THE ‘AYNALI MARTINI’: THE OTTOMAN ARMY’S FIRST MODERN RIFLE

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Abstract

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 is generally recognised as the most calamitous of the several wars fought by the ‘modernised’ Ottoman Army of the late 19th century as it ended with the Russian army at the gates of Constantinople in the west, and in occupation of Erzurum in the east. The only major Ottoman feat of arms in that campaign was the ‘Plevna delay’, where between July and December 1877, the garrison of Plevna, under Nuri Osman Paşa, resisted two major attacks by Russian forces and a third with their Romanian allies, thus preventing the Russians from advancing on Constantinople until the following year. The successful defence of Plevna was to a great extent due to the defensive earthworks built there by the Ottoman garrison and which resisted all attempts at destruction through artillery fire. But the main factor in the ‘Plevna delay’ was the wholesale employment by the Ottoman garrison of the Peabody-Martini rifle, a weapon that had only recently entered the Ottoman infantry inventory. While the story of the Siege of Plevna itself within the wider context of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 is well known among those interested in the military affairs of the period, the history and nature of the rifle that played so significant a role there – its biography, as it were – is not well known outside of specialist military reference works, a vacuum this article seeks to fill.

Introduction

The defeat suffered by the Ottoman Empire in the Ninth Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the eleventh such conflict between the two states in a series stretching back to 1568-1570, and the fourth in the 19th century alone, was the most disastrous of them all. At the end of the ‘93 War, as it is often referred to in contemporary and even some modern sources, from the Islamic year it began, 1293, one Russian army was encamped at San Stefano (Ayastefanos, today Yeşilköy), with an unimpeded view towards Constantinople’s Land Walls, and a second...
was ensconced in Erzurum, the key strategic point for the defence of Eastern Anatolia. Moreover, the war was brought to its end only by the intervention of the ‘Great Powers’ in a strange alliance of disparate countries led by Great Britain and bonded only by fierce opposition to a Russian capture and subsequent annexation of Constantinople, the key to the Black Sea and trade routes beyond.

The reasons for the Ottoman defeat – or, rather, collapse – in the face of the Russian advance on Constantinople in 1877-1878 are many and various and have been discussed and analysed by numerous scholars from the moment the war ended to modern times. All agree, however, that there was one bright flourish of Ottoman military glory in the campaign, the fierce resistance of the garrison at Plevna (modern Pleven, Bulgaria). Under its commander, Nuri Osman Paşa this held firm for almost five full months, from the 20th July to the 10th December 1877, despite repeated shelling and three major attacks, a Romanian force joining the Russians for the last of these assaults, and only surrendered owing to the application of the age-old method of circumvallation and consequent starvation.1 Thus the ‘Plevna Delay’, as the Russian operational plan envisaged its army being at Constantinople within five weeks of the campaign’s start, and so by September 1877,2 not in January 1878 as happened. Quite simply, while Plevna evaded capture the main Russian force dared not commit itself to advancing on the Ottoman capital for fear of an attack from the rear. But what is more, this ‘Plevna Delay’ permitted the ‘Great Powers’ of the time to rally together and under British leadership oblige Russia to withdraw – even as its army was at the gates of the ‘City of the World’s desire’. Hence the ‘Sick man of Europe’ was granted ‘another forty years of life’.3

The ‘Plevna Delay’ owed much to the superb system of earthwork defences and redoubts Nuri Osman Paşa caused to be provided around the town. These were so well-designed and constructed that, combined with inferior Russian artillery and gunnery, the defenders survived several bombardments essentially unscathed, three of great severity in pursuance of ‘softening up’ the occupants prior to major infantry attacks.4 But the key factor in the defence against all three main attacks on Plevna was the garrison’s use of its standard service firearm, the Peabody-Martini Rifle. It was the Ottoman Empire’s first modern rifle and at the time of its introduction also one of the most advanced infantry firearms of the period. Popularly known to Turkish-speaking users – official and unofficial – as the ‘Aynalı Martini’, or ‘Mirrored Martini’,

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1 There are several contemporary or near contemporary works in English that provide detailed accounts of the Siege of Plevna and the ‘Plevna Delay’, e.g., Hozier 1877; Greene 1879; Herbert 1895; Trotha 1896; Ryan 1897; and Maurice 1905. There are naturally a number of accounts in other languages, in particular the full-length near-contemporary Ottoman account of the siege in Osmaniça translated into Turkish with a commentary: Talat and Yalazan 1997. Of the many others, the various parts devoted to the siege in Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902 are especially informative, as their volume was translated directly from the official Russian account of the war for the benefit of the Austrian High Command. The only ‘modern’ works in English are those of Furneaux 1958, and the Plevna-focussed chapters in Barry 2012 (the account provided by Trenk 1997 is untrustworthy in some respects).


3 Taylor 1980, 245. Despite the ‘Plevna delay’ being a crucial event in Ottoman history, with a wide-ranging impact on international affairs in the ‘Great Game’ of the time, its 140th anniversary in 2017 was not apparently marked in any obviously public way in Turkey.

4 Cf. Ryan 1897, 220-224.
in reference to the steel plates housing its firing mechanism,⁵ it was introduced into Ottoman military service in 1874, and remained 'on the books', as it were, until at least the First World War. Yet despite this long and valued period of service, a comprehensive account of its development and employment in Ottoman use is wanting, what detailed information there is on the subject being scattered through several reference sources, some difficult to obtain in the normal run of things.⁶ Hence this article which attempts to rectify this omission.

‘Newfangled Jimcracks’

The ultimate origins of the Peabody-Martini Rifle can be traced back to the American Civil War of 1861-1865, an episode in history that holds a pivotal place in the development of many modern military tactics and weaponry. On the one hand it was the last major conflict fought with both sides using Napoleonic-style field tactics: a reliance on in-line formations and blanketing firepower with artillery focussed of the planned point of attack, followed at the appropriate moment by close combat with the bayonet as the decisive armed strike.⁷ On the other hand, it was the first modern war in that the two sides used a wide range of recently developed (and so 'modern') technologies in addition to those standard field tactics in support of a major campaign, all of these new systems being ancestral to many in use today. So, for example, communication methods, using the telegraph, along with defined transport routes, in this case the railway network, for concentrating troops and supplies where needed; aerial reconnaissance with balloons, providing information regarding enemy positions on the eve of and during battle; and last but not least new infantry weapons. It is the latter that is relevant here, for aside from other weapons deployed for the first time in full-scale combat, such as rifled musketry firing an aerodynamically-shaped projectile (the ‘Minié Ball’) and the Gatling Gun, the American Civil War also saw the appearance in battle – if on an occasional basis only – of the breech-loading rifle, a weapon that greatly increased a soldier's rate of fire, and the precursor of modern infantry weapons.

The advantages of a breech-loading long firearm for rapid firing by infantry troops were known well before the Civil War. Indeed, in 1819 the US army had adopted for limited service use the breech-loading Hall Model 1819 Rifle once it was shown how a man with this could fire between eight and ten rounds in one minute, against the three or so shots managed

⁵ As in, e.g., the folk ballad ‘Hekimoğlu derler benim aslima’. Cf. the way by which the Winchester Model 1866 repeating rifle was generally known as the ‘Yellow boy’ in reference to the yellow gunmetal used for its receiver mechanism: Trevelyan 2016, 41.

⁶ For earlier brief accounts, see: Hull 1979, 20-22; Achtermeyer 1980, 38-43; Seel 1981a; and Hintermeier 2001. None of these provides a fully detailed account of the rifle from its introduction up to the end of its service life, which is attempted here. That aside, note that in this article as a whole, paired references have been given where possible to compensate for the general lack of availability of much of the rarer source material used except for those with access to a specialist library or Inter-library loan system.

⁷ As according to the dicta of, for example, the Russian General A. Suvorov, such as: ‘The bullet is a mad thing; only the bayonet knows what it is about’, and ‘Attack with the cold steel! Push hard with the bayonet’: cf. Duffy, 1982, 191-192.
in the same time using a muzzle-loading musket. However, senior officers in the US army resisted the full-scale adoption of this or similar weapons for various reasons. Some, for instance, with no sense of irony, disparaged the speed with which the soldier could shoot-off ammunition causing – it was feared – potentially fatal ammunition supply problems in battle; others were concerned that such rapid-firing using the then standard black powder charge might foul and so jam quickly the breech chamber, requiring a dangerous pause while cleaning the weapon during combat; still others noted how the imperfect sealing of the chamber and resulting loss of pressure observed in countless models of breech-loaders submitted for official trials reduced the effective range of any bullets fired from such a weapon. These attitudes prevailed even as the Civil War was in progress despite the unquestioned success in action of the breech-loaded Sharps Model 1859 Rifle and its carbine version used by two specially formed regiments of snipers commanded by Major General Hiram Berdan – and so the term ‘Sharpshooter’ for a marksman. Old attitudes died hard, with Colonel J.W. Ripley, the Union’s head of the Ordnance division in the Civil War period, allegedly dismissing such weapons as ‘newfangled Jim-cracks’, ostentatious items that had no real functional and so no real combat value. Especially so, given their weight, price, and reliance on specialised ammunition.

