail, we turn exclusively to foreign-born respondents and proceed with our analyses in two steps. First, we report the direct effects of our key variables of interest along with immigrant-specific variables and traditional controls in the models of immigration attitudes. Second, we additionally include interaction terms and analyze the extent to which citizenship conditions the impact of economic threat and political views on attitudes towards immigration.

The results from the direct effect models, shown in Table 1, indicate that dissatisfaction with the state of economy has a consistent negative and highly statistically significant effect on perceived immigration consequences as well as beliefs about the appropriate levels of immigration. While dissatisfaction with household income and unemployment have no effects on our dependent variables, we find that respondents in low-skilled occupations are significantly more opposed to immigration, probably because their jobs are more susceptible to downward pressures of wage competition from new arrivals. Taken together, these results suggest that immigration attitudes among foreign-born respondents are driven both by sociotropic concerns about the national economy, as well as skill level (but not income or employment status).

Furthermore, the results show that political views as measured by left-right self-placement predictably shape support for immigration among foreign-born respondents as well: right-wing orientations are associated with more negative views about and stronger opposition to immigration. The direct effect of citizenship is negative, which means that formal incorporation into the host society is associated with a more skeptical outlook towards immigration. However, foreigners’
experiences in their new home countries matter as well, as individuals who identify with ethnic minorities and belong to groups that they feel are discriminated against are significantly more sympathetic towards immigration. As well, life satisfaction and social connectedness among new arrivals clearly produces a more positive outlook towards other foreigners, and so does education, usually associated with more tolerant, multicultural views, as well as greater social connectedness (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).

Variables measuring immigrant socialization experiences in their countries of origin suggest that foreigners from more democratic and more economically developed countries are more opposed to immigration; however, statistical significance of these coefficients is inconsistent across the two dependent variables. Finally, among demographic controls, we find that older individuals are more opposed to immigration, although the data does not allow us to distinguish between life-cycle and cohort effects. Interestingly, concerns with crime have no effect, and neither do any of the macro-level controls, such as the share of foreigners relative to natives, GDP per capita, or diversity of immigrant population in their host society. Taken together, these results indicate that variation in immigration-related attitudes among migrants are driven by individual-level difference, rather than differences across countries.

[Table 1 about here]

Further, our conditional effects models, shown in Table 2, indicate that the impact of citizenship should not be considered in isolation. Specifically, we find that the interaction terms for citizenship and dissatisfaction with the state of the economy are negative, suggesting that the effects of socio-tropic economic concerns on anti-immigrant sentiment are more pronounced among those formally incorporated in the host society via the route of citizenship. Dissatisfaction with the economy continues to have a direct negative effect, which means that the attitudes among noncitizens are also driven by macro-economic concerns, while the impact of citizenship among those who are completely satisfied with the economy loses its statistical significance in the model of perceived consequences of immigration, and even reverses its sign in the results of preferred levels of immigration.
In addition, we find that citizenship enhances threat perceptions among foreigners with manual skills, but the effect is statistically significant only with respect to perceived consequences of immigration. Dissatisfaction with personal income and unemployment do not have any effect, either alone or in interaction with citizenship, further supporting our expectations that openness towards people from other countries is affected to a greater degree by socio-tropic rather than personal economic concerns, even among foreigners who are asked about their attitudes towards people like themselves. However, political views play an independent role in shaping people’s views about immigration, and our results provide some evidence that these views are particularly important among naturalized foreigners (the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant in the model of perceived immigration consequences). Though we cannot directly test this, this result may suggest that, given the right to more fully engage in the political process of their host societies, naturalized foreigners become more attentive to elite cues and party campaign messages regarding immigration.

