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How not to Globalise IR: ‘Centre’ and ‘Periphery’ as Constitutive of ‘the International’

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ABSTRACT

Scholars who adopted de-centring as a strategy for globalising IR have embraced the notions of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ to highlight structural inequalities between North America and Western Europe and the rest of the world in the production of knowledge about world politics. In doing so, however, de-centring IR scholarship has portrayed the ‘periphery’ as if it is a new entrant to the ‘international’. Yet, such a presumption is not in the spirit of globalising IR, which views the periphery as the ‘constitutive outside’. By re-visiting the 1970s’ centre-periphery approaches, the paper highlights the limitations of the de-centring approaches inssofar as they have not always been attentive to the critical concerns of earlier theorisations about ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, and underscores the need for studying the periphery as ‘constitutive outside’. The periphery is ‘outside’ by virtue of having been left out of those mainstream narratives that the centre tells about the international; it is also ‘constitutive’ because those ideas, practices, and institutions that are typically ascribed to the ‘centre’ have been co-constituted by centre and periphery in feto.

Keywords: Center, Periphery, Constitutive Outside, Decentering IR, Global IR

Uluslararası İlişkiler Nasıl Küreselleştirilmez: ‘Uluslararası’nın Kurucusu Olarak ‘Merkez’ ve ‘Çevre’

ÖZET


Anahtar Kelimeler: Merkez, Çevre, Kurusu Dış, Uf’yi Merkezsizleştirme, Küresel Ul
Introduction

In the 1970s, distinguishing between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ was offered as a key move by critical scholars who sought to move away from totalizing conceptions of the international which, at the time, prevailed in the study of world politics.1 Typical of totalizing approaches to International Relations (IR) is a failure to consider the ideas and experiences of other constituents (be they states, social groups or peoples) while mistaking their own (particular) ideas and experiences for the whole. In the 2000s, scholars who adopted de-centring as a strategy for globalising IR2 have embraced the notions of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ to highlight structural inequalities between North America and Western Europe and the rest of the world in the production of knowledge about world politics.3 In doing so, however, de-centring IR scholarship has portrayed the ‘periphery’ as if it is a new entrant to the ‘international’. There is an internal logic to such a move; if we’re seeking the periphery’s perspective only now, then presumably it was not present in the constitution of the international. That said, such a presumption is not in the spirit of globalising IR, which views the periphery as the ‘constitutive outside’.4 The periphery is ‘outside’ by virtue of having been left out of those mainstream narratives that the centre tells about the international; it is also ‘constitutive’ because those ideas, practices, and institutions that are typically ascribed to the ‘centre’ have been co-constituted by centre and periphery in toto.

The notion of ‘constitutive outside’ was offered by cultural theorist Stuart Hall in discussing how “the whole process of expansion, exploration, conquest, colonisation and imperial hegemonisation... has constituted the ‘outer face’, the constitutive outside, of European and then Western capitalistic modernity after 1492.”5 IR scholars David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah have concurred, noting that such “refusal to recognise how the non-West and non-modern are already integrated as constitutive forces within the West and the modern is precisely how the colonial comes to be externalized.”6 But then, Blaney and Inayatullah’s conceptualization of ‘constitutive outside’ goes beyond Hall’s insofar as they understand constitutive dynamics not only in terms of the periphery providing bodies and lands whose labour and riches were usurped by the centre (I), or an/the ‘other’ to centre’s ‘self’ (II), but also as thinking actors who have shaped ideas, practices and institutions of their own and those of the centre (III).

Where de-centring approaches capture the exploitative and self/other dynamics between centre and periphery (I and II), they overlook the co-constitutive dynamics behind the ideas, practices and institutions of centre and periphery (III). Furthermore, de-centring approaches typically portray those ideas, practices and institutions as having autonomously developed by ‘Europe’ and or the

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2 See the special issue Introduction for further discussion on the challenges of and strategies for globalising IR.
6 Blaney and Inayatullah, “International Relations from Below”, p. 5.
How not to Globalise IR

‘West’. It is by virtue of overlooking periphery as co-constitutive of those ideas, practices, and institutions that make up the international that de-centring approaches have allowed totalizing conceptions of the international to remain unscathed.

