

Politics of Nationhood and the Displacement of the Founding Moment:

Contending Histories of the Turkish Nation

Alev Çınar, Department of Political Science, Bilkent University [alevc@bilkent.edu.tr]

Hakki Taş, Department of Political Science, Swedish Defence University [hakki.tas@fhs.se]

Word Count: 13, 859 (13,940 if 5 illustrations with captions are added)

“A man is always a teller of tales, he sees everything that happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if he were telling a story.”

— Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*

During a speech he gave on the 100th anniversary of the Ottoman victory against the British army in the First Battle of Kut, Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdoğan said “I reject the conception of history that places the beginning of the history of our thousands-year-old civilization in 1919” (Altun 2016). He was referring to the launching of the Turkish War of Independence on May 19, 1919 by Mustafa Kemal, which is celebrated every year as one of Turkey’s most significant national holidays. Two days later, a prominent journalist and outspoken representative of *Ulusalcı* nationalism Bekir Coşkun said “the President is forgetting that he owes his presidency to the process that started on May 19, 1919,” and reasserted that the history of Turkey “begins in 1919” (Coşkun 2016).

This exchange between Erdoğan and Coşkun exemplifies the politics of nationhood that has dominated the Turkish political scene since the turn of the millennium in Turkey, which takes shape as a confrontation between two contending projects of nationhood. While Erdoğan’s view

represents the ruling AKP's¹ notion of nationhood that claims Turkey as an Ottoman Islamic civilization (Çınar 2001), Coşkun's view represents the conception of the Turkish nation as primordialially secular, ethnically Turkish and fundamentally anti-imperialist, which was developed and propagated by a new political movement called *Ulusalcı* nationalism that emerged around the same time that the AKP was founded in 2001.² This contention between the AKP's Islamist/Ottomanist conception of the Turkish nation, and the secularist/anti-Ottomanist/anti-Western view of the *Ulusalcı* came to mark the main political axis around which Turkey's recent political history unfolded.

Since it came to power in 2002, and intensifying after its third term in office in 2011, the AKP has been pursuing an increasingly systematic, rigorous, and at times aggressive policy of Ottomanization and Islamization of Turkish society (Zencirci 2014, Ongur 2015, Batuman 2014), as is evident in the sheer rise in the number of Imam Hatip (Islamic Preacher) school students more than tenfold since 2002 (Eğitimsen 2016); the introduction of new Islamic courses and themes into school curricula; the strict regulation of the sale and use of alcohol in public spaces; and other similar interventions all accompanied by Erdoğan's continual referral to Turkey as a civilization rooted in Islam, and his persistent declaration of the AKP's devotion to raise a "pious generation."³ The conception of Turkey as an Ottoman-Islamic civilization has been the core of the AKP's political ideology and program since it came to power and it has increasingly dictated its policies and interventions to transform Turkish society toward more compatibility with Islamic values and norms.

Ulusalcı nationalism, on the other hand, stood out as the AKP's main political adversary throughout its four terms in power, which defined itself as a secular nationalist and Kemalist movement that challenged the AKP's Islamism and close alliance with what they claimed to be

imperialist Western powers. *Ulusalcı* nationalism first appeared in the Turkish scene around 2002 as a distinct movement that made a slight but significant departure from official Kemalist ideology,⁴ when politicians, intellectuals, writers, activists, retired military officials, artists, students and different civil society associations started to identify themselves as “*Ulusalcı*” to refer to a particular political stance that is defined as being primordially secularist, anti-imperialist, and against any form of Islamism, Ottomanism and Islamic identities, as well as the European Union and the USA. Even though *Ulusalcı* nationalists claim to be true Kemalists, their stance departs from mainstream Kemalism that has embraced modernization, Westernization, and secularism more as a cultural identity and a lifestyle than a form of nationalism, and had always sought to establish Turkey as a close ally of the West and eventually part of Europe. While some of its proponents were active under the social democrat, Kemalist CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – Republican People’s Party), the majority of the *Ulusalcı* activists gathered around civil society organizations to constitute an autonomous political movement.⁵