[Table 2 about here]

The substantive effects (calculated holding other variables at their means and dichotomous measures at their median values) further reveal the extent to which dissatisfaction with macro-economy and right-wing views decrease support for immigration among foreign-born alone and in interaction with citizenship. Specifically, the difference in the scores on the 0-1 scale of perceived immigration consequences between a typical foreign-born citizen who is completely satisfied with the state of the economy and a foreign-born citizen who is completely dissatisfied with the economy is .146 (.663 vs. .517) (Figure 1a). In contrast, support for immigration for a non-citizen declines only by .088, as we move from the highest to the lowest level of satisfaction with the economy (.647 vs. .559). Similarly, support for increased levels of immigration changes from .640 to .503 among naturalized foreigners compared to an almost flat line among non-citizens (.593 vs. 587) (Figure 1b).

[Figures 1a and 1b about here]
The substantive effects of political ideology and citizenship on immigration support exhibit similar patterns. The results show that the score on the perceived immigration consequences changes from .661 for an individual who is a citizen and has extreme left views to .533 for a citizen at the other end of the ideological scale (.128), while the difference in values for a non-citizen at the extreme left and a non-citizen at the extreme right is only .082 (.645 vs. .563) (Figure 2a). Moving across the complete spectrum of the ideological continuum also produces a steeper slope for citizens with respect to preferred levels of immigration (Figure 2b). This figure reveals, however, that the score for a foreign-born respondent *who is a citizen* and has extreme left views is .048 higher than for an individual with similar political views but *who is not a citizen* (.672 vs. .624). In contrast, the difference in the scores between extreme-right citizen and extreme-right non-citizen is only .007 and is reversed (.507 vs. .514). Thus, taken together, the results suggest that economic threat and political views make a difference to opinions foreigners hold about immigration, and that their effect is particularly strong among those who enjoy citizenship status.

[Figures 2a and 2b about here]

Discussion

Human migration has become a persistent feature of contemporary societies. People move across country borders looking for a better life, more fulfilling jobs, greater opportunities for acquiring new skills and ideas, and a more pleasant retirement. They also migrate to escape war, political persecution, or natural disasters. For better or for worse, migration has been on the rise in recent decades and is unlikely to subside in an increasingly interdependent world marked by sharp economic, political, or climatic differences across countries.

While migration affects both immigrant-sending and receiving countries, as well as migrants themselves, most scholarly and policy debates to date have focused on the consequences of migration on native populations in immigrant-receiving countries. In contrast, the attitudes and behavior of migrants themselves remain mostly uncharted territory: we still lack a general understanding how immigrant political views and behavior are shaped by experiences unique to immigrants, and the
extent to which the effects of these experiences complement, replace, or interact with the impact of other individual or contextual characteristics. Insights into the attitudes of foreigners will enable policy makers to better predict and prevent more violent expressions of disaffection among migrants, develop more adequate immigration and immigrant incorporation policies, and to ensure more tolerant and cohesive communities in contemporary democracies with large immigrant populations.

Our study sought to contribute to this area of research by focusing on what and how foreigners think about immigration. Previous research on pro-immigration attitudes focused exclusively on native-born individuals and little is known about the views of individuals who have personal experiences with migration and are directly affected by immigration and immigrant incorporation policies in their host societies. Understanding immigration-related attitudes among foreign-born may help us to predict their willingness to forge stable political alliances to push pro-immigration policy agendas as well as the effectiveness of advocacy on their behalf by others friendly to their cause. Thus, in this study we asked whether foreigners perceive immigration more favorably than natives, whether these attitudes are shaped by similar considerations as among natives, and whether the formal incorporation of immigrants into their host societies helps to condition the impact of these considerations.

We argue that the attitudes towards migration among foreign-born residents in Europe are marked by several competing motivations. On one hand, migrants express more positive views about immigration compared to the attitudes of natives. We suspect, but cannot test directly, that this effect is rooted in a variety of considerations, including kinship and solidarity with other immigrants based on their shared minority status, a better understanding why people migrate and the difficulties this involves, as well as instrumental considerations, such as desire to bring in their relatives from abroad. On the other hand, the formal incorporation via citizenship and perceptions of threat posed by further migration motivates foreign-born individuals to be more cautious in supporting immigration and thus leads to a convergence between the attitudes natives and foreigners who have become better incorporated into their host societies.