Thus the American Civil War began with troops mainly equipped with smooth-bored muzzle-loading muskets alongside a relatively small number of men who had one or other version of a rifle, that is to say, a long firearm with a rifled-barrel ensuring greater accuracy, although over time the armies of both sides gradually replaced their muskets with rifled weapons, typically the Springfield Model 1861 or British Pattern 1853 rifle. Like the muskets they replaced, however, these were muzzle-loaders also, the only breech-loaders in rare use by either side, such as the Sharps Model 1859, being generally privately purchased. Even so, from President Lincoln downwards, the clear superiority of breech-loaders over musket-loaders in terms of their firing-rate could not ignored. And as the war progressed, many private inventors sought to develop a suitable breech-loading mechanism for military use, and so win a potentially lucrative arms contract, one of them being the Boston resident Henry O. Peabody: and so the development of the eponymous mechanism, which went on to become the basis of two of the most famous rifles in military history: the British Martini-Henry and the Ottoman Peabody-Martini.

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9 Cf. Huston 2004, 129-130, with 190; and Emerson 2004, 6. In 1858, William Greener, a contemporary authority on small arms, observed himself how the lack of an effective seal to then existing breech-loading mechanisms resulted in weapons that did ‘not shoot nearly so well, and are not half so safe, as muzzle-loading guns’: Greener 1858, 335-337.
10 Kurtz 2006, 143, with Bruce 2011, 112.
11 Trevelyan 2016, 19.
12 Bruce 2011, 116
13 The principal modern summaries for the activities of H.O. Peabody and the adoption of his mechanism by the Providence Tool Company of Rhode Island, who produced the Peabody-Martini rifle and carbine, are Hull 1978, and Achtermeier 1980, 28-44, the latter being based almost entirely on the analysis of the company’s papers as presented in Stewart 1973, a work only viewable at Brown University, RI.
The Peabody Mechanism

The Peabody mechanism, as fully formed in 1862, was developed – as was the way of the world – on earlier such devices, including, among others, the trigger-guard lever system for opening and closing a falling block mechanism for loading and firing as employed in the Sharps Model 1859 Rifle. What distinguished Peabody’s system in the first instance from this and other breech-loaders then being developed was in part a smoother operating breech block for loading and ejecting a round, using a rear hinge, along with a proprietary metallic cased cartridge, as opposed to a paper or linen-wrapped one, this being detonated by a hand-cocked hammer system on the right hand side of the receiver. But another vital contribution to the future development of breech-loading mechanisms for military use was, as the patent explained, a spring system in the receiver that did ‘not merely draw out the [fired] cartridge-case but throws it out with such force as to throw it over the breech-frame and entirely clear of the gun, thereby obviating the necessity of using the fingers in any way for its removal’. In other words, the rifle could be loaded, fired, and re-loaded in a series of five simple actions: pushing the lever mechanism down with one hand to open the breech ready for loading; inserting a cartridge; pulling up the lever to close the breech while cocking the hammer simultaneously with the thumb; firing the rifle; and then pushing down the lever to open the breech and eject the spent cartridge ready for inserting a new one.

Peabody’s load, fire, and eject system showed its worth in US army trials in May 1862, where field use revealed a firing-rate of ten rounds a minute: but as the US Ordnance Board was then in process of deciding on a suitable calibre bullet for army use no decision was made as to its possible adoption. On the other hand, the reliability and simplicity of the Peabody mechanism did catch the eye of J.B. Anthony, of the Rhode Island-based Providence Tool Company (hereafter the PTCo), who on the 26th October 1864 leased its use possibly with a view to converting muzzle-loaders to breech-loaders, a process then popular with the US Army’s Ordnance Board. Then, when a further series of trials to select a breech-loading rifle for future army use were announced for December 1864 to 9th April 1865, the PTCo submitted a rifle fitted with the Peabody mechanism and its proprietary cartridge for assessment, this being chosen for field trials alongside 19 others selected from an initial 65 models. J.B. Anthony learnt that the PTCo entry was selected as the best choice available before any official announcement was made on the matter and bought the full use of the patent on 15th April 1865. But, as it was, the Civil War ended before this prototype of the future Peabody Military Rifle – and so the direct ancestor of the Peabody-Martini and the Martini-Henry Rifles – was confirmed as the winner of these trials, thus ending any urgency to develop and adopt an en-

14 Cf. US patent 35947 A, granted on the 22nd July 1862.
15 Cf. the contemporary illustrations in Norton 1880, 42, and republished in Hull 1979, 16.
16 Hull 1979, 7.
17 Achtermeier 1980, 30, contra Hull 1979, 23.
18 As per the letter written by J.B. Anthony to his colleagues that day, transcribed in Hull 1979, 47 and Achtermeier 30-31.
19 Cf. Hull 1979, 8, with Achtermeier 1980, 30, where the year the patent was bought is erroneously given as 1864, one year before the trials took place.
tirely new breech-loading army rifle for service use. Instead, now that hostilities had ceased, the head of the US Army Ordnance Board recommended in his report for 1865 that the possibility of converting existing war-surplus stocks of muzzle-loading rifles to breech-loaders be examined, using a method developed by ‘the master armorer at the Springfield Armory’. This was a natural and, of course, more economical alternative to paying for the development and production of an entirely new breech-loading rifle given how some one million Springfield Model 1861 Rifles had been produced for US army use during the Civil War, along with perhaps as many English Pattern 1853 Rifles, of which a substantial number would have survived the fighting in working order.

If nothing else this decision confirmed the advantages in combat of breech-loaders over muzzle loaders, an advantage that could no longer be ignored among serving officers of the United States military. Or elsewhere, for that matter, the French and British governments, for example, having taken steps as the Civil War came to an end to convert their stocks of muzzle-loading muskets into breech-loaders as an interim measure while searching for acceptable purpose-made versions. Forward thinkers in the US Army likewise argued for the eventual adoption for service use of a purpose-built breech-loading rifle rather than a weapon converted this way and so another series of trials for these was held in May-June 1866, with weapons firing the new agreed calibre of .45: yet again, a rifle submitted by the PTCo using the Peabody mechanism performed well enough to be identified as the lead contender – only for the Ordnance Office to again delay a decision with further trials at some unspecified future date. The decision evidently did not dishearten J.B. Anthony entirely, though. As early as January 1865 he had begun exploring foreign military and local markets for sales of both a military and a civilian hunting and sporting version of ‘Peabody’s Patent Breech-Loading Rifle’, stating in an advertising broadsheet issued at the time by the PTCo how: ‘The rapidity with which it can be loaded and fired is believed to be equal, if not superior, to that of any [other] breech-loader, and in continuous firing to that of any repeater’.

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20 Cf. Norton 1880, 14 with 24. The ‘master armourer’ was E.S. Alin: hence these converted rifles are often referred to as the ‘Alin’ Springfields, the first versions being the M.1865, superseded by the M.1866, with the M.1873 becoming the standard infantry rifle: Walters 2006, 461-462.


22 The British chose eventually to convert their Pattern 1853 Enfield rifles with a breech-loading and side-hammer ignition system developed originally in 1862 by the American J. Snider and the Frenchman F.E. Schneider (cf. Clode 1869, 534-536), and adapted for British service use with a metallic-cased cartridge designed by their Colonel E.M. Boxer: thus the introduction into service in late 1866 of the P.1853/66 ‘Snider Enfield’ rifle and its ‘Boxer’ cartridge (Walters 2006, 456-457). The French meanwhile converted their Mle 1853-54 muskets with a Snider-type mechanism, but relied on a paper-wrapped cartridge for their Fusil Mle 1867 or ‘Tabatière’ rifle (Walters 2006, 480).