Examining the case of *Ulusalcı* nationalism and its use of nation-building techniques to establish and propagate its own version of Turkish nationhood, this paper seeks to demonstrate the ways in which the politics of nationhood unfolds around confrontations among rival nation-building projects each of which generate their own versions of national history that are built around different founding moments. We argue that the most significant technique used by the *Ulusalcı* nationalists to redefine Turkish nationhood is to displace the founding moment from the official Kemalist moment marked by the founding of the Republic in 1923, and relocate it instead during the War of Independence fought against the European powers between 1919 and 1922. It is based on this displacement that the *Ulusalcı* journalist Bekir Coşkun claims that Turkish history begins in 1919 when the War started.

The main goal of this paper is to draw attention to the centrality of the notion of the founding moment in the process of nation-building, writing of national history, and creation of national communities. We seek to illustrate how the designation of a founding moment is not only an essential part of the nation-building process but also vital in the continual legitimation and conservation of the nation-state, its ideology, and its history. We discuss how national history is structured around a founding moment, which is established as a point in time when the nation is assumed to have acquired agency to become a sovereign entity that is capable of determining its own fate. The designation of a founding moment is a crucial part of nation-building not only because it serves as an anchor in time around which time is nationalized and structured along a linear path, but also in that it allows the nation to be located on this path as a single sovereign entity that has a uniform continual existence throughout history.

This paper examines *Ulusalcı* nationalism through a narrative analysis of the record-breaking best seller historical documentary novel, *Those Crazy Turks (Şu Çılgın Türkler)*, which became the bible of the *Ulusalcı* movement, and its author, now late Turgut Özakman, one of its main spokespersons. We demonstrate that this new narration of Turkish nationhood displaces the founding moment by narrating national history around the War of Independence instead of the founding of the Republic, by framing the War as the moment when the Turkish nation acquired its sovereignty. We argue that through the displacement of the founding moment, the *Ulusalcı* narration interpellates a new national subject that is primordially secular,⁶ militaristically patriotic, and adamantly anti-Western, which are projected as the essential qualities that need to be upheld and defended at all cost against Islamist, Ottomanist and Western powers that are conspiring to bring Turkey down.

Another contribution of this study involves the adoption of the narrative approach to the study of nationalism by focusing on stories of nationhood as the main means through which national communities come into being. Even though some of the key figures in the study of nationalism, such as Benedict Anderson or Homi Bhabha have studied nationalism as narration, it is only recently that the narrative study of nationalism became a trend (Morden 2016, Khoury 2016). We adopt this approach in our study of *Ulusalcı* nationalism mainly because it allows for a more flexible and a context-specific way of studying nationhood by focusing on locally produced categories with which contending nation-building projects define themselves, instead of resorting to popular categories used conventionally in the study of nationalism such as civic or ethnic nationalism, which can sometimes result in the dismissal of contextual specifics that are essential to unique forms of nation-building projects. Indeed, one of the most commonly debated issues on Turkish nationalism is whether it can be qualified as ethnic, civic, cultural, territorial or a mixture of these (Yıldız 2001, Bora 2003, Özkırmımlı 2013). In this study, we depart from this line of debate and instead propose to study nationalism as a field of contending stories that strive to define nationhood in different ways, and how these stories produce different national subjects by marking them with categories of culture, territory, religion, ethnicity, or, as in the case of *Ulusalcı* nationalism, a more unique category such as primordial secularism.