We find that foreign-born individuals have indeed significantly more positive attitudes towards immigrants and immigration than natives, suggesting that foreigners may have a shared
interest to promote more liberal immigration policies. This means that they could be useful allies to business groups lobbying for more flexible labor markets as well as human rights organizations in favor of more open borders for humanitarian purposes (refugees, asylum seekers, etc.). At the same time, our results show that there is considerable variation in foreigners’ attitudes towards immigration, and that the differences in how foreigners view migration are largely due to the same factors as support for immigration among natives in established democracies. Specifically, we find that fears about the macro-economy and right-wing ideological orientations are responsible for more skeptical assessments of migration. In contrast, neither feelings about personal income nor employment status play a detectable role, although we do find some evidence that immigrants with lower levels of skills are more opposed to immigration.

Taken together, our results suggest that foreigners assess immigration in light of socio-tropic economic considerations about their host society rather than egocentric motivations, painting an image of foreigners committed to their new homeland rather than being highly individualistic and self-serving residents of their host societies. This means that at the time of economic crisis, foreigners are unlikely to push for more liberal immigration policies, despite the fact that this may negatively affect their own situation. What is more, and perhaps more importantly, we find that the effect of dissatisfaction with the macro-economy and ideological views becomes particularly pronounced among foreigners who have acquired citizenship. Thus, in contrast to fears of immigration skeptics who believe that granting foreigners citizenship rights may create new political tensions and lead to the loss of control enjoyed by the native populations, our results show that the formal incorporation of foreigners into the body politic is associated with convergent views among foreigners and natives, and that naturalization helps to motivate immigrants to place greater emphasis on collective (national) rather than self-interested concerns in forming their opinions about immigration.

The effects of citizenship, however, should be interpreted with caution. Foreigners tend to self-select into the process of naturalization and individuals with stronger attachment or concern for their host societies are potentially more likely to acquire citizenship. This means that the effect of citizenship may be confounded with the impact of other individual characteristics. At the same time, however, we have reasons to believe that the process of naturalization encourages immigrants to think
and behave as responsible citizens of their new homeland and thus become responsive to collective
considerations in forming their attitudes towards immigration and other immigrants. Unfortunately,
the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to measure people’s attitudes before and after
the event of naturalization. Future research would therefore benefit from a more direct test of our
ideas using panel data that can capture shifts in people’s attitudes when citizenship status changes.
What is more, scholars should devote more attention to developing a comprehensive model of
citizenship acquisition that would take into account not only immigrant characteristics but also
institutional and other contextual differences across immigrant-receiving countries.

We conclude that, while the immigration experience encourages foreigners to evaluate
immigration more positively than natives, the key determinants of these attitudes are essentially the
same. Like natives, foreigners have economic and ideological motives when considering the
consequences of and support for immigration, and are particularly affected by their evaluations of
macro-economy rather than ego-centric considerations. Further, our results imply that while
governments cannot control foreigners’ socialization experiences in their countries of origin, they are
not completely powerless when it comes to shaping attitudes among immigrants in their countries.
After all, our study suggests the possibility that, by facilitating the formal immigrant incorporation
into the body politic via the route of citizenship, governments can encourage foreigners to behave as
responsible members of their societies and pay more attention to national concerns in shaping their
attitudes towards issues that are likely to play an important role in policy-making of many
contemporary democracies in the foreseeable future.
References


Table 1. Direct Effects of Economic Conditions, Ideology, and Citizenship on Support for Immigration among Foreigners in 23 European Countries, 2002-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Perceived Consequences of Immigration</th>
<th>Preferred Levels of Immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key variables of interest</strong></td>
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<td>Citizenship</td>
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<td>-.001 (.004)</td>
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Note: Results are multi-level maximum likelihood estimates using STATA 10.0’s xtmixed command. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed).
Table 2. Interactive Effects of Economic Conditions, Ideology, and Citizenship on Support for Immigration among Foreigners in 23 European Countries, 2002-6.