24 A reproduction of the January 1865 PTCo catalogue is published in Hull 1979, 45-46; the reference to the repeater is to the Winchester Model 1866 Rifle, a repeating rifle with its tubular magazine holding 15 or more cartridges.
The Königgrätz effect

The Battle of Königgrätz (Hradec Králové), on 3rd July 1866, between Prussia and Austria, likely greatly calmed any remaining doubts senior military officers in many countries may have yet harboured about the combat value of breech-loading rifles. The universal opinion as events moved incrementally towards the battle, which many observers recognized as the deciding contest in the so-called ‘Seven Weeks’ War’, was that the Prussian army would be defeated with major losses: after all, it had not faced a major European power since the Battle of Waterloo fifty years before, and despite its success against Denmark in the Second Schleswig War of 1864, it was better known for its skill and appearance on the parade ground rather than the military field.\(^{25}\) In the event, though, the Austrian army was effectively annihilated, with losses of some 45,000 against 10,000 Prussian killed and wounded, the complete destruction of the Austrian forces being prevented only by the judicious use of their cavalry. What brought about the surprising Prussian victory was its use of the bolt-actioned breech-loading ‘\textit{leichtes Perkussionsgewehr Model 1841}’. Better known as the ‘\textit{Zündnadelgewehr}’ or ‘Needle-firing gun’, on account of its percussion method, using a long needle-like firing pin, this weapon, which had seen limited service use in the Second Schleswig War, had an effective range of 730–1,100 m., and could be loaded, fired, and re-loaded from a standing, kneeling, or prone position, at the rate of six or so rounds per minute.\(^{26}\) Thus the Prussian infantryman had a distinct advantage over his Austrian counterpart using a standard muzzle-loading firearm, fortunate indeed if he could fire two rounds a minute, and who had to either stand or kneel when reloading, forming a clear target for his opponent.\(^{27}\)

Even non-military specialists saw how the overwhelming Prussian success at Königgrätz was due in the main to their breech-operated \textit{Zündnadelgewehr}.\(^{28}\) As such, it is likely to have provided the impetus for the military of those nations lacking the industrial base for large-scale weapons production to seek abroad for reliable breech-loading rifles to equip their own armed forces. Be that as it may, it was surely hardly coincidental that in the months following immediately on from Königgrätz the PTCo received a rash of requests from outside of the USA for trials of their Peabody Military Rifle – presumably on the basis of its proven success in trials before the US Ordnance Board, even though the US Army itself had not accepted it for military use. What is certain is that already in August 1866, the Province of Canada tested and in September approved the purchase for its militia and volunteer units of 5,000 ‘Peabody military muskets’, each priced at US$ 25.\(^{29}\) The following month the Peabody Military Rifle was trialled by Austria, although the Austrian High Command settled eventually on a locally-derived version of the falling block system developed by J.Werndl, and in some respects

\(^{25}\) E.g., Friedrich Engels, writing on 20\textsuperscript{th} June 1866, before the battle: cf. Engels, 1975a, 173.
\(^{26}\) Strachan 1985, 38-40.
\(^{27}\) Cf. Fuller 1958, 139.
\(^{28}\) Cf. Engels, writing on 6\textsuperscript{th} July 1866, giving full credit to the \textit{Zündnadelgewehr} for the Prussian victory: cf. Engels 1975b, 188.
\(^{29}\) ‘Muskets’ still being the colloquial term for ‘long firearms’. For details of the Canadian contract, cf. Hull 1979, 11 and 49, with Achtermeier 1980, 32-33. As it was, 3,000 only were delivered as in March 1867, Ottawa used a contract option allowing them to cancel any further deliveries once that number had been delivered: Hull 1979, 11.
influenced, it is said, by the Peabody design. Further trials were commissioned later that same year by Denmark and by Russia, although in the event neither submitted an order; and by the Swiss also, who followed through with an order for 15,009 in June 1867. This perhaps persuaded Prussia to test an example of the Peabody Military Rifle in September 1867, although nothing further came of that. Then on the 4th April 1868 came an order from Romania, an Ottoman vassal state with a semi-independent status, for 15,000 Peabody Military Rifles, with the order for another 10,000 coming that October. By the end of the year Spain had ordered around 30,000 Peabody Military Rifles and Carbines for its garrison in Cuba, and a contract came from Mexico in 1870 for 8,500. But what must have formed the crème de la crème of the PTCo order book for the period 1866-1870 was the 1870 agreement with France to supply 35,000 Peabody Military Rifles and perhaps as many as 16,000 older muzzle-loading rifles converted to breech-loaders using the ‘Peabody system’, this being to compensate for the shortage of their own Mle 1866 ‘Chassepot’ rifles, needed urgently in response to a Prussian threat of war.

Even as these sales confirmed the efficiency of the Peabody mechanism others looked to improve it. This became clear to the PTCo in June 1867 when a Peabody Military Rifle was entered in a series of trials before the Ordnance Select Committee of the British Army to choose a breech-loading rifle for future service use. Among the other competitors was a rifle submitted by the Swiss-Hungarian Friedrich von Martini and it soon became obvious that his system was an ‘improved’ version of the Peabody mechanism, presumably developed after the Swiss army received samples of the Peabody Army Rifle for testing in 1866. Martini’s mechanism incorporated two incremental refinements of great significance, the first allowing the cocking of the mechanism by lifting the lever action, the second eliminating the external hammer firing system entirely in favour of central firing pin, so allowing the use of a more

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31 Denmark: Norton 1880, 29, and Hull 1979, 11; Russia: Hull 1979, 12. For the PTCo’s decision not to pay a ‘fee’ for an already provisionally agreed Russian contract, so loosening this to Colt’s Berdan Rifle, see Achtermeier 1980, 33. Irony of ironies, as the 1877-1878 War saw the Berdan matched in combat against the Peabody-Martini, and an American military observer considered the Berdan no match for the Peabody-Martini (Hozier 1877, 353), although it was notorious for the destructive power of its bullet (e.g., Ryan 1897, 132, 133, and 143).
32 Norton 1880 28-29; Hull 1979, 12; Achtermeier 1980, 3-34.
33 Norton 1880, 31; Hull 1979, 12
34 Norton 1880, 29; Hull 1979, 12; Achtermeier 1980, 34-35: the initial order was for rifles chambered at .41 calibre, as used by the Swiss army, but the second required rifles chambered at .45 calibre, known by then to be superior in terms of its ballistic properties.
36 Achtermeier 1980, 35-36 for these totals, but Norton 1880, 29, and Hull 1979, 14, speak of 39,000 rifles, Hull noting some carbines also. For the Peabody conversion system, see Hull, 1979, 52.
37 Hull 1979, 14, where it is stated that 33,000 were delivered, and notes examples with German markings, evidently captured during the war. According to Achtermeier 1980, 36 and 71, of the 51,000 total he claims were ordered, about 33-39,000 were delivered before 1871, some of these being offered after the war to Romania, but leaving the PTCo with the rest and an unpaid bill for these.
38 Norton 1880, 28-29; Hull 1979, 12; Achtermeier 1980, 33-34; and Rose 2009, 182.
reliable centre-fire cartridge. The resulting mechanism had a somewhat higher rate of fire as three simple movements only were involved in its operation: opening the breech and loading a cartridge; closing the breech which cocked the weapon simultaneously; then, after firing, opening the breech and ejecting the spent cartridge ready for reloading. On the 11th February 1868, the British Ordnance Select Committee recommended the adoption of Martini’s mechanism for further testing in combination with a barrel using the rifling system demonstrated in the same trials by Alexander Henry along with the ‘Boxer’ metallic-cased cartridge. However, an extended series of trials was to follow before a final version of the ‘Rifle, Breech-loading, Martini-Henry’ was approved formally for British army use on 12th October 1874.

Martini had applied on the 22nd July 1868 for a provisional British patent for the mechanism he submitted to the British trials, receiving a formal grant on the 22nd January 1869. This gave Peabody and the PTCo a chance to open a law suit in London on the 14th April 1869 for patent infringement. But, although Martini later freely admitted in print that his mechanism owed much to the Peabody system, he successfully argued how the basic concept behind the falling-block mechanism, on which the law case centred, was in common use. Then, as if to add salt in the wound, he went on to apply for and win a US patent on the 25th May 1869 for his ‘certain new and useful Improvements in Breech-Loading Fire-Arms’, following this with upgraded versions of the mechanism on the 30th May 1871 and the 15th October 1872.

Meanwhile, the PTCo was still trying to sell its Peabody Military Rifle to the US army and an example was submitted to an Army Board that met on the 10th March 1868 with evident success. Even so, it was decided to convene yet another board to re-examine the wider choice of breech-loading rifles now becoming available, this meeting in the summer of 1870 when it surprisingly rejected the Peabody Military Rifle. This was a startling decision in the eyes of the PTCo, given how well the rifle had been received in Europe and elsewhere, and was apparently due to repeated problems with the extractor system owing to imperfect cartridges. Despite appealing the decision so ended J.B. Anthony’s efforts and dreams of supplying the Peabody Military Rifle to his own country’s army, although the PTCo did manage to sell some of the surplus rifles remaining from the French contract to the National Guards of Con-

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39 Becket 2013, 239-240.
40 Becket 2013, 241-242. This in its various adaptations became the standard infantry weapon for the late 19th century British army, and those of a certain age or who are dedicated cinephiles will know the weapon for its appearance in the film *Zulu*.
41 GB patent No. 2305
42 Achtermeier 1980, 34.
43 Cf. Martini’s letter to *The Engineer* for 11th June 1869, on his system being an ‘improvement’ of the Peabody mechanism, and a second in the same paper for 25th June 1869 (quoted in Temple and Skennerton 1983, 48), stating how ‘That system [i.e., the falling block] is, however, neither peculiar to the Peabody firm, nor is Mr. Peabody its inventor.’
44 US patents 90614A, 115546A, and 132222 A; Martini renewed his British patent 2925 on the 31st October, 1871.
45 Norton 1880, 24-25.
46 Norton 1880, 25.
47 Norton 1880, 28.
necticut (in 1871), Massachusetts (1872), and South Carolina (1877).\(^{48}\) Instead it found its future, or so it seemed at the time, in supplying a version of the Peabody Military Rifle to the Ottoman Empire, and so the birth of the 'Aynali-Martini'.