Stories of Nationhood and the Founding Moment

Charles Taylor notes that “we grasp our lives in a narrative,” which allows us to sustain a sense of self that has continuity in time (1992: 47). Among the many stories we tell to constitute our reality and situate ourselves in time, it is no doubt that the most prominent ones are stories of nationhood, which act as a general frame under which other stories are subsumed. Tales of nationhood are used

all over the world to shape and justify all sorts of choices and practices that constitute one's reality, ranging from voting preferences and political actions to choices about whom to marry, where to live, what school to send the children, and to seemingly trivial things like what music to listen to, what sports team to follow, or what kind of car to buy. As Bhabha notes, "the scraps, patches, and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle of national subjects" (1993: 297). Stories assign national meaning to such ordinary and arbitrary objects, practices and choices made on a daily basis to bring them together into a meaningful, coherent, collective national narrative that converts ordinary individuals into members of the nation by addressing them as national subjects and assigning them particular roles and identities in the grand narrative of the nation.

Through narration, the nation works itself into the imagination, and in Sartre's words, people come to see things that happen to them through the collective story of the nation. Stories of nationhood are publicized on a daily basis through novels, films, television, newspapers, and more recently video games, or the internet, which are laden with an abundance of national icons, symbols and codes that concertedly educate individuals not only on the norms and standards of the life, culture, language, and preferences of a typical fellow member of the nation, but also on how to become worthy citizens, what to value and prioritize to be part of the national community, and what the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion are. When the imagination is nationalized as such, people tend to think, speak, act, and even dress on behalf of the nation and assume that everyone else is doing the same. As such, nationally circulating stories constitute the nation and its members on a daily basis.⁷

The constitutive power of stories is emphasized in Judith Butler's account of the construction of sex and gender. Butler argues that the marking of a body by the category of sex is

not only a classificatory inscription but more importantly a constitutive intervention. Noting that “there is no body prior to its marking,” Butler indicates that it is not possible to talk about the body outside of the category of sex (1993: 98). Just as narratives of sex and gender mark the body into being, stories of nationhood mark the nation into existence. What categories of sex and gender are for the body, categories of ethnicity, religion, culture, territory, or historicity are for the nation. Rephrasing Butler’s words, there is no nation prior to its marking by culture, territory, religion, and especially ethnicity.

Stories of nationhood not only interpellate the nation into existence, they also serve to reify the nation by inserting it in time. The story of a nation is always narrated as if it is a single being that moves through time and has a continuous, uninterrupted, unwavering existence through history, regardless of the incommensurable changes in the actual number, origins, and the ethnic, cultural or religious affiliations of the people that constitute it.

The narrative location of the nation in history is achieved by the designation of a point of origin, or a founding moment, which marks the point at which the nation came into being. This founding moment is not necessarily the beginning of the nation before which it did not have an existence, but it is the point at which the nation is assumed to have come into awareness of itself as a sovereign entity capable of making choices for itself. By the designation of a founding moment, the nation can now assume agency and a voice of its own to declare itself independent and sovereign. After the moment of its founding, the nation is deemed capable of deciding the norms and principles by which it will live, codifying these in a constitution, and setting the conditions of inclusion and exclusion into its collective body. But since the nation is an imaginary subject, so is its voice and agency. Hence, it is up to a group of elites, and later the state, to assume this authority to act, speak and make decisions on behalf of the nation. The legitimacy of the claim

to assume the voice of the nation is based upon the effectiveness of the established regime of representation and the claims of the state to represent the nation, which it seeks to achieve through elections or another system of delegation of authority.

The designation of a founding moment, therefore, is arguably the most important discursive technology with which a nation-state is formed. It is through the declaration of a founding moment that the nation acquires a singular, monolithic, and continuous subjectivity vested with sovereignty and agency, which is claimed by the founding state that emerges and legitimizes its authority as the sole representative of the nation.

Since founding moments play such a vitally constitutive role in the formation and continued legitimation of the nation-state, they need to be continuously reproduced and kept alive in public memory. Yael Zerubavel suggests that this is done through a variety of different commemorative rituals including “the celebration of a communal festival, the reading of a tale, the participation in a memorial service, or the observance of a holiday,” all of which concertedly “contribute to the formation of a *master commemorative narrative* that structures collective memory” (1997: 5-6, emphasis original). The sustenance of the founding moment in public memory by such a master narrative serves the continued reification of the nation and the legitimation of the state on a daily basis.

