Inside Outsiders: Comparing State Policies Towards Citizens of Palestinian and Kurdish Descent in Israel and Turkey

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ABSTRACT
This study compares state policies of Israel and Turkey regarding their citizens of Palestinian and Kurdish descent, respectively. It then explores the reasons for the differences and points at the consequences for Israel’s and Turkey’s democracy. Israel’s citizens of Palestinian descent and Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish descent have faced systematic discrimination. While Israel never considered assimilating its Palestinian citizens into mainstream Israeli national identity, considering Jewishness as its essential and indispensable element, Turkey engaged in assimilation policies vis-à-vis its Kurdish citizens, which met with limited success. While applying different methods in defining the boundaries of Israeli and Turkish ethnicity, both Israel and Turkey have refused to view members of these groups as equal citizens. Awarding full citizenship rights has been questioned on accounts of Jewish sovereignty-dilution fears in Israel and of Kurdish self-determination and partition in Turkey. Failing to distinguish their citizens from their trans-border ethnic kin groups and viewing them as part of a transnational community threatening Israeli and Turkish sovereignty, Israel’s citizens of Palestinian descent and Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish descent have been turned into ‘inside outsiders’. This has deprived them of fundamental constitutional rights and limited the prospects of democratic consolidation in both states.

Introduction
As nation states often failed to achieve their promise of full national homogenization, it became clear that ethnic differences do not necessarily erode over time. Ethnically diverse societies are more prone to social tension and political conflict, as one ethnic group dominates others in terms of competition over political access and resources. Israel and Turkey were established in the first half of the twentieth century through nationalist projects with strong modernist orientations, namely Zionism and Kemalism. The formation of the Israeli and Turkish nation states simultaneously led to the ‘minoritization’ of those Palestinians and Kurds, who became citizens of Israel and Turkey, constituting the largest ethnic groups in their respective countries. Currently, there are 1.7 million Israeli citizens of Palestinian descent within the 1967 borders of Israel, comprising 21% of the population;
while, according to various counts, between 14 and 15 million Kurds reside in Turkey, constituting approximately 18% of the country’s population. \(^5\)

Managing ethnic diversity within a state depends on policy choices and institutional arrangements. Vestiges of the Ottoman *millet*, a system of non-territorial autonomy in which various religious groups had been categorized into culturally autonomous and self-regulating communities, continued to exist in Israel and Turkey though at different levels. \(^6\) While *millet*-like institutional arrangements led to a strict and salient separation between Jews and non-Jews in Israel, non-Muslims transformed from *millet* to minorities in republican Turkey. On the other hand, various Sunni Muslim communities living in Anatolia, including the Kurds, and the Alevi were considered as ‘prospective Turks’ \(^7\) or potential members of the Turkish ethno-cultural community. Therefore, Israel and Turkey adopted fundamentally different policies towards their largest ethnic minority groups. While Israel’s Palestinian citizens have enjoyed some minority rights, such as mother tongue education, an official status granted to Arabic language \(^8\) and religious autonomy, the ‘Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty of Israel’, which has functioned as the country’s *de facto* constitution, has defined Israel as a ‘Jewish state’, thus putting the equal rights of all non-Jewish within the Israeli polity into question. Israel has maintained a preference for Jews, regardless of their citizenship, and restricted the access of its Palestinian citizens to power, resources and land allocation. \(^9\) In contrast, the Republic of Turkey aspired to forcibly assimilate Kurds into Turkish national identity, \(^10\) and any expression of a distinct Kurdish ethnic identity was suppressed until the 1990s. \(^11\) Citizens of Kurdish descent enjoyed equal rights insofar as they had willingly assimilated into the Turkish nation. \(^12\) In the early 2000s, when EU harmonization packages aiming to bring the Turkish constitution and legislation in line with the Copenhagen Criteria and the *aquis communautaire* were introduced, a comprehensive reform process was launched regarding Kurdish minority rights, including topics such as education and broadcasting in Kurdish. Despite these steps, there was, however, no redefinition of Turkish national identity along civic lines, in order to accommodate the Kurdish minority: national identity continued to be based on Turkish ethnicity.

There is a shortage of in-depth qualitative research in the literature which compares majority–minority relations in Israel and Turkey, despite a long-term strategic partnership between the two countries. \(^13\) Only Peleg and Waxman offered an analysis in which they defined Israel as an ‘ethnic’ and Turkey as a ‘civic’ state. \(^14\) Nevertheless, an analysis within the framework of civic vs. ethnic dichotomy cannot grasp the complexity of majority–minority relations and how national identities have been constructed, negotiated and developed in Israel and Turkey. Although the two states have followed fundamentally different ethnic policies, exclusion and separation in one case and forced inclusion by means of assimilation in the other, which led to the different treatment of Palestinian and Kurdish citizens, respectively, they have converged in denying full citizenship rights to the members of their biggest minorities. Especially in recent decades, both states have been challenged from their Palestinian and Kurdish minorities seeking equal treatment with the Jewish and Turkish majorities. Minority demands share common elements: redrawing more inclusive national identities, equal citizenship rights and effective inclusion into the political system.