**The Birth, Debut and End-life of the ‘Aynali Martini’**

As the American Civil War ran its course the types of infantry firearms used in that conflict and their capabilities did not escape the often myopic view common to many governmental dignitaries at Constantinople. The standard Ottoman infantry firearm at the time was one or other form of smooth-bore percussion-fired muzzle-loading musket, although from August 1853 onwards certain elite units were equipped with French- and Belgian supplied *Mle.1849* rifles, capable of a longer range and more accurate firing using the 'Minié Ball'.\(^{49}\) Even as the Civil War was in progress, though, the Ottoman government saw the need for more modern firearms. Thus in 1863, a rapid modernisation programme was initiated to provide its infantry and cavalry with these. There followed an initial order with a consortium of Birmingham gunsmiths for 50,000 rifled muzzle-loading Enfield muskets of the type favoured by both sides in the American Civil War, and a second in 1865 for 21,000 Enfield rifles fitted with breech-loading Snider mechanisms along with 6,000 of these devices for converting muzzle-loaders into breech-loaders, a third order for 3500 more rifles being placed in July 1868.\(^{50}\)

The Bab-i-Ali then explored what surplus weaponry was available in the United States, leading in 1869 to a contract for 114,000 ‘English Enfield’s’ and 125,000 US ‘Springfield’s’ at $4 and $7 respectively, with an option on another 120,000 Enfield's supplied at a later date, all of these firearms, along with the initial Birmingham purchases, being subsequently converted to the Snider breech-loading system at the Tophane, the official armoury in Constantinople.\(^{51}\) In addition, between 1870 and 1871, the Ottoman government received from the Winchester Repeating Arms Company between 46,000 and 56,000 of their Model 1866 repeating rifles and carbines,\(^{52}\) the latter intended principally for use by the Ottoman dragoon regiments, but also by a small number of other mounted troops.\(^{53}\) The end result was that by 1872, Constan-

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\(^{48}\) Respectively 2,000 and 2,941 of the rifles, and 350 of the carbines: cf. Hull 1979, 15-16.

\(^{49}\) Engels 1984, 501 (originally published as a leader in the *New York Daily Tribune* 3944, 7th December 1853), with Köremezli 2013, 124, and Uyar and Erickson 2009, 171.

\(^{50}\) Ward 1946, 13, with Taylerson 1983, 472, and Walters 2006, 459-460; but note that Gencer *et al.* 1981, has somewhat different figures and foreign sources also for the Snider conversions used in the Ottoman Empire, a topic deserving further investigation elsewhere.

\(^{51}\) Cf. Achtermeyer 1980, 37; Sander and Kurthan 1977, 56-58; and Seel 1981c, 1578. All contemporary or near contemporary references in Ottoman and other records refer usually to these conversions simply as Snider rifles: e.g., Dwight 1881, 84; Norman 1878, 16, 27, and 48, etc., etc. A common Turkish-language name for a Snider converted rifle was ‘igieli tupek’ or ‘needle gun’, as it used a long needle-like firing pin, as with the Prussian *Zündnadelgewehr*.


\(^{53}\) Gencer *et al.* 1981, 152 (Tablo 4). The rifle model is never referenced directly as such in contemporary sources except for one of 1879 reporting losses in the 1877-1878 war (see below, page page 247); the carbine was supplied evidently as a cavalry weapon as is indicated by many contemporary observers, e.g., Maurice 1877, 18; Greene
tinople had received some 512,500 Enfield and Springfield rifles for use by the infantry arm of the Ottoman army, all of these already or about to be converted to breech-loads, along with possibly as many as 48,314 Winchester rifles, and 18,425 Model 1866 repeating rifles and carbines.

News of the Ottoman re-armament programme using older weapons converted to breech-loaders evidently reached J.B. Anthony. Even though the PTCo had effectively abandoned military weapons production in 1871, after making at least 112,265 of their Peabody Military Rifles, it still had some unsold examples of these left over from the French 1870 contract, and, more importantly, the necessary machinery in situ as well as the experienced craftsmen on hand to re-start production of this rifle if a new order came through. Thus on 8th February 1872 negotiations began with Constantinople via Blacque Bey, the Ottoman representative in Washington DC, to supply the Bab-i-Ali with 50,000 Peabody Military Rifles, only to come to an abrupt end when Sultan Abdülaziz Baḫtsiz Şehid received a gift of allegedly as many as 50,000 Martini-Henry Rifles from Ismail, the Khedive of Egypt. These, it is said, so impressed the Sultan that in May 1872 he decided to equip the Ottoman army with the same rifle and a competition was announced to that effect to take place that summer to win a contract for 200,000. Despite submissions from a Birmingham consortium and the Winchester Repeating Rifle Company, the competition was won on the 25th July by the PTCo through Blaque Bey and the company’s agent in Constantinople, William de St.Laurent, the

1879, 141 (stressing how dragoon regiments only were supplied entirely with the weapon, along with two squadrons in each lancer unit); Herbert 1895, 23; with Norman 1877 adding that the Winchester was in use also by mounted jandarma (18-19), field artillery gunners (44), and Circassian irregular cavalry (e.g., 112, 114, etc.).

54 The total is derived from the sources cited in footnote 52 excluding the tables of Gencer et al. 1981. Of these weapons, official Ottoman records indicate that an all-round total of some 392,000 were available for service use in 1877: Dwight 1881, 84, with Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902, 33.

55 For the numbers and supply of the Winchesters, see Williamson 1952, 55-58; Trevelyan 2016, 49 and 60; Seel 1981c, 1578; and Gencer et al. 1981, 142.

56 Hull 1979, 14, Achtermeier 1980, 36 and 37.

57 Hull 1979, 20.

58 McCoan 1889, 144, with Weigall 1915, 106, are the ‘contemporary sources’: see also Hull 1979, 20; and Achtermeier 1980, 38. But the accuracy of the ‘contemporary sources’ for this exceptional generosity on the part of the Khedive is highly doubtful. Aside from the fact there does not seem to be any independent evidence that Martini-Henry Rifles may have been sent to the Khedive this early, the number of 50,000 allegedly presented in this way simply cannot be true as their production had barely started. By the end of 1871 less than 300 had been distributed for evaluation under service conditions (Temple and Skennerton 1983, 84 and 111; Becket 2013, 242), which identified a series of defects requiring modification and so the ‘Second Pattern’ of the rifle, approved for production on 3rd November 1872, with further changes resulting in the ‘Third Pattern’, introduced officially for service use on 1st October 1874 (Temple and Skennerton 1983, 112), although actual examples were not issued on a wholesale basis until 12th October 1874 (Becket 2013, 242). Thus while it is not impossible that the Khedive had somehow received or acquired one or more of the Martini-Henry trials rifles by the spring of 1872, the total number made by then cannot have approached anything near the alleged 50,000 at his disposal.


60 Norton 1880, 63. An attempt at winning the contract made by the BSA Company in Birmingham, England, then in the process of tooling up for production of the Martini-Henry rifle, failed – it is said – because their samples arrived too late for consideration as their local agent was ‘also acting for two firms in the United States [i.e., PTCo and Winchester] and had deliberately held back B.S.A.’s entry in the hope that the order would go to one of the American companies, from which a larger commission could be expected’: cf. Ward 1946, 16.
PTCo agreeing that within six months of receiving the necessary pattern rifles and cartridges, they would supply the first of the 200,000 of their own version of the Martini-Henry Rifle with a ‘quadrangular’ socket bayonet, at a cost of 63 English shillings apiece. At this point, though, Oliver Winchester, fortuitously in Constantinople acting on his own behalf, made use of his local contacts on 1st August to underbid the PTCo by offering the same number of rifles for 62 English shillings each. In the event the threat of a lawsuit from PTCo, as they owned the Peabody section of the mechanism, along with an intervention by the US government, and an awareness of his own company’s inability to meet the contract itself, obliged Winchester to surrender the contract to the PTCo as of 1st January 1873.

The contract with the PTCo specified that the rifles were to be exact copies of the Martini-Henry Rifle as approved for service use with the British Army with certain specific changes. One was relatively minor, that the tangent-sights be graduated in metres from 1-1,300 using the Persian-based Turkish number-system. A more significant difference was the demand they be chambered for a thinner ‘Berdan’-type cartridge, resulting in the 11.43 × 55R ‘Peabody-Martini Turkish Military cartridge’. This fired a lead bullet with a nominal calibre of .45 inches, as with the Martini-Henry, but was smaller in diameter than its .577-450 ‘Boxer’ cartridge, and so necessitated modifying the extractor and chambering system of the mechanism, albeit incidentally resulting in a stronger and better sealed and so more efficient receiver. A final adjustment required by the Sublime Porte was that the side of the receiver be stamped with the Sultan’s tughra, to denote imperial ownership of the weapon, and the rifle’s serial number in Turkish numerals. These differences apart, none of which would be apparent without a detailed examination, the Peabody-Martini Rifle was to be in all effects and purposes a direct clone of the Martini-Henry Mk. I Rifle.