Founding moments also offer a resolution to what Homi Bhabha refers to as the “double-time” of the nation. According to Bhabha, “the nation's people must be thought in double-time,” where they are narrated both as “historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy,” and also as “the ‘subjects’ of a process of signification” whereby the nation emerges as the agent and author of its own history (1993: 297). For Bhabha, this double-time of the nation as both ancient and new creates the conceptual space within which the nation is written into being.

In the double-writing of the nation as both old and new, the effect of ancientness is achieved by the projection of the nation into a distant past through the writing of official national histories, various commemorative practices, and the construction of national memory. The effect of novelty, however, involves a very different kind of intervention, especially since the claimed ancientness of the nation needs to be preserved. Such a sense of novelty is produced by the projection of the nation as acquiring agency in the creation of its own history. It is this kind of agency that the declaration of independence and sovereignty ensures, which allows for the imagination of the nation as having existed for a long time, but has “awakened” into sovereign existence only recently. This intervention both in time and in the subjectivity of the nation is marked by a founding moment where the nation is declared into being as a sovereign entity.

Hence, founding moments serve to make the “double-time” of the nation possible by creating a conceptual space where the nation can exist both as ancient and as new at the same time. Founding moments do this by authorizing the founding elite or the state with the authority and power to declare the nation into being, thereby establishing it as new and modern by virtue of its newly acquired self-declared autonomy. As Alev Çınar notes, the inscription of the founding moment in time serves to constitute the state as the sole representative of the “national subject vested with the ability (agency) to intervene and inscribe the nation into time” (2001: 368). This function of the founding moment that resolves the ambivalence of the double-time of the nation is evident, for example, in Lyn Spillman’s comparison of the American and the Australian founding moments. Spillman notes that founding moments serve not only to legitimize the unity and continuity of the nation (i.e. its ancientness), but also to grant citizenship and agency to those who participate in the collective celebration of the founding moment (1997: 71-73).

Commented [AC1]: Burada üstteki paragrafa hafif bir tekrar var, cıkartılabilir ya da kısaltılır.

Official Turkish national history has designated October 29, 1923 as the founding moment, which marks the date of the declaration of the new republic by the Grand National Assembly under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's leadership. Commemorating the most important moment of Turkish national history, October 29 is celebrated as the point at which the Turkish parliament assumed the voice of the nation and declared its sovereignty. In *The Outline of Turkish History*, which was the first and main book on official Turkish national history, the founding moment is summarized at the end in the following words:

The sons of Osman [the Ottoman dynasty] had long lost the ability and the honor to rule the Turkish nation. During the Armistice the Turkish nation encountered the worst devastation that it had ever faced in its history, which is as old as the history of the whole world. [... But] knowing the heroism of the Turkish nation in battlefields, the hardships it is facing and its needs, *Mustafa Kemal* took on the leadership of the nation and initiated an opposition in Anatolia (1919). The Turkish nation did not hesitate to come together under the banner of *Mustafa Kemal* and initiate the struggle for independence. [...] *Mustafa Kemal*, who saved the Turks from the sons of Osman and the worthless Caliphate, formed the Republic (October 29, 1923). The *Gazi* [Mustafa Kemal], who was elected as the president of the Republic, engaged the Turkish nation on a path of true advancement and progress (Türk Tarih Heyeti 1930/1996: 466-467 – emphasis in the original).

This short but significant passage from the Outline of Turkish History not only narrates the nation into sovereign existence, but also nationalizes and structures time along a linear path around the founding moment. The double-time of the nation is also clearly visible here, where the Turkish nation is marked simultaneously as an historical object that is “as old as the history of the whole

world,” and as an autonomous subject that emerges as the agent of its own fate. It is both an object, and a subject; both ancient and modern.