In light of these observations, this study aims to address the following questions: What are the boundaries of Israeli and Turkish national identities? Why have the Israeli and Turkish states followed different policies towards their largest ethnic minorities and yet
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Moreover, therefore, national identities are socially constructed as a result of interactions between actors, power relations and political processes. Starting in the 1990s, Palestinian and Kurdish political mobilization has led to repeated demands for redrawing national boundaries on a more inclusive basis, something that would result in a more pluralistic political system. How have the Israeli and Turkish states responded to these demands? Why has their response been remarkably similar, although they had followed different policies regarding the definition of ethnic boundaries?

Wimmer’s boundary-making approach-boundary-making strategies in Israel and Turkey

Ethnic boundaries are key to explaining ethnic or national group formation as they determine who is a member of the in-group and who is not. Wimmer defined ethnic boundaries as ‘the subjective ways that actors establish by pointing specific markers that distinguish them from ethnic others’. Ethnic boundaries are understood as socially constructed; they are not fixed and immutable, but fluid across time, permeable and crossable.

Wimmer distinguished several types of boundary-making strategies: some nation builders aimed to shift boundaries, by means of expansion and contraction, while others aimed to modify boundaries’ meanings and implications, by means of inversion, repositioning and blurring. Expansion refers to creating a new and more inclusive boundary by expanding the range of people included. The opposite strategy, contraction, means drawing a narrower boundary by excluding certain groups from the in-group to reduce the number of people included to a core population. Wimmer also identified three types of strategies seeking to alter the meaning of an existing boundary: inversion, repositioning and blurring. Inversion referred to changing the meaning of an existing boundary by challenging the hierarchical ordering of ethnic groups. There are two subtypes of inversion: normative inversion in which the excluded group challenges the ethnic category and claims superiority vis-à-vis the dominant group and equalization where the excluded group pursues equality among ethnic categories. Repositioning might take place on either individual or group level and refers to changing one’s social membership by moving from one side of a boundary to another or repositioning one’s whole social category. Finally, blurring aims to overcome ethnicity as a principle of categorization and social organization by promoting other non-ethnic markers, such as civilizational and religious affiliation.

Despite the strong secular founding ideologies of both states, while drawing the boundaries of Israeli and Turkish identity, religion played a key role as a constitutive identity marker. This happened through different strategies and consequently led to different institutional arrangements with regards to ethnic minorities and their differential treatment by the state. On the one hand, the Turkish political elite pursued an
expansion strategy, and Sunni Muslim Kurds were considered as Turks because of their common religious identity.21 The Turkish state pursued their assimilation and forced inclusion into the boundaries of Turkish national identity, although this was objected by a sizable part of the Kurdish population.22 On the other hand, the ‘Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty of Israel’ defined Israel as a ‘Jewish state’,23 and the Israeli political elite pursued a boundary contraction strategy by means of excluding Palestinian citizens from equal access to power and resources.24 As Wimmer noted, however, not all such strategies have been successful25 In both Israel and Turkey, there have been constant Palestinian and Kurdish demands for changing the meaning of existing boundaries through inversion. In other words, Palestinian and Kurdish citizens have challenged the hierarchical ordering of ethnic groups by demanding equalization by means of demanding more inclusive national boundaries, which they would include as equals. The Palestinian demands to transform the Jewish state into a ‘state for all its citizens’ have challenged the boundaries of Israeli national identity.26 Similarly, Turkey’s reform process that started in the late 1990s aiming to meet the EU Copenhagen Criteria sparked a debate on the reconsideration of national boundaries and a shift of the focus on Turkish ethnicity to the territory of the Republic of Turkey. Shifting the boundary from ‘Türk’ to ‘Türkiyeli’ became a key social demand of Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish and other minority descent. Nevertheless, the securitization27 of the human rights question of Israel’s citizens of Palestinian descent and Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish descent led to their relegation to a sui generis status: they have become the inside outsiders of the Israeli and the Turkish polity, respectively.

Methodology
Wimmer argued that ethnic boundaries are the outcome of classification struggles and negotiations among social actors.28 In other words, members of the political elite are the main actors in the boundary-making process as they may shift and modify the meaning of boundaries by redefining insiders and outsiders. For this reason, this study has focused on elite interviews as a key method of data collection. Twenty-eight elite interviews were conducted with Turkish and Israeli policymakers, such as members of parliament, former ministers, vice-presidents of political parties, diplomats and national security bureaucrats, conducted in Istanbul, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa between December 2018 and January 2020. Interviews were initially organized through personal contacts, especially through media professionals who had a broad network of politicians and bureaucrats in Israel and Turkey; then a snowball sampling strategy was applied, as each interviewee was being asked to kindly suggest and refer another potential participant. Interviews with members of the Israeli and Turkish political elites provided crucial first-hand data, since they provided valuable insights into the policy-making process and their perception of ethnic boundaries. The latter depends on power relations among them and their capacity to impose their vision of identity on the rest of the population.