On 11th March, 1873, the PTCo appointed Azarian Effendi Père et Fils as their agent in Constantinople. On that same day he negotiated a second contract for a further 300,000 rifles, and then a third on 23rd August 1873 for 100,000 more, thus 600,000 in all. The total of 600,000 made this the largest ever contract received by a fire-arms maker in the United States. But a stay in commencing production on the first 100,000 was forced on the PTCo partly by a delay in receiving the agreed three pattern rifles and the specimen cartridges to serve as models for their own product; but also in receiving the necessary cash deposit for full-production. A further complication came in the July of 1873, when Martini, who had patented his system in the US the previous year, opened a claim against PTCo for their intended use of his modified version of the Peabody action. This was not settled until October when Peabody and the PTCo were obliged to acknowledge his ‘improvement’ to the original Peabody mechanism as in the Martini-Henry Rifle, and the requirement they pay Martini two English shillings

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61 Achtermeier 1980, 38.
64 Norton 1880, 67.
65 Achtermeier 1980, 39.
68 US 132222 A of the 15th October 1872.
Fig. 1. A standard Peabody-Martini Rifle, shown here with a bayonet tenon on the top barrel band and yataghan-style bayonet as introduced with the final 200,000 versions of the rifle (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 2. The right side of the receiver of a Peabody-Martini rifle showing the tughra and serial number, and safety catch in the trigger guard, eliminated after 1876 (photograph courtesy of http://www.militaryrifles.com/Turkey/TpeabMar.htm).

Fig. 3. The left side of the receiver of a standard Peabody-Martini rifle, with the maker's mark (photograph courtesy of http://www.militaryrifles.com/Turkey/TpeabMar.htm).

Fig. 4. A Peabody-Martini breech block opened for loading, showing also the chequered thumb rest characteristic of the Martini-Henry Mk. 1 Rifle (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).
royalty for each of the new rifles, along with, so it would seem, combining his name with Peabody’s when advertising and marketing the rifle.69

The end result of these delays and the need to acquire the extra machinery and appropriate manufacturing space was that production of the Turkish contract rifles did not commence until April 1874: but even so, the PTCo was able to deliver the first of their 1,000 Peabody-Martini Rifles by the following March.70 As required these were essentially indistinguishable from a Martini-Henry Rifle (e.g., Fig. 1). Closer examination, though, naturally revealed the Turkish-numerals on the tangent leaf sight and, more obviously, the tughra stamped above the Turkish-numerals used for the serial number on the right side of the receiver (Fig. 2), the left side stamped ‘Peabody & Martini PATENTS / MAN’F’D BY / PROVIDENCE TOOL CO. / PROV. R.I. U.S.A.’ (Fig. 3),71 and the use of a small crescent moon and star symbol above a PTCo inspection letter, for example an ‘H’, on the barrel bands, the upper right hand side of the receiver plates, the cocking-indicator, and elsewhere (e.g., Fig. 11). Otherwise these ‘clones’, as it were, were direct copies of the Martin-Henry Mk. I Rifle, down to many of their finest details, to the extent of having the same chequered buttstock end plate, and the chequered thumb rest on the top right of the receiver (Fig. 4).72

A more obvious visual difference was only apparent in the form of the socket bayonet supplied with the Peabody-Martini Rifle, for as noted, the contract specified a socket bayonet of quadrangular form (Fig. 5). Moreover, unlike being fitted with the blade parallel to the right-hand side of the muzzle, as was usual for almost all socket bayonets, it was suspended directly beneath the barrel (Fig. 6). The reason for the choice of a quadrangular section and under-the-barrel location are unknown, and are features that at this time were shared only by the Dutch Beaumont Model 1871 rifle, although the Swiss had earlier used quadrangular-sectioned but side-mounted socket bayonets with their Model 1863 and Model 1871 rifles, while the Peabody Military Rifles they bought in 1867 came with a similar model bayonet, as did the Berdan rifled musket used by the Russians. Be that as may an under-the-barrel location might be related to giving the rifle holder a direct line of sight when firing the rifle with bayonet attached and when using the bayonet and rifle as a pike-like stabbing weapon. Whatever, the bayonet itself had an overall length of 23.25 inches (591 mm), with a blade measuring 20.12 inches (514 mm), and weighing around 14 ounces (390 gr.). Thus, when fitted to the 49 inch (124.5 cm) long rifle, it gave a pike-like weapon with a combined overall length of some 5 feet 8 inches (175 cm) from butt to the bayonet point. This seems an excess length in modern eyes but it was deemed essential at a time when ‘bayonet reach’, the ability of an infantryman to transfix a charging cavalryman or engage an enemy in bayonet combat when there was no chance to re-load the firearm, was a major consideration in infantry weaponry design.73

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70 Norton 1880, 63; Achtermeier 1980, 40.
71 On some versions of the rifle, the text reads ‘PATENT’ without the ‘S’ at the end.
72 Features such as these make it clear that the Peabody-Martini Rifle was indeed fashioned from an existing production version of the Martini-Henry Mk.1 Rifle, which begs the question of where the three examples of these sent as models from Constantinople came from.
73 E.g., Burton 1853, 7. Concern over the matter of supplying soldiers with a rifle and bayonet having a long enough reach for close combat with the enemy continued into the First World War as was demonstrated by a British
Fig. 5. A Peabody-Martini socket bayonet and scabbard (photograph courtesy of Mick Hibberd).

Fig. 6. An early production Peabody-Martini Rifle with socket bayonet fixed, demonstrating the novel under the muzzle placement shared with the Dutch Beaumont Model 1871 rifle as opposed to the usual right-hand side position of such bayonets (photograph from the collection of the late John Ward).

Fig. 7. Side view from the right of a Peabody-Martini Rifle with yatagahn bayonet fixed to the bayonet tenon on the top barrel band (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 8. Peabody-Martini yatagahn bayonets in their scabbards as seen at the Ankara Antika Pazari, the top one an original length version, with a repaired chape, the bottom one a shortened and straightened version (photographed by the writer with permission of their owners).
With production of the Peabody-Martini Rifles for the Ottoman contracts finally under way yet another halt in production threatened when Alexander Henry, who had patented his rifling system in Britain in 1860 and taken out a US patent on it the 10th October 1871, attempted in the early summer of 1874 to claim royalties on its use by the PTCo.74 His claim was disallowed: as the court heard, the basic concept behind rifled-barrels was well established in the United States and Henry had in any case neglected to apply for a US patent within one year of its publication in Britain as was required by United States law for it to be applicable there.75 Thus free to continue with production the PTCo managed to manufacture a further 53,600 Peabody-Martini Rifles in the course of 1874, well on the way to satisfying the initial Ottoman contract for 200,000.76 Indeed, the final weapons for this were delivered to Ottoman ownership by 9th November 1874,77 by when work had commenced on the second contract for 300,000 more.

These two successes were perhaps the reason for J.B. Anthony’s visit to Constantinople in January 1875, and his being honoured by the Sultan with enrolment in the Order of the Osmani Second Class.78 Also at this time negotiations began for a fourth contract for 200,000 Peabody-Martini Rifles, and a request for a change, that the final 2,000 rifles of the second and third contracts and – we might assume, those in the proposed fourth contract – be supplied with yataghan sword-bayonets as opposed to the socket bayonets agreed in the first two contracts.79 As it was the PTCo had produced some 10,411 Model 1860 sabres for the US Army between January 1862 and July 1863, but many of these were rejected at the official inspection stage for military issue, even if accepted eventually for use as meeting ‘serviceable quality’.80 Thus perhaps rather than face a potential similar problem by producing these in-house, the making of these yataghan bayonets was sub-contracted to the Ames Manufacturing Co. of Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts.81 They followed the standard yataghan form popular at the time, having a downward curved blade after the midpoint (Fig. 1). With their all steel construction they weighed around 2 pounds (930 gr.), with an overall length of 28 inches (714 cm), and a blade length of 22.6 inches (575 mm), they were fixed to the rifle by means of a tenon on the right side of the top barrel band (Fig. 7),82 and housed in a leather scabbard with steel


74 GB patent No. 2802, issued 15th November 1860; US patent 119846 A.
75 Full details of the case are given in Thurston 1878, and conveniently summarised by Norton 1880, 61. On 1st May 1874, Henry, gave notice of his intention to prolong the original patent: London Gazette, 1st May 1874.
76 Norton 1880, 63.
77 Hintermeier 2001, 120.
78 Achtermeier 1980, 41, where it is stated that the only other foreigner to receive this distinction was Alfred Krupp, the ‘Canon King’, then busy supplying the Ottoman Empire with artillery (e.g., Yorulmaz 2014, Chapter 3, passim), although Menne 1938, 150, in listing the 53 Prussian and other honours Krupp received states that he received the Medjedie Order, as did ‘Tom’ Bennett of the Winchester Repeating Rifle Company (Trevelyan 2016, 67), in his case for supplying ammunition to the Ottoman government. In 1890 and 1892 Paul Mauser was to receive a series of Ottoman awards for the supply of Mauser rifles to the Ottoman Empire, culminating in the Osmani Second Class: Seel 1981 b, 1265.
79 Hull 1979, 21, with Hull 1989; Achtermeier 1980, 41.
80 Hull 1979, 5-6.
82 Hull 1979, 21.
fittings when not in use (Fig. 8). The result for the infantryman wielding a Peabody-Martini rifle with a fixed yataghan bayonet was a slightly longer weapon than before, at about 6 feet (181.6 cm) long, but certainly a heavier one.