The first part of the paper revisits the 1970s’ centre-periphery approaches that sought to do away with totalizing conceptions of the international, and recovers their notions of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’. Part two highlights the limitations of the de-centring approaches of the 2000s that have not always been attentive to the critical concerns of earlier theorisations about ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’. The final part of the paper underscores the need for studying the periphery as ‘constitutive outside’.

Revisiting Centre-Periphery Theorising of the 1970s

Centre-periphery approaches are most familiar to students of IR in the writings of Latin America’s Dependency School and the World-System scholarship. Norwegian Peace Research scholar Johan Galtung, who did not belong to either school, utilised the same notions when fleshing out his ‘structural theory of violence’. Let us consider the notions of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ as found in these three bodies of work.

The Dependency School emerged as the culmination of years of dissatisfaction and debate in ECLA (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) circles regarding the limitations of modernization and under/development accounts in IR and Economics. These ideas found their first sustained formulation in the writings of Latin America’s scholars who sought to locate their experiences in the world economy and offered an explanation in the form of a hierarchical conception of the international comprising a centre and periphery.7 In Dependency School’s conception, ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ were not delineated in spatial terms, as with the First and Third World (the Second World being an ideologically distant cousin of the First).8 Nor did they conceive of the international as structured around nation-state economies, some at the centre and others at the periphery. Rather, Dependency School thinking was an attempt to do two things to begin with: First, to highlight that, in the Latin America context “global market forces, not domestic ones, have determined national economic development or underdevelopment”9—a process that Andre Gunder Frank neatly captured as the “development of underdevelopment”10. Second, the Dependency School underscored that global market forces have multiple actors pursuing their agenda in multiple places. Some of those who pur-

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10 Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment”
sue the agenda of global market forces are located in the so-called ‘Third World’. And some of those who resist the said agenda can be found in the so-called ‘First World’. Hence Cardoso’s reminder that “if the initial studies of dependency possessed any novelty, it certainly was not the affirmation that dependency exists, but it was rather the characterization and search for an explanation of emerging forms of dependency”.

Accordingly, Dependency School thinkers designed research “to characterize a ‘transnational capitalism’ and to estimate its effects, not only on the peripheries, but also on the very centre of capitalist economies”. Writing on the reception of dependency thinking in the United States, Cardoso noted that he was not surprised by the way the ideas of the Dependency School seemed to resonate among scholars in the U.S., for he thought “it explained more accurately certain changes occurring in Latin America, while certain changes in the countries of the centre itself (above all the U.S.) beginning in the 1960s, brought out the inadequacy of the assumptions of structural-functionalism”. Cardoso elaborated in the following way:

“The protest of American blacks, the war in Vietnam and the movement in opposition to it, the counterculture, the student movement, the feminist movement, etc, all demanded paradigms that were more sensitive to the historical process, to social struggles, and to the transformation of systems of domination. In such a perspective, analyses of dependency correspond better to this search for new models of explanation, not only in order to comprehend what is happening in Latin America, but also what is happening in the U.S.”

What came across clearly in Cardoso’s writings was an awareness of the experiences of the periphery at the “centre of capitalist economies”. This may appear surprising in that, years later, the “Global South’ was offered as a ‘new’ notion to capture the so-called “new geography of production” and the presence of a first world in the Third World and a third world in the First World. Yet, in Cardoso’s telling, the notions of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ and ‘emerging forms of dependency’ were developed in the 1960s and 1970s by the Dependency School to do just that. Put differently, while their empirical focus remained limited to Latin America, the set of ideas developed by the Dependency School offered a novel conception of the international as a hierarchy comprising a centre and periphery. That said, this novel conception was not proposed as an alternative to mainstream IR’s conception of the international as anarchical, but rather side-stepped it. For, centre-periphery approaches were interested in what happens amidst anarchy. Hence their focus on hierarchy within, between and beyond states.