Participants were selected based on the study’s purpose, because they fitted a particular profile. A non-probabilistic purposive sampling strategy was applied, and participants were primarily recruited according to their party affiliation,
ideological background and position. Ten politicians, three diplomats and three national security bureaucrats in Turkey and six politicians, three diplomats and three national security bureaucrats in Israel were interviewed. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of politicians’ perceptions and their positions vis-à-vis ethnic minorities, party representatives were selected from political parties represented in the national parliaments across the political spectrum. For this purpose, members of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP), Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) and the Good Party (İyi Parti-İP) in Turkey and members of the Likud Party and the Labour Party (HaAvoda) in Israel were interviewed. Security bureaucrats were selected among retired top-ranking military and intelligence officers. (Figure 1)
Boundaries of Turkish identity—the Kurdish challenge

Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923, religion and later language were used as boundary markers in Turkish nation-building. During the 1919–1922 Turkish War of Independence, Sunni Islam remained a crucial unifying factor and mobilizing force for Anatolian Muslims. The Kemalist political elite pursued an expansion strategy by incorporating all Muslim groups into the republican Turkish national identity, regardless of their ethnic, linguistic or cultural background. This inclusion, however, was non-voluntary, as a broad panoply of social and legal devices was employed by the state elite in order to eliminate anything that might suggest a separate Kurdish identity, including language, culture and heritage. Even today, defining Turkish identity in civic terms instead of ethnicity, an identity based on common culture and language, is a common attitude among the Turkish political elite. Almost all respondents of this study define citizens of Turkey as ‘Turks’, regardless of ethnicity or religion, an attitude similar to the official discourse that claims ‘everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a . as written in the Turkish constitution. This resonates with official Turkish policies, which denied until the 1990s the existence of Kurds as a separate ethnic group and ‘assumed’ that there was no Kurdish element on Turkish territory. Therefore, any demands for cultural and linguistic rights were seen as treacherous and were harshly suppressed.

The relative liberalization of the Turkish public sphere following the promulgation of the 1961 Constitution and the flourishing of militant ideological movements of all hues matched with assimilation policies and paved the way for the establishment of a Kurdish armed organization in 1978, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê-PKK). PKK integrated Marxist-Leninist ideology with Kurdish nationalist aspirations in a vision of an ‘independent, unified, and democratic Kurdistan’. Turkish security officers and politicians from right-wing and nationalist parties explained the emergence of the PKK as a plot of ‘external power centres’ (diş mihralar) conspiring against Turkey’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, even though they acknowledged that Turkey has a ‘Kurdish problem’. Although participants did not give a clear definition for who these ‘external power centres’ are, they insinuated Western powers, particularly the United States. They pointed to the US role in the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq in 1992 and its support .who have established an autonomous political space in northern Syria since the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011. For instance, a former senior officer from the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı-MİT), stated:

They did it in Iraq in the 1990s. Now they are trying to do same thing in Syria. The possibility of a federal region in northern Syria under the control of the PKK (referring to PKK’s Syrian offshoot the ‘People’s Protection Units’ (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel-YPG) now has become concretized. This will definitely affect Turkey’s Kurds, too.

Diplomats and politicians from the AKP and the CHP, on the other hand, acknowledged Turkey’s Kurdish issue as a ‘democracy problem’ that has evolved over time as a result of state’s ‘wrongdoings’, such as banning the use of Kurdish language and the implementation of harsh security measures in the Kurdish-inhabited eastern and southeastern provinces.
In the 1990s, state attitudes vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue shifted from denial to acknowledgement of the problem in its ethno-political dimensions. As Saracoğlu stressed, however, this was an ‘exclusive recognition’. The law banning speaking Kurdish in public was lifted in 1991, and the Turkish government developed close relations with the KRG leadership in northern Iraq. President Turgut Özal and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel publicly acknowledged that they had come to recognize the ‘Kurdish reality’. On the other hand, following the death of Turgut Özal, the securitized approach of the Kurdish issue relapsed, and oppression in predominantly Kurdish provinces peaked, including forced migration and village evacuations affecting hundreds of thousands of citizens. Pro-Kurdish political parties were closed down, and pro-Kurdish politicians were jailed and banned from politics. A former state minister who served in the 1990s stated that the main reason for the recognition of the ‘Kurdish reality’ was the emergence of the PKK and the establishment of the KRG in northern Iraq that had been perceived by the Turkish state as a threat to Turkey’s unity. Following the capture of its leader Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire, which contributed to détente and a calmer reassessment of the state of affairs, regarding the Kurdish question. Moreover, Turkey’s improving relations with the European Union greatly facilitated a policy shift of historic dimensions.