<table>
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*Note: Results are multi-level maximum likelihood estimates using STATA 10.0’s xtmixed command. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed).
Figure 1a. Effects of Dissatisfaction with Economy and Citizenship on Perceptions of Immigration Consequences among Foreign-born

Figure 1b. Effects of Dissatisfaction with Economy and Citizenship on Preferred Levels of Immigration among Foreign-born
Figure 2a. Effects of Ideology and Citizenship on Perceptions of Immigration Consequences among Foreign-born

Figure 2b. Effects of Ideology and Citizenship on Preferred Levels of Immigration among Foreign-born
Appendix. Measures and Coding

Perceptions of immigration consequences. Average value of three survey questions: 1) “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country’s] economy that people come to live here from other countries?” 2) “Would you say that [country’s] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” 3) “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” (Each item ranges from 0 ‘most anti-immigrant attitude’ to 10 ‘most pro-immigrant’ attitude.) We calculated an average value for each respondent and recoded it so that the resulting index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more favorable attitudes towards immigration.

Preferred levels of immigration. Average value of three survey questions: 1) “To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country’s] people to come and live here?” 2) “How about people of different race or ethnic group from most [country’s] people?” 3) “How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?” Each variable was recoded so that higher values indicate more favorable attitudes towards immigration: 0’allow none’, 1 ‘allow a few’, 2 ‘allow some’, and 3 ‘allow many to come and live here.’ We then created an average value for each individual and recoded it so that the resulting index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more support for immigration.

Citizen. “Are you a citizen of [country]?” 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.

Foreign born. “Were you born in [country]?” 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.

Dissatisfaction with economy. “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?” 0 ‘extremely satisfied’, 10 ‘extremely dissatisfied.’

Dissatisfaction with income. “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?” 0 ‘living comfortably on present income’, 1 ‘coping on present income’, 2 ‘difficult on present income’, 3 ‘very difficult on present income.’

Manual skills. Following Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), coded using the ISCO88 classification: it is a dichotomous variable, where 1 represents 1st and 2nd skill level (manual labor), and 0 – 3rd and 4th skill level (skilled labor) in addition to the fifth category of legislators, senior officials, and managers assumed to be skilled. The few (14) members of the armed forces are excluded since no ISCO88 skill level is defined for this group.

Unemployed. Based on two survey questions: “Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? 1) unemployed and actively looking for a job; 2) unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job. This is a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if a respondent gave a positive answer to at least one of these two questions, 0 – otherwise.

Recent immigrant. “How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?” 5 ‘within last year’, 4 ‘1-5 years ago’, 3 ‘6-10 years ago’, 2 ‘11-20 years ago’, 1 ‘more than 20 years ago’.

Democracy in country of origin. Based on three survey questions: “Were you born in [country]?” If a respondent said “no”, then the follow up question was “In which country were you born?” and “How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?” Information about immigrant country of origin and the timing of immigrant arrival were matched up with the polity scores from the Polity IV data set http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. Since the timing of immigrant arrival is a categorical variable that captures only approximate number of years in host country, immigrants who arrived, for example, more than 20 years ago and were surveyed in 2002 were assigned an average 1972-1981 polity score in their countries of origin, those who arrived 11-20 years ago – 1982-1991 score, 6-10 years ago – 1992-1996 score, 1-5 years ago – 1997-2001 score, and those who arrived within last year – 2002 score. We similarly calculated values for ESS interviews conducted in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.
Where interview year was missing, the median year (2004) was assumed. The variables ranges from 0 “the most non-democratic country” to 10 ”most democratic”.