A second body of work theorizing centre-periphery dynamics is found in Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-System approach. In a key article introducing World-System analysis, Wallerstein noted that he took Frank’s analysis of ‘development of underdevelopment’ in Chile as a starting point and extrapolated to the rest of the world: “capitalism involves not only appropriation of surplus-value by an owner from a labourer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas”

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 17.
14 Ibid.
and that "capitalism was from the beginning an affair of the world economy and not of nation-states. As such, the international, conceived hierarchically, was the unit of analysis for Wallerstein.

Writing around the same time as Dependency School and World-System scholars was the Norwegian Peace Researcher Johan Galtung, who incorporated the notions of centre and periphery into his 'structural theory of violence'. While his is not a name that springs to mind when thinking about centre-periphery approaches, Galtung’s key contribution to the study of world politics, the concept of ‘structural violence’ focused on centre-periphery dynamics cognisant of their economic, cultural and political dimensions. Galtung wrote:

“The world consists of Centre and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn has its centres and periphery. Hence our concern is with the mechanism underlying this discrepancy, particularly between the centre in the Centre and the periphery in the Periphery. In other words, how to conceive of, how to explain, and how to counteract inequality as one of the major forms of structural violence.”

To adopt Galtung’s distinction between centre-periphery as a socio-economic status and Centre-Periphery as specific geographical locale, centre actors at the Centre rested on top of the hierarchy that is the international. While periphery actors at the Centre also suffered, argued Galtung, it is peripheral actors in the Periphery that were located at the very bottom of the hierarchy. If it was not for “harmony of interests” between the centre actors, the flow of raw material, goods and services that sustain the global markets cannot be maintained, observed Galtung. Furthermore, if it was not for the vulnerabilities of the periphery (including “cultural violence” that renders it natural, thereby minimising resistance) such “disharmony of interests” between centre and periphery could not be sustained, he concluded.

The point being, Galtung highlighted a theretofore underexplored dimension of centre-periphery dynamics: it is ideational as well as material convergences between centre actors that produce and sustain the hierarchical structure of world politics. Galtung’s stress on the cultural dimension of ‘structural violence’ was also taken up by Wallerstein who regarded race, ethnicity and gender as “cleavages in the World-System” in reference to the ways in which racial, ethnic and gendered differences cut across class differences in shaping centre-periphery dynamics.

To conclude this section, Dependency School, World-System scholarship, and Galtungian Peace Research sought to move away from totalizing conceptions of the international. All three bodies

17 Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis”. While Wallerstein is said to have preferred using the term ‘core’ “to suggest a multicentric region containing a group of states rather than the term centre, which implies a hierarchy with a single peak” (Christopher Chase-Dunn and Marily Grell-Brisk, “World-System Theory”, Oxford Bibliographies (2019)), his conceptualization of core-periphery dynamics was not unlike that of Dependency School’s study of centre-periphery. Indeed, what we find in both approaches to centre-periphery dynamics is a hierarchical international constituted through convergences between centre/core actors notwithstanding resistances found in various peripheral locale.
of work highlighted different experiences of those at the centre and those in the periphery, and underscored the structural connections in between: that dissimilar experiences as such do not come about autonomously. What is more, all three bodies of research highlighted (but did not explore in any detail) the ways in which such co-constitution is not isolated to the extraction of material resources and/or self/other dynamics, but also comprised learning (ideas, practices and institutions such as the ‘development of underdevelopment’ and ‘cultural violence’). As will be discussed below, it is such connectedness of centre and periphery’s experiences that is often overlooked by de-centring approaches.

De-centring as a Strategy for Globalising IR?