Between 1999 and 2004, as a result of Turkey’s December 1999 becoming an EU candidate state and the subsequent EU harmonization process, Turkey introduced reforms to meet the EU Copenhagen criteria, which included full respect for minority rights. Reforms started with the coalition government of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi-DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) under Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. In the 3 November 2002 parliamentary elections, the AKP won the absolute majority of seats and rose to power with the promise of solving Turkey’s age-long Kurdish issue. In Aktürk’s view, if ‘counter-elites’ come to power equipped with a ‘new discourse’ on ethnicity and nationality and garner a ‘hegemonic majority’, they can change state policies on ethnicity. EU harmonization reforms lasted throughout the first term of the AKP administration, while the government continued to initiate Kurdish minority rights reforms, such as allowing the operation of private Kurdish language courses and giving Kurdish names to children. On 1 January 2009, the Turkish Radio Television Corporation (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu-TRT) launched its Kurdish language channel, TRT 6 (TRT Şeş). In August 2009, the AKP administration launched a public engagement campaign with the aim to develop proposals for the resolution of Kurdish question and political reform, variously named the ‘Democratic Initiative’ (Demokratik Inisiyatif), ‘Democratic Opening’ (Demokratik Açılım), ‘Kurdish Initiative’ (Kürt Inisiyatifı) or ‘Kurdish Opening’ (Kürt Açılımı).

Meanwhile, Kurdish political activists increasingly turned to the legal and formal political arenas and worked within civil society groups and umbrella organizations, including pro-Kurdish political parties, namely the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-BDP) and later the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi-HDP). In this period, pro-Kurdish political parties pushed for demands including decentralization, devolved or autonomous local government, mother-tongue education, lifting the 10% electoral law threshold for the entry of political parties to parliament, and the removal of ethnic references from the constitution. After
the 2011 elections, when a parliamentary committee was formed to study the amendment of the 1982 Constitution, the BDP proposed to replace the term ‘Turkish society’ in the constitution with ‘society of Turkey’. Pro-Kurdish politicians attempted to reposition the Kurdish minority vis-à-vis the Turkish majority, claiming that Kurds were one of ‘the constitutive elements’ of the Republic of Turkey, due to their participation in the Turkish War of Independence, therefore, they demanded such a definition in the new constitution and equal status to that of Turks.

Contrary to the past official discourse that was based on the denial of a separate Kurdish identity, all respondents of this study regardless of their ideological background have acknowledged that Turkey has a ‘Kurdish problem’ and agreed to limited reforms, such as liberalizing the use of Kurdish language in public and symbolic initiatives such as turning the Diyarbakır Prison, where the majority of prisoners were Kurdish inmates and subjected to torture over the years that followed the 1980 military coup, into a museum. Although Turkish political elites agreed that elective Kurdish language courses might be taught at public schools, they opposed, however, the idea of comprehensive mother-tongue education in Kurdish alongside Turkish. A former member of parliament from the AKP, for instance, says that ‘the state should only have one education language that is the official one’. Except a former AKP member of parliament for one of the Kurdish-inhabited provinces who served during the AKP’s first term in office, all respondents considered Kurdish demands for local autonomy and to be recognized as ‘a constitutive element’ in the constitution along with Turks as ‘unacceptable’ or as a ‘pipe dream’.

The collapse of the Kurdish peace process in summer 2015 and the resumption of armed conflict throughout eastern and southeastern Turkey dealt a heavy blow against Kurdish minority rights. As the AKP government was consolidating its alliance with the far-right MHP and the Eurasianist nationalist Homeland Party (Vatan Partisi), it increasingly drifted towards a policy on the Kurdish question that would appeal to right and left-wing Turkish nationalist voters. The discourse of state survival (bekâ) and the securitization of the Kurdish question were amplified following the abortive coup of 15 July 2016. The systematic identification of HDP with PKK, its ostracization from mainstream political activities, the detention of the charismatic former co-president of HDP Selahattin Demirtaş and hundreds of Kurdish political activists on unsubstantiated terrorism charges, the systematic dismissal of the HDP mayors elected in the 31 March 2019 municipal elections pointed at an increasing assault on the fundamental rights of the minority. The view considering Turkey’s Kurds not as equal citizens, but as ‘pseudo-citizens’ was gaining traction again.