Politics of Nationhood

In the vast body of literature on nationalism, perhaps the most understudied topic is the politics of nationhood. When terms like politics of nationhood, nation-building or nationalism are used in literature, they are often employed to mean how the political elite or the state is involved in the nation-building process. Since further theorizing or conceptual exploration of the term is seldom offered, the notion of politics tends to become conceptually void and analytically useless. Yet, in the study of nationalism, politics of nationhood has significance far beyond the involvement of the state in the nation-building process. Nation-building is not only always political but also it stands as one of the core elements of politics in general. Because politics is not only about governance, distribution of power, or political action, it is also – and maybe more importantly – about the ways in which contending nationalisms, expressed as rival stories of nationhood, compete to come to power and establish their own version of nationhood as the dominant one.

If nation is understood as ultimately the product of storytelling, politics of nationhood, then, would involve ~~the study of~~ the production, dissemination, contestation, negotiation, and rivalry among different stories of nationhood, and the resulting clashes and struggle for power among these competing movements and projects. In any given context there are always multiple and contending stories of nationhood that produce different national subjects by placing differential emphasis on one or more of the common categories of nationhood such as ethnicity, religion, culture, or territory. Therefore, politics of nationhood is about the rivalry and struggle among contending nationalist projects to produce, disseminate and promote their version of the national

story; to undermine, destroy, or discredit its rivals; and to institutionalize their version of the national subject and national history in public memory.

All these movements and projects, most of which organize into political parties, eventually seek to come to power, or to influence those in power, because it is only by using the state apparatus and its resources that a particular nationalist project can insert its own version of the nation in history, interpellate its own version of the national subject, rewrite and implement a new commemorative narrative, and restructure time around its own version of the founding moment.

But even when the particular national story of a political movement is institutionalized firmly and pervasively, it is always surrounded by alternatives and rivals. The establishment, institutionalization and normalization of a particular narrative of the nation are ongoing – and political – processes precisely because the official narrative is always surrounded by contending projects. The politics of nationhood is about ongoing efforts to sustain the status of the dominant narrative as the founding ideology, as well as the continuous struggle among contending projects to replace it. As Rogers Smith notes, “The politics of people-making, then, involves continual, partisan, conflictual, often invidious, and always exclusionary processes centered on stories and force” (2003: 56). One of the most important aspects of the politics of nationhood is the struggle among contending national projects that claim different founding moments so as to empower different kinds of national subjects. This contention is best illustrated by J.J. Ellis, when he points out that in the making of American nationhood, there were two competing conceptualizations of the nation that rest upon two different founding moments: the first is 1776, marking Independence, and the other is 1787, marking the adoption of the Constitution (2000: 9). Ellis’s account suggests that these two founding moments correspond to two contending narratives of the nation. The United States, which has the oldest written constitution in the world, and which had successfully

institutionalized the Unionist national story, has still, to this day, to deal with the Confederate national story as its main contender.

An analysis of the politics of nationhood in Turkey would explore various competing notions of the Turkish nation that are the products of substantially different national histories, and produce different commemorative narratives that are built around different founding moments and interpellate different national subjects.⁸ Indeed, Turkey's three main political parties each celebrate different notions of nationhood founded in different moments in history. The ruling AKP promotes the Turkish nation as an essentially Ottoman-Islamic subject and locates its founding moment in May 29, 1453 as the Conquest of Istanbul, which is celebrated as the "Conquest Day" every year with massive festivals and demonstrations (Çınar 2001, White 2013). For the MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – Nationalist Action Party) the Turkish nation is defined through its ethnic origins, which are located in the Turkic tribes of Central Asia. The MHP locates the real founding moment in 1071, the Battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt), which was fought between the Seljuq Turks and the Byzantine Empire allowing the Turks 'to imprint the stamp of the nation on Anatolia' as noted by the leader of the party (Bahçeli 2013). Being founded by Mustafa Kemal himself, the CHP's version of Turkish nationhood is the closest to official Kemalist nationalism that celebrates the founding moment in October 29, 1923 when the Republic was declared into being by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Among these competing projects of nationhood, *Ulusalci* nationalism stands out as a political movement that was not organized around a political party, but instead was initiated by various secularist civil society associations as a reaction against the rising power of Islam in politics. As the AKP came to power in 2002 with a majority government, various secularist circles sought to take a political stance and rally against what they perceived to be the Islamic threat