By the summer of 1876, work on the second contract of Peabody-Martini Rifles was well advanced when the Ottoman government was hit by a series of financial crises. The agreed payments to the PTCo for the first contract were stalled, promoting a refusal to deliver 40,000 already completed rifles of the second contract – and a threat even to cease arms production entirely unless cash was forthcoming. On the 20th November 1876, by when the PTCo had made an overall total of 369,200 Peabody-Martini rifles, the suggestion was made to lessen production costs at no financial loss to PTCo by eliminating the safety mechanism on the weapon, just as the British had done during production of the Martini-Henry Mark I. Then, in February 1877, sufficient monies were received by the PTCo to pay for the release of the 40,000 rifles embargoed in 1876, and resume production of the remaining rifles for the second contract, with 73,000 rifles ready for delivery by the summer of 1877.

What prompted the Ottoman government to pay its dues to the PTCo in early 1877 and so release the 40,000 embargoed rifles and re-commence production of those ordered in the second contract was quite simply the threat of war with Russia. Thus at about the time the war actually began, in April 1877, the Ottoman army had access to 334,000 Peabody-Martini Rifles, 323,000 ‘Snider’ rifles, and 39,000 Winchester Model 1866 repeating rifles and carbines, the rifles for infantry use, the carbines by the various cavalry and other mounted units. The Peabody-Martini, including some of those supplied with the new yataghan-form bayonet, quickly proved its worth in action at the Siege of Plevna, playing a vital part in resisting the three attempts at capturing the place, and thus substantially impeding the Russian advance on Constantinople in what became known as the ‘Plevna Delay’.

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84 Hull 1979, 22 for the total; Hintermeier 2001, 120.
85 Hull 1979, 21-22; Achtermeier 1980, 42: those completed with the safety mechanism are referred to by collectors as the ‘Type A’ those without as the ‘Type B’. The same device had been eliminated on the Martini-Henry Mark I some time earlier, on the 11th November, 1873, to be precise.
86 Achtermeier 1980, 42.
87 Dwight 1881, 84, reporting information received from Ahmet Mithad Effendi, the most prominent journalist of the later Tanzimat period, and with access to government figures. Cf. Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902, 46, evidently derived from the same or a similar source. Most if not all of the ammunition for these weapons came from the Winchester Repeating Rifle Company, which supplied some 87.5 million Peabody-Martini cartridges in 1874 and 112.45 million in 1875, and 80.1 million Snider cartridges in 1876-1877: hence the award in 1877 of the Mejidie order to the company’s chief negotiator ‘Tom’ Bennett while visiting Constantinople: cf. Williamson 62-63 with 65 and 67.
88 Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902, 44-45, where it is also observed that ‘nach offiziellen türkischen Daten’ (‘according to official Turkish sources’), 310,000 only of the 334,000 Peabody-Martini’s had actually been issued for service use. The distribution and use of the Winchester Model 1866 Rifle is a mystery element in the 1877-1878 War as unlike the carbine equivalent, used by mounted units, no sources identify it specifically as being used in the campaign, although an Ottoman report for 1879 does refer, *inter alia*, to the loss of 28,527 rifles in the 1877-1878 campaign: see below.
89 Cf. Herbert 1895, 23: ‘The equipment [of the Turkish infantry] consisted of a Martini-Peabody rifle and sword-bayonet’ and 352-353: ‘The bayonets were sharpened; the men had two each, one sword-shape, and one of the ordinary [i.e., socket] kind.’
A detailed account of the Siege of Plevna and the ‘Plevna Delay’ is not necessary here. But what cannot be eschewed is a rebuttal – no matter how brief – of a growing tendency in some modern literature – especially ‘on-line’ sources – to down-play the role of the Peabody-Martini in the defence of Plevna in favour of emphasising the use at close range by its infantry garrison of an allegedly 8-12,000 or so rapid firing Winchester repeater rifles they were armed with. This is to ignore contemporary accounts such as the memoirs of Osman Pasha, along with others, stating quite categorically that the Turkish infantry at Plevna did not use the Winchester Model 1866 Rifle. The Winchester carbine was, of course, issued to mounted units or elements thereof; but as there were no more than 1500 or so cavalry of all kinds at Plevna, the maximum number of Winchester carbines available for its defence was probably nearer 1,000. Quite simply, aside from how contemporary records indicate clearly that the Winchester was not thought of very highly of as a service weapon, the rapid and devastating fire that decimated the Russian infantry attacks on the place was the ease of loading and reloading of the Peabody-Martini together with its capability for long-distance and plunging fire and – in particular – an abundance of ammunition. Indeed, so effective was the rifle in this way the Russian commander, General Skoubeloff, ordered the re-arming of one company in the Russian 63rd Regiment with captured Peabody-Martini Rifles for an attack on one particularly well-entrenched Ottoman position at the decisive Battle of Shipka in January 1876. 

Footnotes:
90 E.g., Götz 1974, 60, and Trenk 1997, followed, without question by, e.g., Rose, 2009, 184-185 (where it is also claimed that the Ottoman government was so impressed by the Winchester's performance that after Plevna, another 140,000 were ordered!), Haag 2016, 140-141, and Trevelyan 2016, 64-66, especially 66. The origin of the belief can be traced back to Boudre 1878, 350, where it is stated that each Ottoman infantry man on the front line was given a Winchester in the early stages of the Battle of Plevna; and Springer 1891, 305, similarly, where it is stated that ‘...jeder türkische Soldat ... mit 15 Patronen geladene Winchester-Gewehr und beschloss die Russen welche nach furchtbaren Verlusten auf dem Sturm mussten’.  
92 Berry 2011, Appendices VII, XIII, and XIX.  
93 E.g., Osman Pacha et al. 1878, 350, on how the Winchester was considered so poor a firearm it was withdrawn from use during the course of the 1877-1878 war. Also Greene 1879, 141, ‘Only the cavalry on the Turkish side was inferior in armament to the cavalry of the Russians; the latter had the short Berdan ... while the Turks had the Winchester, which, although a repeating arm, has such a small charge and short range as to make it a very inferior weapon’; and Herbert 1895, 23, and 25, where it is noted how ‘The weapons gave satisfaction in 1877, except the Winchester repeating carbine, against which frequent complaints were heard’. Contemporary statements such as these negate completely those unsupported claims for the influence of the Winchester at Plevna and elsewhere in the 1877-1878 war along the lines of, e.g., ‘The Winchester 1866 ... proved the deciding factor because of its firepower in early battles against Russia’ – Smith and Smith 1948, 395.  
94 Cf. Greene 1879, 17: ‘The supply of ammunition was one of the few effective organizations in the Turkish army, and the infantry were prodigal in its use. They frequently opened fire at a range of 2,000 yards when occupying field works, and were accustomed to keep up an uninterrupted fusillade, often without raising their heads over the parapet to aim’. Also Herbert 1859, 352-353, who notes that on the attempted break-out of the garrison on 9th November 1877: ‘Each man carried 130 cartridges, eighty in the pouch and fifty in the haversack. Each battalion had a reserve stock of 180,000 cartridges (or 150 per man, taking the average at 100 men per battalion), in 180 boxes of 1,000 each’.  
95 Greene 1879, 353-354.
The Peabody-Martini Rifle, then, was the fundamental infantry weapon in the Ottoman resistance at Plevna and elsewhere in the Ninth Russo-Turkish War. But Plevna and other actions in that campaign evidently resulted in their heavy wastage, including – as we have seen – a sufficient number captured and used against their former owners by the Russian 63rd infantry regiment. Indeed, according to an official Ottoman reports in June 1879, the 1877-1878 War had resulted in the loss of 156, 277 'Martini-Henry' rifles (by which the Peabody-Martini is clearly meant as the Ottoman army never received any of these British-made weapons), together with 207,555 Snider rifles, 11,708 Winchester carbines and 28,527 Winchester rifles. The war also naturally drained Ottoman finances even further. Thus the last of the 600,000 contract rifles in the third PTCo contract were not paid for and completed before 24th December 1879, after which they were dispatched to Constantinople.