**GDP per capita in country of origin.** Based on three survey questions: “Were you born in [country]?” If a respondent said “no”, then the follow up question was “In which country were you born?” and “How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?” Information about immigrant country of origin and the timing of immigrant arrival were matched up with the GDP per capita scores measured in constant 2000 international dollars (Source: World Bank Development Indicators (WDI), December 2008 on-line edition). Since the timing of immigrant arrival is a categorical variable that captures only approximate number of years in host country, immigrants who arrived, for example, more than 20 years ago and were surveyed in 2002 were assigned an average 1972-1981 value of GDP per capita in their countries of origin, those who arrived 11-20 years ago – 1982-1991 score, 6-10 years ago – 1992-1996 score, 1-5 years ago – 1997-2001 score, and those who arrived within last year – 2002 score. We similarly calculated values for ESS interviews conducted in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Where interview year was missing, the median year (2004) was assumed.

**Life satisfaction.** “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” 0 ‘extremely dissatisfied’, 10‘extremely satisfied’.

**Education.** Years of full-time education completed.

**Age.** Number of years (calculated by subtracting respondent’s year of birth from the year of interview).

**Male.** 1 ‘male’, 0 ‘female’.

**Ethnic minority.** “Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]?” 1”yes”, 0”no”.

**Discriminated against.** “Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?” 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.

**Crime victim.** “Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?” 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.

**Social connectedness.** “How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?” 1 ‘never’, 2 ‘less than once a month’, 3 ‘once a month’, 4 ‘several times a month’, 5 ‘once a week’, 6 ‘several times a week’, 7 ‘every day’.

**Urban residence.** “Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?” 0‘Farm or home in countryside’, 1’Country village’, 2’Town or small city’, 3’Suburbs or outskirts of big city’, 4’A big city.’

**Left-right self-placement.** “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” 0’left’, 10’right’.

**% Foreign-born in host country.** Calculated using Census 2001 data from the Eurostat.

**Immigrant heterogeneity in host country.** Fractionalization index (the Hirschman-Herfindahl index) defined as follows:

\[
\text{Heterogeneity} = 1 - \sum \frac{g_i^2}{n}
\]
where \( s_i \) is the share of group \( i \) over the total of the foreign-born population. The measure captures the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from the foreign-born population originated in different regions of the world: Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, the Balkans, East Central Europe, Western Europe, non-European established democracies (North America, Australia, and New Zealand), and Other (Stateless or Unknown). We calculated this measure using 2001 Census data available from the Eurostat. The measure ranges from 0 for countries with completely homogeneous foreign-born populations to a theoretical maximum of 1 when every外国er is from different region in the world.


*New democracy.* Dichotomous variable: 1- if Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, or Slovenia, 0 – otherwise.
The total migrant stock in the 27 current EU member states, Norway, and Switzerland increased from 5.85 percent in 1990 to 8.69 percent in 2005 (World Bank 2008).

For research on public opinion, see Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007); Citrin et al. (1997); Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004); Money (1997), (1999); Fetzer 2000; for research on immigration policies in the EU member states, see Franchino (2009) and Sasse and Thielemann (2005).

Because our individual-level these analyses are based on samples of foreign-born respondents only, we sought to establish to what extent these samples matched the characteristics of the populations under investigation. Specifically, we conducted two preliminary analyses. First, we calculated the percentages of foreign-born respondents in the original sample and compared these to data measuring the actual percentages of foreign-born individuals collected by the European Union’s statistical agency, Eurostat. The Pearson correlation between the percentage of foreign-born individuals in the surveys and the percentage of foreign-born residents according to Eurostat in the countries included in our study was .98, indicating an extremely close fit between survey and official statistics. Second, using a question indicating respondents’ country of origin, we then investigated the extent to which our samples of foreign-born respondents were representative of populations in the countries under investigation by calculating the percentages of individuals from different regions of the world. We differentiated individuals by the following regions of origin: Africa, Asia, the Balkans, East Central Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, Australia and New Zealand, and Western Europe. The Pearson correlation between the percentages of foreign born individuals in our surveys from specific regions and the official percentages of foreign born residents in the countries from these regions was .90, indicating yet again a very close fit between survey and official statistics. For more details about individual countries, please contact the authors.

The three items scale very well, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .81 for foreign-born respondents.

Cronbach’s alpha is .87 for foreign-born respondents.

Like Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), we excluded the few (14) members of the armed forces since no ISCO88 skill level is defined for this group.