rising under the AKP's rule. While some of these groups were associated with the mainstream Kemalist CHP, they mostly chose to gather around independent civil society associations and autonomous organizations, such as the Association of Atatürkist Thought (ADD – *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*), Support for Modern Life Association (ÇYDD – *Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği*), or the Women of the Republic Association (CKD – *Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği*) that formed the *Ulusalcı* movement.

Even though *Ulusalcı* nationalism is an offshoot of Kemalism, the primordially secularist and the anti-Western/anti-imperialist features attributed to Turkish nationhood by the *Ulusalcı* are different from the way Kemalism has constructed official national ideology. First, while mainstream Kemalism takes secularism as a cultural identity and lifestyle adopted as part of Turkey's modernization project in the nineteenth century (Göle 2000: 111, Cizre and Çınar 2003: 310, Navaro-Yashin 2002: 85), *Ulusalcı* nationalism mobilizes secularism as the defining element of Turkish ethnic identity, which is invoked as a primordial quality of the Turks that existed long before Islam was imposed on them by outside forces, thereby declaring Islam as something that is alien to Turkishness brought to them by the Arabs, which Turks tamed and secularized (Saltık 2004).

Second, *Ulusalcı* nationalism places an exclusive focus on the anti-imperialist, anti-Western and militaristic aspects of Kemalism, and dismisses the civilian elements that became dominant after the founding of the republic when the new state under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk fully embraced Westernization as one of the key axioms of official ideology, and sought to make close alliances with European powers. It was indeed the Kemalist secular elite that sought to establish Turkey as part of Western civilization and fully supported its accession process to become a full member in the European Union (Çınar 2010: 98).

Commented [AC2]: Bu paragrafakilerin bir cogu daha once soylene misti.

We argue that the *Ulusalcı* re-framing of Turkey's national ideology as primordialistically secularist and anti-Western is achieved by the displacement of the founding moment of the new Turkish state from the officially recognized date on 29 October 1923 to the War of Independence period (1919-1922) and especially to its victorious finale in August 30, 1922. Re-branding their current stance as another renewed War of Independence against the Western imperialists and their in-house proxies, *Ulusalcı* nationalists take it upon themselves to protect the Turkish nation against what they perceive as two of the most important threats it ever faced: Western imperialism (including the EU) that threatened to destroy Turkey's hard-earned sovereignty and independence, and political Islam that threatened to destroy secularism, which was seen as the very essence of the Turkish nation.

The difference between the *Ulusalcı* founding moment in 1919-1922 and the official Kemalist moment in 1923 signifies the difference between Mustafa Kemal as a soldier and commander of the Turkish army fighting an anti-imperialist war, and Atatürk as the civilian leader and president of the new republic that draws its legitimacy from the consent of the people. The latter represents a version of Kemalism that seeks to transform Turkey into a modern country that is part of the "civilized" West through a rigorous program of modernization, including the building of a parliamentary republic, the writing of a new constitution, and other political, economic, and social reforms. Whereas the former represents the *Ulusalcı* version of Kemalism that prioritizes the significance of military power over civilian authority as the source of legitimacy of the sovereignty of a nation, rallies the nation behind Mustafa Kemal as a military commander rather than as a civilian leader, and gives utmost priority to resisting and fighting the imperialist intentions of Western powers to defend the country at all cost.