Calls for de-centring the study of world politics are relatively new to IR. A key text is Meghana Nayak and Eric Selbin’s Decentering International Relations, where the authors define de-centring IR as “interrogating, disturbing, engaging, reframing, challenging, mocking, or even undoing mainstream, privileged ways of viewing the world.” By focusing on four key issues, namely indigeneity, human rights, globalization, and peace and security, Nayak and Selbin have sought to do two things: “figure out what exactly each of these concepts ‘accomplishes’ for IR, as how it came to be that way, and examine the implications” and ask how those same concepts can be used to “unravel, challenge and rethink IR as a discipline, a field of study, discourse, policy-making, and the sum of political interactions?” Put differently, the authors’ strategy for de-centring IR is about provincializing IR knowledge produced in North America and Western Europe, highlighting that it is but one way of narrating the international, and showing that other ways are not only possible but that they presently exist. Insofar as IR knowledge has been produced in the US and Western Europe, the authors write, de-centring is about “[challenging] the politics, concepts and practices that enable certain narratives of IR to be central.” As such, the notion of ‘centre’ in Nayak and Selbin’s study is not akin to centre-periphery approaches’ conception of ‘centre’. Not that the authors claim otherwise. Nayak and Selbin’s is a decidedly institutional definition of ‘centre’, understood in terms of scholarly locales where disciplinary IR has developed.

A similar definition of core/centre as ‘institutions where disciplinary IR has developed’ is found in Arlene Tickner’s analysis of “Core, periphery and (neo)imperialist International Relations”. The author notes at the outset that she uses ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ “interchangeably with ‘North’ and ‘South’” defined in terms of places where IR knowledge has been produced. Indeed, Tickner’s understanding of core-periphery relations is closer to science studies, which the author draws from to study “the assembly of global fields of inquiry and the creation of what [Bruno Latour] refers to as ‘centers of

21 This is not to overlook decades of efforts to address IR’s shortcomings but to focus on a specific way of addressing such shortcomings, i.e. de-centring approaches. On the limitations of IR, see, for example, Stephen Chan, Peter G Mandaville, and Ronald Bleiker (eds.), The Zen of International Relations: IR Theory from East to West, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001; L. H. M. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West, New York, Palgrave, 2002; Vivienne Jabri, The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity, London, Routledge, 2013; Sanjay Seth, Postcolonial Theory and International Relations: A Critical Introduction, London, Routledge, 2013.

22 Nayak and Selbin, Decentering International Relations, p. 8.
23 Ibid., p. 9.
24 Ibid., p. 4.
25 Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations.”
calculation,’ to which distinct peripheries are subsequently networked.” On the one hand, Tickner is critical of early science studies scholar George Basalla by virtue of his embrace of “modernization theory’s cumulative and evolutionary assumptions” in analysing the “birth” of ‘Modern Science’ in Western Europe and its “diffusion” to the rest of the world (Basalla’s choice of terms). Hence Tickner’s propensity for Latour’s approach to studying “the social processes by which (core) science becomes internationalized.” On the other hand, Basalla’s understanding of ‘Modern Science’ (as having developed autonomously in Western Europe and spread to other parts of the world) goes unchallenged in Tickner’s analysis of the development of IR scholarship around the world. But then, overlooking “local agents and context” is not uncharacteristic of science studies including Latour, who, to quote Warwick Anderson, “manages to omit local agents and context, thus turning the network into a sort of iron cage through which no native can break.” It is in this sense that Tickner’s analysis of core-periphery is closer to science studies, but not centre-periphery approaches where local agency and context is viewed as constitutive.