**Boundaries of Israeli identity-the Palestinian challenge**

When Israel was founded in 1948, about 150,000 Palestinians escaped the fate of those displaced from Mandate Palestine during the war; they remained within the boundaries of the newly established state and were granted Israeli citizenship. Although the Israeli Declaration of Independence promised complete ‘equality of social and political rights for all citizens regardless of race, religion, and sex’, the definition of Israel as a Jewish state and an ‘ethnic democracy’ by the same declaration excluded Palestinians from the formal definition of national collective. Israel’s Palestinian citizens were viewed as ‘second-class citizens’, often faced segregation, overt or veiled, and had to give an uphill struggle for
recognition. In contrast to their Turkish counterparts, almost all members of the Israeli political elite who were interviewed for this study introduced an ethnic definition for Israeli national identity. For instance, a former Knesset Member from the Labour Party stated:

Clearly for me, the Israeli identity is the modern way of being Jewish. Israel is my ability to be part of the Jewish people without any religious aspects. The idea that Israel is a Jewish state is a national idea, not a religious idea at all. It’s about the idea of self-determination of the Jewish people. It’s the idea that Israel is the only state in the world whose public symbols expresses Jewish history and Jewish culture.

Likewise, a senior member of the Likud Party argued:

Israel is the state of the Jews; yet, it is a Jewish and democratic state. I want to emphasize that Israel is nationally the state of the Jews, even though there are minorities with equal rights within it. We take almost every possible action in order to give them equal rights from the economic and intellectual point of view.

The major determinant of the relationship between the Israeli state and its Palestinian citizens is the ‘Jewishness’ of the state that consequently elevates Jews, whether they are citizens or not, into a privileged position over others. In addition to that, an Israeli former deputy national-security advisor, explained:

Palestinian citizens have been viewed as part of the Arab enemy, which has fought against Israel since the beginning, so they have been put into an ‘enemy-affiliated’ position.

Rekhess argued that the perception of Palestinian citizens as part of the ‘enemy’ led to a ‘security-oriented’ state policy towards them. This policy manifested itself in the institution of a military government regime in the Palestinian-populated areas, which was abolished in 1966, following heated parliamentary debates. After the abolition of the military government, political activism among the Palestinian citizens increased as they saw themselves as part of the broader Palestinian nation; the political empowerment of Palestinian citizens led to the emergence of several organizations, including the Arab Communist Party Rakah, the first authentic Palestinian political representation at the national level. This period lasted until the Oslo Process in 1993. A former Israeli minister and one of the initiators of the Oslo Peace Accords, explained:

Oslo was about assuring that Israel is a Jewish state, to be recognized as such by the Palestinians. Without a Palestinian state this would not have been possible.

He also emphasized that, during the Oslo talks, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representatives officially did not involve the Palestinian citizens of Israel and did not speak on behalf of them. According to Rekhess, the exclusion of Israel’s Palestinian citizens from the Oslo Accords led them to realize that their political aspirations would not be fulfilled through the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity and thus marked a new phase in state–minority relations in Israel. Rubin described this phase as the ‘localization of the national struggle’ or ‘Israelization’ of Palestinian citizens. In this period, the political discourse of the Palestinian minority mainly focused on a more inclusive political vision, such as demanding ‘a state for all citizens with full equality’. In the 2000s, these demands were manifested in three documents published by Palestinian intellectual and political elites: Mada al-Carmel’s ‘Haifa Declaration’, the ‘Future Vision’, developed under the auspices of the ‘Committee of Arab Mayors in Israel’

Similar to the Turkish political elite, the Israeli political elite, regardless of its ideological orientation, also rejected the idea of ‘de-ethnicization’ of the state by changing the meaning of existing boundaries through an inversion strategy. A former Knesset Member from the Labour Party, for instance, argued that given the demography of the Arab-dominated Middle East, Palestinian demands based on equality violated the sovereignty of the Jewish people:

> When Arabs say that we want a neutral state, we know that means that their vision is an Arab state since the Jews are the smaller minority in the Arab-populated region. The Jewish majority in Israel is trying to get the Arab minority to finally give up on this vision, because there is no neutral state in the region.

Similarly, a former Likud minister and Knesset Member, stated that the demand for a state for all of its citizens was ‘unacceptable’ and added:

> Because after thousands of years in exile in which we suffered as Jews, there was not even one state on earth where the Jewish people could define themselves not only majority but also a sovereign national entity. On the other hand, the Arab nation enjoys self-determination in about 20 or 22 states. It is unfair that there will be another state which would be a Jewish-Arab state.