With the receipt of the last of these contracted rifles, records for 1880 indicate that the Ottoman army had access to about 350,000 Peabody-Martini rifles, along with some 400,000 ‘Snider’ rifles, 20,000 Winchester repeaters, and 20,000 Remington rifles. But however much the Ottoman government may have wished for a renewed and continued supply of Peabody-Martini Rifles to make up the losses of the 1877-1878 War and so bring the effective total back up to the original 600,000, this was no longer possible. The life of the PTCo itself was close to its end for a variety of reasons, but most especially the various defaults of the Ottoman payments allied to a costly expansion into the sewing-machine industry. Having declared bankruptcy on 19th April 1882, its gun-making machinery was sold that 1st August, with the PTCo closing formally for business in 1885. It had by then manufactured some 630,737 Peabody-Martini rifles, 369,200 of Type A with the safety catch and 251,537 of Type B without this, 600,000 of these being delivered to the Ottoman government, along with a further 5,000 examples for the Valide Sultan and 717 for private buyers, the 15,020 residue being delivered to the civilian market.

Yet the Peabody-Martini had clearly proved so vital in infantry use that by 1881 already, the Ottoman government had embarked on a programme of making its own substitutes at Constantinople. Such is indicated by Ottoman records for the Tüfekhâne-i Âmire that year recording the manufacture of as many as 840 ‘Martini-Henry’ rifles a week as well as ‘Sniders’

96 Hence the observation alleged of a Romanian veteran of Plevna when France offered to sell to Romania the surplus Peabody Military Rifles in their own stocks after the Franco-Prussian War: ‘If you must have a Peabody, get a Peabody-Martini – the same as the Turk has’: Achtermeier 1980, 35-36.
97 Greene 1879, 355, Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902, 122.
98 Olgun 2017, 629.
99 Hunt 1979, 22; Achtermeier 1980, 43.
101 Achtermeier 1980, 42.
102 Achtermeier 1980, 43.
103 Achtermeier 1980, 43; Hintermeier 1981, 120. Gencer et al. 208, 152 (Tablo 4), note the models delivered to the Valide Sultan arrived 26th Nisan 1291, but do not record the private purchases.
and Winchester repeating rifles.\textsuperscript{104} It seems likely that part of the workforce engaged in this work was of Albanian origin, as gunsmiths from the Kosovo and Tetovo region had been busily engaged for some time in their home region in making a generic version of the ‘Martini-Henry’ and other Ottoman service rifles for sale to local residents and others, Albanian nationals certainly being employed at the Tüfekhâne-I ‘Âmire as late as 1903.\textsuperscript{105} Be that as it may, the manufacture of these ‘clones’ meant that by 1886, the Ottoman army had between 339,160 and 450,000 Peabody-Martini rifles in service use or in store, along with 396,172 ‘Sniders’ and 9,370 Winchesters.\textsuperscript{106}

This number of weapons was, however, apparently deemed insufficient or their types too obsolete for the needs of the Ottoman army as then being reorganised with the help of seconded German officers under the overall authority of Major (later General) Colmar von der Goltz: so the Ottoman government began preliminary discussions on ordering 450,000 Martini-Henry Rifles from British manufacturers.\textsuperscript{107} The Mauser concern in Germany, having been made aware of this potential contract, responded by entering their \textit{Gew. 71/84}, a bolt-actioned rifle with an 8-round tubular magazine, for a series of trials at Constantinople in December 1886 against other competitors that included Martini-Henry, Mannlicher, and Hotchkiss Rifles.\textsuperscript{108} The Sultan’s decision on these trials, made on either the 6\textsuperscript{th} or 10\textsuperscript{th} February 1887, was for the Mauser, and discussions began on purchasing 500,000 rifles and 50,000 carbines of a modified version of the \textit{Gew. 71/84}.\textsuperscript{109} Thus the birth of the 9.5 × 60 mm calibre ‘Turkish Model’ 1887 rifle and carbine, and a long period of collaboration between Constantinople and the Mauser concern that saw the introduction into Ottoman service of successively the ‘Turkish Model’ 1890 rifle, with its smaller and more powerful 7.65 × 53mm cartridge propelled by smokeless powder, and then, using the same cartridge, the ‘Turkish Model’ 1893 and ‘Turkish Model’ 1903.\textsuperscript{110}

This decision to adopt the ‘Turkish Model’ 1887 and its successors did not, though, end for once and all Ottoman military use of the ‘Aynali Martini’, even if an official inventory in 1887 declared the 450,000 ‘Martini-Henry’s’ then in stock ‘obsolete and useless’.\textsuperscript{111} A report submitted in 1890 to his government by the then British Naval Attaché at Constantinople noted how in 1888, examples of ‘Martin-Henry’s’ were being made at the Tüfekhâne-I ‘Âmire in 1888 at a rate of 100 a week, although this had dropped to ten a week at the time his report

\textsuperscript{104} Cf. Yorulmaz 2014, 97-98. It is not at all clear how these rifles may have been marked, although Martini-Henry/Peabody-Martini Rifle look-a-likes, with tughrs on the right-hand side of the receiver and a series of unintelligible letter markings on the left-hand side, have been noted in the Ankara Antika Pazarı and elsewhere, and may well represent these.

\textsuperscript{105} Olgun 2017, 630 with 637.

\textsuperscript{106} Yorulmaz 2014, 110, with 215.

\textsuperscript{107} Yorulmaz 2014, 33-34 and 110.

\textsuperscript{108} Yorulmaz 2014, 113-114.

\textsuperscript{109} Yorulmaz 2014, 116, for the 6\textsuperscript{th} February, and Seel 1981a, 800, for the 10\textsuperscript{th}.

\textsuperscript{110} For a detailed account, see Ball 2011, 374-388, where the rifles and the various carbine versions are profusely discussed and illustrated.

\textsuperscript{111} Yorulmaz 2014, 110.
was compiled, this drop evidently in response to the arrival of their Mauser replacements. And yet even as late as 1896, despite having been declared ‘obsolete and useless’ some 10 years earlier, the Ottoman army registered some c. 500,000 ‘Martini’ rifles among its stock of rifles, along with 150,000 ‘Sniders’; c. 50,000 Winchester repeaters; c. 50,000 Remington’s; 220,000 ‘Turkish Model’ 1887 rifles and 4,000 carbines; 280,000 ‘Turkish Model’ 1890 rifles; and 201,900 ‘Turkish Model’ 1893 rifles.

The ‘Martini-Henry’ rifles inventoried at this time were evidently not all PTCo products as the total of 500,000 or so is higher than the 350,000 indicated in the inventory list for 1880, and thus must include ‘clones’ produced at the Tüfekhâne-I ‘Âmire after 1881. But be that as may the decision to keep this substantial number of Peabody-Martini or the locally-made ‘Martini-Henry’ rifles as a stand-by weapon was a testament to its reliability and durability if future circumstances required, having won this reputation in the 1877-1878 war: as a contemporary observer then noted, a Peabody-Martini could be used in such ‘a condition that would drive the captain of a line regiment into an early grave’. To be sure, the Peabody-Martini Rifle, along with one or other of the older Snider conversions, continued to be the standard Ottoman infantry rifle almost until the end of the 19th century, owing to a failure to distribute the stocks of Mausers to the army for training purposes, which meant that those already delivered remained in store right up until the outbreak of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897. That is why in the event, some units were given Mausers in exchange for Peabody-Martini’s and other rifles as they marched off to battle, and then had to be trained in their use under campaign conditions, but even so, it is thought that as many as nine out of every ten divisions involved in the campaign used Peabody-Martini or other long obsolete weapons, some units even being armed with muzzle-loaders of an uncertain but evidently great vintage.