Let me illustrate the argument here by focusing on Nora Fisher Onar and Kalypso Nicolaidis’ effort to de-centre European Studies. Onar and Nicolaidis describe their agenda as one of countering Eurocentrism in European Studies, which they understand as a narrative that the European Union tells itself by papering over its members’ colonial past. Onar and Nicolaidis’ approach to de-centring, then, is about revealing the ways in which European colonialism has been constitutive of ‘Europe’. Furnished with this knowledge, the authors caution against the EU’s top-down policies toward non-European locale, which they find implicit in the debates on ‘normative power Europe’ and ‘civilian power Europe’.

As a strategy for de-centring, Onar and Nicolaidis suggest that scholars seek to “engage” and “learn from the other”. How to do this? They write: “one can seek out other accounts of the world, and one can unpack those accounts to better understand the worldviews and value systems by which they are underpinned.” Yet, while it is laudable as an initiative to turn to ‘others’ and ask ‘so what do you think about X, Y and Z?’, it is less than commendable if such initiatives are interlaced with the assumption that those ‘others’ have not been constitutive of X, Y, and Z. Indeed, Onar and Nicolaidis’ sub-title, ‘Engagement: learning from the other’ and the narrative that follows suggests that the international which shapes the authors’ approach to de-centring is the making of the centre all by itself. On the one hand, de-centring approaches do acknowledge material exploitation and othering dynamics between centre and periphery when they highlight the ways in which periphery has provided bodies and lands whose labour and riches were usurped by the centre or served an/the ‘other’ to centre’s ‘self’ (I and II, see above). Yet, on the other hand, they fail to consider the periphery as thinking actors who have been co-constitutive of those ideas, practices and institutions that are otherwise portrayed as having autonomously developed by ‘Europe’ and or the ‘West’ (III, see above). Put differently, the

26 Ibid., p. 628.
28 Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations”, p. 630.
30 Onar and Nicolaidis, “The Decentring Agenda”.
31 Ibid., p. 289.
periphery makes an appearance as having been deprived of its material riches, or as the/an ‘other’ to centre’s ‘self’, but almost always in ways that are “quite abstract, strangely depopulated, and depleted of historical and social context.”

But then, de-centring approaches are in good company when they affirm the periphery’s ‘outside’ status without due acknowledgement of the ways in which it has also been constitutive of the international. Consider, for example, R.B.J. Walker’s discussion on the “double outside of the modern international”, which rests on a similar understanding of ‘outside’.

The first of the ‘doubled outsides’ was discussed in Walker’s 1993 book *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, which focused on the question “where and what politics must be?” As Walker underscored in a later study, while “claims about the international work as if they are claims about the world and as such, or at least about the totality of humanity that is to be found all over the world”, in reality, “what we understand politics to be is famously statist, nationalist, a matter of the polis, the specific political community.”

The second of Walker’s ‘doubled outsides’ is about who is considered as a part of our ongoing considerations regarding “where and what politics must be”; for, some are presumed to exist “outside to the space and time that is projected out as the limit of the modern world.” Not even “internationalization as internalization” (or, the expansion of international society, in English School parlance) has changed the ‘outside’ status of some, argued the Walker, insofar as they were ‘brought in’ the international not on their own terms. To quote Walker, “The official stories all tell tales of inclusion. But official stories about the inclusions of the sovereign state and system of sovereign states systematically erase the complex patterns of exclusion that have enabled official stories of inclusion.”

This remains to be the case, Walker concluded, notwithstanding the globalisation of world politics, as observed in the practice of declaring exceptions as part of the Global War on Terror.

It is in this sense that Walker’s discussion on the ‘double outsides of the modern international’ comes across as akin to the notion of periphery adopted in above-discussed works seeking to de-centre IR; for, both portray the periphery as ‘outside’ but not as constitutive of the international. While periphery’s ‘outside’ status is lamented, a solution is sought in asking ‘so what do you think about X, Y and Z?’ What is missing is an understanding of the periphery as constitutive of the international not only by providing bodies and lands whose labour and riches were usurped (I), and an/the ‘other’ to one’s ‘self’ (II), but-also as thinking actors who have been a part of what Sankaran Krishna has referred to as “the intimate dialogue between “Western” and “non-Western” economies, societies, and

34 Ibid., p. 58.
philosophies” (III). Such ‘dialogue’ is not only about othering dynamics (as emphasised by Walker) or about material exploitation (as explored by centre-periphery approaches) but also comprises centuries of learning in that one can no longer boldly claim sole authorship of X, Y and Z.