The response of the Israeli state to such minority demands morphed into legislation imposing restrictions on free and fair contestation for political power, equal exercise of basic political and civil liberties and civil society activities of Palestinian citizens. Since 2010, a number of laws aiming to complicate the political representation of the Palestinian minority have been passed by the Israeli Knesset. These included raising the electoral threshold from 2% to 3.25% as a barrier against entrance of small parties to the Knesset and prohibiting public funding to civil society organizations which use the term ‘Naqba’. Moreover, an amendment of the ‘Basic Law: Israel the Nation State of the Jewish People’, also known as the ‘Nation-State Bill’, adopted by the Knesset in July 2018, made it clear that Palestinian citizens could not be incorporated into Israeli identity, since the law granted the right of national self-determination exclusively only to the Jewish people. For Jamal, the law could be seen as a backlash against Palestinian demands for a state for all citizens, since it also viewed such demands as a violation of the law. Distrust remained high and posed a major obstacle to any conflict resolution attempts.

**Inside outsiders: securitization of transborder communities**

While Israel and Turkey have followed different boundary-making strategies, as far as their largest minorities were concerned, they have followed similar policies regarding the non-recognition of full citizen rights. Despite persistent attempts of Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish descent and Israel’s citizens of Palestinian descent to claim equal individual and political rights with the respective majority populations, both states resisted against such a reform. The reason for the refusal of equalization demands is, however, common in both states. Both Kurds and Palestinians comprise stateless national groups inhabiting territories spanning across the borders of several states: Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran in the case of the Kurds, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt in the case of the Palestinians. Trans-border
The cultural and social relations of Israel’s citizens of Palestinian descent and Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish descent with their ethnic kin have raised concerns and eventually led to their identification with their ethnic kin across the border. To the extent that they refused to assimilate to mainstream national identity in the case of Turkey and under any circumstances in the case of Israel, their citizenship rights came under question and were viewed as ‘inside outsiders’. Instead of being viewed as equal citizens, they were perceived as ‘security threat’, ‘part of a transnational community intent on undermining territorial integrity and sovereignty’. Recognizing equal rights was not seen as reinforcing citizenship links between the state and the minority but paving the way for sovereignty dilution and partition.

In the case of Israel, citizens of Palestinian descent were viewed as existential threats, due to a fear about their contribution to diluting Jewish sovereignty in the state of Israel. Their presence within the borders of Israel was something that some Jewish nationalists would consider ‘an accident’. Their escaping ethnic cleansing and displacement complicated Israeli nation building. Israel pledged to become a liberal democracy, the only in the Middle East. This required granting equal rights to all its citizens, including minority members. Yet the treatment of its Palestinian minority posed a major contradiction and a challenge to Israel’s democracy. Politics and demographic dynamics also played their role. The series of Arab-Israeli wars led to further securitization of Palestinian minority rights. The occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights brought hundreds of thousands of more Palestinians under de facto Israeli administration and complicated the position of Israel’s own Palestinian citizens. So did the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, the growing demographic weight of Israel’s Palestinian minority vis-à-vis the Jewish majority amplified these concerns, which in turn brought to surface a fundamental contradiction of Israeli democracy. The fear that a resurgent Palestinian minority could question Israel’s Jewishness through democratic means led to an ethnic-based conceptualization of sovereignty. In that view, sovereignty did not belong to the people of Israel as a whole but exclusively to its Jewish component. Otherwise, it was not the partition of Israel that was at stake but its eventual implosion and transformation into Palestine. The State of Israel was ‘owned’ by its ethnic Jewish citizens, and Israel’s ‘ethnic democracy’ could not challenge this.

In the case of Turkey, partition fears were linked to the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’, the atavistic and often conspiracy theory-driven fear that foreign powers would use Turkey’s minorities as instruments for Turkey’s partition. Having its roots in late Ottoman history, when the violation of the right of non-Muslim subjects often served as a pretext for foreign interventions, the syndrome was named after the short-lived 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which partitioned the Ottoman Empire recognizing the right of self-determination to Anatolia’s Armenian, Greek and Kurdish communities. While the Treaty was aborted in the battlefield by the nationalist Ankara government forces under the command of Mustafa Kemal and was replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, this fear persisted, even though the non-Muslim minorities of republican Turkey amounted to a tiny part of the population. While the demographic weakness of Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities and Turkey’s growing economic and military power did not suffice for the obliteration of such fears, Turkey’s Kurds joined non-Muslim minorities and rose to the most feared agents of Turkey’s alleged partition. International concerns about the state of human rights in
Turkey and the oppression of the Kurdish minority were interpreted as pretexts for Turkey’s breakup in a renewed effort to reintroduce the Treaty of Sèvres, affecting Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, sovereignty was conceptualized in a fashion excluding Turkey’s minorities. Sovereignty did not belong to the people of Turkey, but only to its ethnic Turkish component. The Republic of Turkey was ‘owned’ by its ethnic Turkish citizens, and democracy could not challenge this fact.