In the years that followed the 1897 War the Ottoman army continued to build up its stocks of Mauser weaponry while maintaining its reserve of Peabody-Martini and other rifles for use by, or so it seems, second line army units and the Jandarma. In fact such was the reliance on the Peabody-Martini even as an ostensibly secondary weapon for service use that in 1910 the Ottoman government adopted finally a suggestion made initially some 20 years earlier by Paul Mauser to re-chamber these to take the same 7.65 × 53 mm standard cartridge as employed in the ‘Turkish Models’ 1890, 1893, and 1903, and thus avoid the potential logistical nightmare during wartime of delivering the appropriate ammunition to units armed with either Mausers or Peabody-Martini rifles. As it was, in 1892 the Österreichische Waffenfabriks-Gesellschaft at Steyr, having heard of the possibility at the time that the Ottoman Peabody-Martini Rifles might be converted to the Mauser standard cartridge, had patented a suitable conversion process already: thus in early 1910 they received a contract to produce 200,000 new chambers

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112 Cf. Yorulmaz 2014, 98.
113 Seel 1981c, 1579.
114 Seel 1981c, 1579.
115 Norman 1887, 184.
116 Seel 1981c, 1580.
117 Yorulmaz 2014, 129-130, for a selection of contemporary accounts regarding weapons in use in the campaign; also Seel 1981c, 1580.
Fig. 9. A post-1910 Peabody Martini Rifle as chambered for the standard Mauser 7.65 × 53 cartridge, with the shortened barrel, 'Turkish Model' 1903 woodwork, alongside a straightened yataghan bayonet associated with this firearm (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 10. The right hand side of a receiver converted to the Mauser 7.65 × 53 cartridge, showing the strengthening plate added to the rear of the breech system (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 11. The left hand side of the receiver as in Fig. 10, showing the strengthening plate and the added legend in Osmanlıca script recording conversion to the Mauser 7.65 × 53 cartridge at the “Tüfenk Fabrikası/Istanbul”, and the date 1327. Note also the crescent and star inspection mark above the letter ‘M’ at the top left of the receiver plate as received in the PTCo factory before being despatched to Constantinople (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 12. The new serial marking on the breech block of a post-1910 converted Peabody-Martin Rifle (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 13. View from above of the muzzle of a converted Peabody-Martini rifle muzzle with stud for fitting a socket bayonet and top barrel band with a bayonet tenon (lower left) for fitting a yataghan bayonet (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).
and barrels to suit the Mauser cartridge along with 150,000 ‘Turkish Model’ 1903 sights, these being supplied to Constantinople for fitting between October 1910 and March 1911.119

The converted rifles have a barrel length of 29.13 inches (740 mm), some 4 inches (10 cm shorter) than before (Fig. 9), giving an overall length of 3 feet 9 inches (1.14 m). The thicker and stronger barrel and chamber required for the new cartridge, which meant adding a strengthening plate also to the receiver at the rear of the breech (Fig. 10), resulted in a rifle that was now slightly heavier, at 9 pounds 4 ounces or so (4.12 kg). The left hand-side of the receiver of these conversions received an Osmanlaci text beneath the original Peabody-Martini marking indicating its conversion and the year this was done, as for example (e.g., Fig. 11), ‘Tüfenk Fabrikası / İstanbul / Sene – 1327’,120 and so ‘Rifle Factory, Istanbul, year 1911/1912’, and the top of the breech facing the user was stamped with a new serial number (e.g., Fig. 12). According to the known and recorded breech serials as collated by collectors, at least 2,337 conversions were completed in the year 1327 (1911/1912), 119,683 during 1328 (1912/1913), and 164,236 in 1331 (1915/1916), although for some reason the highest individual number reported, at 173,778, is on a conversion dated 1330 (1914/1915), and so the conversion was done sometime before the serial number was added.121 The necessary new woodwork for the conversion – the handguard and forestock – was configured to match the ‘Turkish Model’ 1903 system and fitted with a ‘Turkish Model’ 1903 leaf sight, and as they were required to take the existing stocks of Peabody-Martini bayonets,122 the muzzles were provided with both a socket lug on the muzzle itself and a bayonet tenon on the top barrel bar (Fig. 13). Given the existence of large numbers of Peabody-Martini yataghan bayonets that have been straightened and shortened (as in Figs. 8, 9 and 14) to a blade length of around 18 inches (46 cm), reducing the weight to around 1 pound 12 ounces (800 gr), it is only natural to assume these were adapted at this time to help provide better balance to the rifle when affixed. When not in use, they were housed in a shortened version of the original leather scabbard (Fig. 8), although a single steel example has been recorded (Fig. 14).

Photographic evidence would seem to confirm these conversions were in service use during the First Balkan War of 1912-1913 by both regular and irregular troops,123 and so perhaps they were used in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912 also. They were certainly in action at Gallipoli, for the diary of Lt Mehmed Fasih, a serving officer there, reports for 22nd October 1915 that the newly arrived Turkish 64th Regiment was equipped with ‘modified Martini Rifles’.124 Moreover, British Military Intelligence was evidently well aware of how the Ottoman

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120 Sometimes the word for year and the number are reversed, and so, e.g., ‘1331 – sene’.
121 Royal Armouries Museum, inventory no. pr 6534 Catalogue-IRN-276788: this is perhaps the one in the now-closed pattern room of the Royal Ordnance collection at Nottingham referred to by Hintermeier 2001, 125, as being the latest example known to him. Note also that all of the conversions seen and recorded by the writer and others on various collector’s on-line forums have certainly been original Peabody-Martini rifles, making it almost definite that none of the ‘Martini-Henry’ clones made at Constantinople between 1881 and 1902 or thereabouts were ever adapted for the Mauser cartridge.
123 Cf. Jowett 2011, 47.
124 Danişman 2001, 27. The regiment was part of the 7th Infantry Division, and had been alerted for combat readiness as early as 26 April 1915: cf. Erickson 2007, 40.
army still relied on the Peabody-Martini Rifle despite it having been officially declared obsolete in 1886. Such is made clear by their report for 1916 which notes how in addition to the various Mauser and other rifles then in service with the Ottoman army, 500,000 ‘Martini-Henry [and] Martini-Peabody rifles’ were available, of which 370,000 were said to date to the war of 1877-1878 and so are certainly Peabody-Martini’s. The report goes on to note how the ‘two types of Martini [sic]’ were being converted to take the Mauser 7.65 mm cartridge and that ‘about 180 Martini’s [sic]’ are, it is said, being converted daily in Constantinople, noting later that ‘the Constantinople factory is said to turn out 100 or 150 [conversions] daily’, although the only such conversions reported in the literature are all Peabody-Martini’s rather than ‘Clones’. British Military Intelligence further concluded that as of July 1914, the ‘Henri-Martini’ (sic) rifle was in use solely by the Lebanese Militia and some of the ‘Asian’ Gendarmerie units, although as we have seen above, converted versions were used by the Ottoman 64th Regiment at Gallipoli.

Be that as it may, the First World War was the last campaign in which the Peabody-Martini is known for certain to have been in service use. Indeed, it was most probably gradually withdrawn from combat duty from 1916/1917 onwards, when Turkey began to be supplied by Germany with a mix of their now obsolete Gew. 88 and surplus-to-requirements but up-to-date Gew. 98. Certainly, there is no evidence for the Peabody-Martini rifle having been deployed during the Turkish War of Independence. But even if it was, it is likely to have been retired for once and for all soon after 1933, when the army of the Turkish Republic began to convert its stocks of German-made Mauser rifles for a 7.9 × 57 cartridge, this same calibre being employed in the Turkish Mauser derivatives produced by the ASFA concern at Kirikkale after 1938. Be that as it may, those specimens of Peabody-Martini Rifles that survive in museums and in private collections are now the only clear if often neglected reminders of its important role in the declining years of the Ottoman Empire. But for a more precise example of its raison d’être in that tempestuous period we shall conclude this study with an example of a partly-preserved regular Peabody-Martini yataghan bayonet found during controlled archaeological excavations at the deserted Arab village of Qaluniya near Jerusalem (Fig. 15). The place served as an Ottoman army outpost during the Great War of 1914-1918, before being ‘silently dealt with’ by forces of the 60th British division as part of the advance on Jerusalem, at which point, as the find shows, the garrison still relied apparently on a rifle and bayonet supplied at least 36 year earlier, further testimony to the reliability and durability of the Peabody-Martini Rifle as the Ottoman Army’s first modern rifle.

125 Anon. 1916, 10. ‘The figures for the Mauser rifles were: 500,000 in 7.65 mm calibre, and so ‘Turkish Models’ 1890, 1893 and 1903, and 200,000 in 9.5 mm calibre, the ‘Turkish Model’ 1887, and the report notes that ‘considerable numbers of Remington’s and Winchester repeating rifles’ were also in use. The source for the figues is not clear, but records indicate that a total of 900,000 Mauser firearms of all models had been sent to Constantinople between 1886 and 1908: cf. Yorulmaz 2014, 128. What is confusing here is the indication that 130,000 or so ‘Martini-Henry’ rifles were in Ottoman service: as noted earlier, there is no evidence the Ottoman army ever received a supply of British-made Martini-Henry rifles and so these are presumably clones of one kind or another.

126 Anon. 1916, 11 with 57.

127 Anon. 1916, 55, with 11 and 102.

128 I am especially grateful to Assaf Peretz for information on this find, and to Shua Kisilevitz and Anna Eirikh-Rose of the Israel Antiquities Authority, for permission to publish it here. For a preliminary account of the multi-period site where it was discovered, but not the bayonet itself, see Kisilevitz et al. 2014.
Fig. 14. A shortened Peabody-Martini yataghan with a steel scabbard (photograph courtesy of Mick Hibberd).

Fig. 15. The remains of a standard Peabody-Martin yataghan bayonet and its surviving steel locket from its leather scabbard found in the remains of the Arab village of Qaluniya, an Ottoman outpost in World War One (photograph courtesy of Assaf Peretz, and Shua Kisilevitz and Anna Eirikh-Rose of the Israel Antiquities Authority).

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