Approaching the Periphery as ‘Constitutive Outside’

The contrast between understanding the periphery as merely ‘outside’ or as ‘constitutive outside’ crystallizes in Vivienne Jabri’s critique of Foucault’s analysis of Iran and the 1979 revolution. That Foucault did not make the international or “imperialism, its practices, and modes of resistance against it” in any way central to his analyses would be an understatement. Yet it is not only a post-colonial critique of Foucault that Jabri offers. Further to the point, Jabri argues that even when Foucault turned to the international, as in a series of articles on the Iranian revolution written in the context of his trips to Iran in 1978, the scholar “clearly interprets the Iranian revolution in terms of its opposition; or resistance to, modernization.” That some Iranian revolutionaries indeed declared their stance as one of opposing ‘the modern West’ is not what is contested here. What Jabri contests is Foucault taking their declaration at face value, a move that she regards as “informed by a distinct cultural sensibility, one that understands modernizing rationalities as essentially emergent from the West and as possessing an expansive dynamic that has the historical effect of diminishing other cultures.” Then, what is missing from Foucault’s uncritical acceptance of the revolutionaries’ ideological declarations as resisting modernization, according to Jabri, is an appreciation of Iran (or other ‘Islamic societies’) as

“[possessing] their own experiences and interpretations of the modernizing imperatives of national identity, imperatives that were central to their liberation from colonial rule as well as being core to the transformation of the lived experience of many, essentially, transformations expressive of liberation from religious doctrine.”

The point being, while Iranian revolutionaries’ self-representation placed them ‘outside’ of (narratives on) modernity, and as Foucault accepted such self-portrayal as befitting his critique of modernity (‘inside’), what was missing from both was an understanding of Iran as ‘constitutive outside’. That such a self-referential understanding of modernity is also present in critical accounts is not without irony, as Sankaran Krishna has underscored.

There is indubitably a paradox at the heart of the notion of ‘constitutive outside’. Yet this is a paradox that de-centring approaches neglect at their own peril. The paradox is that while the periphery has been left outside of those narratives that mainstream IR has produced about the in-

41 Jabri, “Michel Foucault’s Analytics of War”, p. 76.
42 Ibid., p. 77.
43 Ibid., p. 78.
45 Krishna, “The Importance of Being Ironic”.
ternational, this is not to be confused with what has transpired in world politics. Periphery has been constitutive of the international in at least three ways, as identified above: material exploitation (I), othering (II), and learning (III). This is not a claim to ‘know’ what has ‘really’ transpired in history, but to underscore that periphery’s exclusion from mainstream (and sometimes critical) IR’s narrative on the modern international is just that: exclusion from a particular narrative. Needless to say, narratives are not without consequences, and periphery’s exclusion from mainstream IR’s narrative on the international has had consequences. While this is a narrative that needs de-centring, as a strategy for globalising IR de-centring cannot be reduced to asking the periphery ‘so what do you think about X, Y and Z?’, as if periphery has not been constitutive of those very things. Consider the following two examples.