**Conclusion**

Israel and Turkey have pursued different ethnic boundary-making strategies towards their largest ethnic minorities, Palestinians and Kurds. On the one hand, the Israeli state has drawn a narrower boundary, pursuing a boundary contraction strategy by limiting the pool of people bestowed on those of Jewish faith and descent. On the other hand, the Turkish state has imposed assimilationist policies, pursuing a strategy of boundary expansion in an effort to homogenize all non-Turkish Muslim groups into Turkish national identity. While both states have maintained exclusive state identities, Jewish and Turkish, Palestinian and Kurdish demands for full equality through an inversion strategy have challenged the hierarchical ordering of ethnic categories in both states. While Kurdish demands have ranged from being recognized as ‘a constitutive element’ of the state to devolution and political autonomy, Palestinian citizens of Israel have called for ‘a state for all citizens’ with equal rights. In other words, both Kurds and Palestinians have demanded to change the meaning of existing national boundaries in their respective states by establishing equality across ethnic categories. As this study has shown, Israeli and Turkish state elites refused to distinguish Palestinian and Kurdish citizens from their trans-border ethnic kin groups. They securitized the question of their equal citizenship rights and viewed them as ‘inside outsiders’. Both Israeli and Turkish state elites perceived the formulation of equal rights demands as a challenge to the ethno-nationalist basis of the state, though for different reasons. While for the Turkish state elites, these demands were interpreted as a resurrection of an age-old Western conspiracies against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey, for the Israeli state, elite demands for equalization undermined Israel’s founding principle as an essentially Jewish state and, therefore, posed a dilution threat to Jewish sovereignty over Israel. Fears of ‘Western power-supported partition’ in Turkey and ‘diluting sovereignty’ in Israel have not been limited to Palestinian and Kurdish citizenship rights, respectively. They have had a toxic effect on Turkey’s and Israel’s democratic regimes. If a democratic regime claims to reserve full respect for human rights only to its ‘constituent’ ethnic group, it cannot guarantee human rights protection even to members of that group that fall out of favour with the government. Neither Israel nor Turkey can rise to the status of a fully consolidated democracy without awarding full rights to their citizens of Palestinian and Kurdish ethnic descent, respectively. Israeli and Turkish citizens belonging to the dominant ethnic group of their country can ignore this only at their own peril.

**Notes**


2. Sensoy and DiAngelo defined a minoritized group as ‘a social group that is devalued in society. This devaluing encompasses how the group is represented, what degree of access to resources it is granted, and how the unequal access is rationalized. Traditionally, a group in this position has been referred to as the minority group. However, this language has been replaced with the term minoritized in order to capture the active dynamics that create the lower status in society and also signal that a group’s status is not necessarily related to how many or few of them there are in the population at large’. See Ö. Sensoy and R. J. DiAngelo, Is Everyone Really Equal?: An Introduction to Key Concepts in Social Justice Education, New York, Teachers College Press, 2017, p. 240. Bozarslan also pointed out that Kurds and Palestinians are ‘minoritized’ people, arguing that minoritized groups are often seen as ‘the enemy within’ by the state. See H. Bozarslan, Sociologie Politique Du Moyen-Orient, Paris, La Découverte, 2011. In his classical definition, Capotorti defined minority as ‘a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members -being nationals of the state- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language’. See F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities, New York, United Nations, 1979, p. 96.


5. The size of the Kurdish population in Turkey still remains disputed since the last census where the people’s mother tongue was asked for was carried out in 1965. As in the 1965 census some 2.2 million declared Kurdish as their mother tongue, this provided a statistical basis for estimating the number of Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish descent. In 1990, Mutlu estimated the number of Kurds as being over seven million and constituting twelve percent of the country’s population. See S. Mutlu, ‘Population of Turkey by Ethnic Groups and Provinces’, New Perspectives on Turkey (12), 1995, pp. 49–51. Van Bruinessen estimated the percentage of Kurds in Turkey to be around nineteen percent (M. v. Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, London & Atlantic Highlands NJ, Zed Books, 1992). More recently, a public opinion survey carried out by KONDA in 2019 estimated the Kurdish population to be sixteen percent in a Turkey of 82 million. M. Yetkin, ‘Türkiye’de Kaç Kürt, Kaç Sünni, Kaç Alevi Yaşıyor?’, Yetkin Report. According to the World Population Review for 2020, Kurds make up eighteen percent of Turkey’s population. World Population Review, Turkey Population 2020, https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/turkey-population/


8. Arabic has been the second official language in Israel since its foundation; the Basic Law, known as the Nation-State Bill, which was amended by the Knesset in July 2018, stated, however, that ‘Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people’, abolished Arabic as an official language and relegated it to a language with only a ‘special status’. See: The Knesset, Basic Law: Israel—the Nation State of the Jewish People 2018, https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawNationState.pdf


12. Several leading republican Turkish political figures, such as İsmet İnönü, Cemal Gürsel and Turgut Özal, were known to be of Kurdish descent.


15. The concept of sovereignty which is one of the defining characteristics of the modern state has been the theme of long debate among political thinkers. Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes ascribed sovereignty to the state and equated it with the absolute ruler, while John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johannes Althusius developed a normative theory of popular sovereignty, by attributing sovereignty to ‘the people’ instead of the ruler, in which the consent of the governed was the cornerstone of government legitimacy. For a brief review of debates on state sovereignty, see E. N. Kurtulus, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, pp. 42–44.


21. S. Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* pp. 102–23, S. Akturk, ‘Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman legacy: mono-religious and anti-ethnic definition of ‘Turkish nationhood’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45(6), 2009, pp. 900–06, M. Yegen, “Prospective-Turks” or “Pseudo-Citizens:” Kurds in Turkey’, *The Middle East Journal*, 63(4), 2009a, pp. 598–608. Alevi Kurds, a typical example of a ‘double minority’, were excluded on the grounds of both their Alevi and Kurdish identity. Çiçek emphasized the historical separation between Alevi and Sunni Muslim people in Anatolia in general and within Kurdish society in particular. He argued that Alevi identity has been more important than Kurdish national identity in the social imaginary of most of the Alevi


23. Although religion has been a component of collective Jewish identity and the state raised Judaism to an ‘official’ status, the Zionist movement was predominantly secular. It aimed to minimize the role of religion in the national identity by transforming Jewish society into a secular one. Therefore, the Jewish essence of the state has been constructed as a ‘civil religion’, a system of religious symbols, values, and norms with significant national and political meaning. On this, see C. S. Lieberman and E. Don-Yehiya, ‘What a Jewish State Means to Israeli Jews’ in S. Sam; Lehman-Wilzig and Bernard Susser (eds), *Comparative Jewish Politics: Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora*, Ramat-Gan, Bar-Ilan University Press, 1981, C. S. Lieberman and E. Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, Y. M. Rabkin, ‘Religious roots of a political ideology: Judaism and Christianity at the Cradle of Zionism’, *Mediterranean Review*, 5(1), 2012


30. The prevalence of religion was best manifested in the case of the Gagauz, an Orthodox community of Turkic ethnic descent, which was banned from participation in the migration from Romania to Turkey in the interwar years. On this, see Ö. Duman, ‘Atatürk Döneminde Romanya’dan Türk Göçleri (1923–1938)’, *Bilig* (45), 2008, pp. 38–39 A similar strategy was applied regarding the 1939 annexation of the sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay) to Turkey. On this see, E. Karakoç, ‘Atatürk’ün Hatay Davası’, *Bilig* (50), 2009.


35. This came to the point of issuing Turkish diplomatic passports to Iraqi Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani.
39. Ş. Aktürk, Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia and Turkey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 5. Turkey’s reform process commenced, however, during the previous coalition government period under Bülent Ecevit, before the AKP’s coming to power.
41. İstanbul Ofisi, ‘BDP Anayasa Önerilerini Açıkladı’, Hürriyet, 29/03/2010
44. ‘Interview’, Skype (Skype: 2019)
47. ‘Interview’, İstanbul (İstanbul: 2020)
48. M. Yegen, “‘Prospective-Turks’ or ‘Pseudo-Citizens:’ Kurds in Turkey”, pp. 608–13
55. ‘Interview’, Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv: 2019)
56. Interview, Jerusalem (Jerusalem: 2019)
57. ‘Interview’, Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv: 2018)
61. E. Rekhess, ‘The Arab Minority in Israel: Reconsidering the “1948 Paradigm”’, p. 188

63. The Oslo Process was officially launched between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to achieve a peace treaty based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, which called on Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian Authority.

64. ‘Interview’, Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv: 2018)


70. ‘Interview’.

71. ‘Interview’, Jerusalem (Jerusalem: 2018)

72. A. Rubin, ‘The Palestinian Minority in the State of Israel: Challenging Jewish Hegemony in Difficult Times’

73. The Arabic-language term Naqba (Catastrophe) refers to the 1947–1948 Palestine war that led to the independence of the state of Israel and the forced displacement of approximately 750,000 Palestinians from its territory.

74. The Knesset, Basic Law: Israel—the Nation State of the Jewish People


77. In addition to the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, around three million Palestinian refugees currently live in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Kurds are divided between four states dominated by other nations. Iraqi Kurds have a de jure autonomous regional government in northern Iraq since 2005 and, since the Syrian war broke out in 2011, Syrian Kurds have established Rojava, a de facto autonomous political entity.

78. H. Frisch, Israel’s Security and Its Arab Citizens, pp. 140–61


82. See, for example, T. S. Nefes, ‘Understanding anti-semitic rhetoric in Turkey through the Sèvres Syndrome’, Turkish Studies, 16(4), 2015, pp. 582–83.

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