Marshall Beier’s account on the absence/presence of Indigenous peoples in IR begins with the observation that “Indigenous peoples have never constituted a subject matter appropriate to the focus of the field inasmuch as none has ever been possessed of the principal preoccupation of its mainstream scholarship: the Westphalian state”. Yet, Indigenous peoples are not entirely absent from IR in that, theorizing about state of nature and the social contract, upon which much of mainstream IR is built, was informed by early colonial encounters, which were documented in European travelogues, “the enduring influence of which in social contractarian thought recommends their treatment as foundational texts to the social sciences.” Here lies the paradox about Indigenous people as a ‘constitutive outside’ to IR. On the one hand, they are nowhere to be found in mainstream IR narratives. Furthermore, calls for considering them are often met with scepticism for above-mentioned reasons. On the other hand, it is based on European travellers’ (however erroneous) observations about Indigenous peoples that much of social contractarian thinking in IR has developed. Calling for de-centring IR on grounds of its inability to capture Indigenous peoples’ lives and seeking to include them is one response to such eventuality. Another response is to interrogate the ways in which Indigenous peoples are present, identify the erroneous aspects of their portrayal in European travelogues and the influence of such portrayal on social contractarian thinking in IR, thereby making room for alternative conceptions of the international.

Whereas Beier’s account focuses on self/other dynamics at work in the shaping of constitutive relations between Indigenous peoples and IR, Blaney and Inayatullah look at the Dependency School to disentangle other aspects of constitutive relations. Dependency thinking is an archetypal account of world politics insofar as it is ‘simultaneously “cast out” of international relations and… [is] the necessary constitutive other of international relations,’ the authors write. On the one hand, Dependency School thinkers pointed to input and experiences ‘from below’ that have been the ‘constitutive outside’ to institutions and processes ‘from above’ (material exploitation). On the other hand, Dependency School scholars who offered such accounts have been ‘cast out’ of IR for being ‘ideological’ and/or ‘unscientific’ (othering). Yet, as Blaney and Inayatullah noted, Dependency School has made important contributions in bringing about a recognition, within IR, of the limitations of

47 Ibid., p. 82.
an ‘ontological individualism’, which ‘in the guise of ‘science … works to deflect our attention from the co-constitution of times and places’. Put differently, dependency theory has been ‘constitutive outside’ to critical IR (learning) by way of its critique eventually being absorbed (albeit not always acknowledged) by neo-Gramscian and historical sociology approaches.

Juxtaposing Blaney and Inayatullah’s analysis of the ways in which periphery in general and Dependency School in particular have been constitutive of the international (material exploitation) and IR’s narrative on the modern international (othering and learning) with the accounts provided by critical scholars who developed centre-periphery approaches offer further support to my argument about periphery as ‘constitutive outside’ here. Consider the following web of relationships: Galtung’s key text on structural violence was authored in response to an invitation by Kenyan scholar and activist Ali Mazrui, who was, at the time, one of the key collaborators of the World Order Models Project. Cardoso credited ECLA circles for generating the ideas that later found their form in the Dependency School. Frank, who contributed to ECLA debates, also collaborated with Wallerstein. In introducing The Essential Wallerstein, the author credited not only his World System approach colleagues (Frank, Amin and Arrighi), but also peripheral factors and actors in the development of his thinking. If it was not for his effort to understand Africa, Wallerstein wrote, he might not have sought to develop a new conceptual framework with its own unit of analysis (World-System) and method (“simultaneously historic and systemic”):

“I initially thought that the academic and political debates were merely over the empirical analysis of contemporary reality, but I soon became aware that the very tools of analysis were themselves to be questioned. The ones I had been taught seemed to me to circumscribe our empirical analyses and distort our interpretations.”

In terms of periphery thinkers, Wallerstein listed Franz Fanon as one of his three key intellectual influences, noting that “Fanon represented for me the expression of the insistence by those disenfranchised by the modern world-system that they have a voice, a vision, and a claim not merely to justice but to intellectual valuation.”

The point being, it was in the attempt to make sense of periphery, and following the lead of periphery thinkers that Wallerstein came to recognise the role played by the centre and periphery in constituting the international, which was later termed the ‘World-System’.

As such, centre-periphery thinking is a good example for making the case for studying periphery as ‘constitutive outside’. Periphery is constitutive of the international not only by providing bodies and lands whose labour and riches were usurped (I), and other/s as foil to one’s self (II), but

50 Ibid.
51 Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”.
54 Cardoso, “The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States”.
55 Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment”.
56 Wallerstein, The Essential Wallerstein.
57 Ibid., p. xvii.
58 Ibid., p. xxii.
also as thinking actors who have produced ideas of their own and together with others (III). Such ideas have served as ‘constitutive outside’ to IR narrative/s on the international, even as those narratives have left periphery (doubly) ‘outside’. While the first and/or second of these three dimensions are appreciated by scholars seeking to de-centre IR, the third is rendered invisible when the periphery is portrayed as a new entrant. Only through understanding the ways in which periphery has been ‘constitutive outside’, I suggest, can we begin to make sense of the international as co-constituted by centre and periphery in toto.

**Conclusion**

That the insights and experiences of periphery are not reflected in IR narratives does not mean that they have had little or no contribution to make—only that their insights, interventions, experiences and inputs do not always get acknowledged in prevalent accounts. It is in this sense that critical theorist Susan Buck-Morss has called for a “double liberation, of the historical phenomena and of our own imagination”, remarking that “by liberating the past we liberate ourselves”. Absent that, de-centring IR approaches run the risk of being reduced to inquiring into others’ perspectives as if they are new entrants to the international, as if the issue is about perspectivity alone, as if perspectives are independent of power and politics, and as if the centre’s narrative is not yet another perspective. Following Wallerstein, it is indeed “easy to consider one’s own views to be expressions of the universal and others as so many expressions of multiple particular” and part of the de-centring agenda is about recognising what is portrayed as universal knowledge is yet another particular perspective. Wallerstein’s proposed strategy for de-centring is designed toward “collectively analysing, appreciating, and approaching a maximally rational, maximally democratic world”. But then, such a solution cannot but be built on the realization that our particular perspectives have not evolved autonomously but through give-and-take. While it is important to interrogate the claim on the part of some to have/pursue universal knowledge on X, Y and Z, this cannot be done in the absence of inquiry into the ‘constitutive outside’ of that very knowledge.

Hence Edward Said’s emphasis on the need for studying ‘beginnings’ as opposed to inquiring into the presumed ‘origin’ of things. His preferred method, ‘contrapuntal reading’ focuses on the “intertwined and overlapping histories” of humankind, thereby urging researchers away from searching for presumed origins of things. To quote Said:

> “the history of all cultures is the history of cultural borrowings. Cultures are not impermeable; just as Western science borrowed from Arabs, they had borrowed from India and Greece. Culture is never just a matter of ownership, of borrowing and ending with absolute debtors and creditors, 59

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59 Earliest such criticism of IR is found in W.E.B. Du Bois’s works from the 1940s as noted by Errol Henderson: “that ‘Western scholarship in the field of international relations (IR) rarely addressed or was informed by political processes in Africa’” (African Realism? International Relations Theory and Africa’s Wars in the Postcolonial Era (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015) 11. Blaney and Inayatullah look at the limitations of IR as not of ‘absence’ as such, but a failure to acknowledge ‘presence in the process of constitution’.


but rather of appropriations, common experiences, and interdependencies of all kinds among
different cultures. This is a universal norm.65

With efforts on ‘Global History’ and ‘Global Sociology’ underway (and without losing sight
of their limitations) we are bound to find out more and more about such “appropriations, common
experiences and interdependencies” between core and periphery. In the absence of an appreciation
for the periphery as constitutive of the international, critique risks becoming “self-contained and self-
referential”66. In contrast are the kind of reflections offered by de-centring approaches, which risk
reifying those totalizing conceptions of the international that they are otherwise critical of. For,
the study of ‘constitutive outside’ is never merely about telling another story about exotic lands far-far-
away, but about overlooked aspect/s of the very same story, be it about sovereignty,67 international
law,68 democracy,69 the state of nature70 or anti-colonial resistance.71

Bibliography


68 Siba N. Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996.