While it has been suggested that *Ulusalcı* nationalism is no different than official Kemalist ideology (eg. Kösebalaban 2005) this stance is ironically taken simultaneously by both the AKP supporters and their *Ulusalcı* contenders, both of which use this claim to justify their own ideological positions. The *Ulusalcı* nationalists claim that they are the true successors of Kemalism so as to justify and highlight the significance of their movement as the only true defender of Turkey's founding national ideals and interests. The AKP circles also recognize the *Ulusalcı* movement as the true successor of Kemalism, which is projected as the oppressive force that has violated Turkey's "national and cultural sovereignty through a process of Westernization" and secularism, and continues to do so to this day through the *Ulusalcı*. (Kösebalaban 2005: 34) The AKP uses this claim to establish itself as the truly patriotic and legitimate political force that is there to protect and promote Turkey's national and cultural sovereignty, and to justify its regulatory and restrictive interventions to suppress not only the *Ulusalcı* movement, but any opposition or challenge to the AKP government. Indeed, the AKP government has framed nonaligned protests such as the Gezi Park incident in 2013 as a conspiracy against Turkey by the *Ulusalcı* circles together with Turkey's enemies (Akbay 2013).

Emergence of *Ulusalcı* Nationalism in Historical Perspective

The words "*Ulusalcı*" and "*Ulusalcılık*" respectively mean nationalist and nationalism in Turkish. However, the commonly used word for nationalism is *milliyetçilik*, which comes from Ottoman Turkish where the root word *millet* was used to mean religious community, and later came to be used to mean "nation." The word *Ulusalcı* comes from the root word "*ulus*" which also means nation, but invented under the rubric of being "purely Turkish" by the Turkish Language Association founded in 1932 by Atatürk with the mission to purify Turkish from Arabic and

Persian influences. While the word *ulus* became popular after it was invented by the Language Association and came to be used interchangeably with *millet* to mean “nation,” its relevant derivatives like *Ulusalcı* or *Ulusalcılık* never replaced the words *milliyetçi* (nationalist) and *milliyetçilik* (nationalism). The choice of such a newly invented word is significant for three reasons. First, the word *Ulusalcı* allows its proponents to avoid marking themselves as *milliyetçi* which has Turkic/ethnic connotations, and hence to differentiate themselves from right-wing nationalists who adhere to ethnic definitions of nationhood. Second, since the word *Ulusalcı* is a derivative of the term *ulus*, invented as part of Kemalist modernization and secularization reforms, it makes a tribute to Kemalism, thereby highlighting the loyalty to the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Third, the use of a “purely-Turkish” word also implies an intentional rejection of the Ottoman word *millet*, thereby expressively taking a stance against Ottoman and Islam and underlining the secularist feature of the movement.

The burgeoning academic literature on *Ulusalcı* nationalism is inclined to establish a linear line of historical development and trace its intellectual roots back to the leftist trend within Kemalism starting with the Kadro movement of the 1930s, the Yön Movement of the 1960s, and later in the works of the socialist-Kemalist poet and writer Atilla İlhan, whose views shaped the development of this nationalism (Gürpınar 2013a, Aktürk 2015). Although the basic presumptions of this left-wing nationalist trend have reverberated in earlier interpretations of Kemalism, they remained confined within an elite circle of intellectuals and have not translated into mass mobilization to form a unique political movement. While this stance was formerly referred to as *Ulusal Sol* (National Left) (İlhan 2005), now the common usage of the term *Ulusalcılık* instead implies a shift in this formation. The most important difference between the *Ulusal Sol* of the 1960s and the *Ulusalcı* movement of the 2000s is that the former was the product of the Cold War

era which had the primary goal of reasserting the anti-imperialist component of Kemalism in opposition to the Turkish state's official alignment with anti-communist Western powers, and had no issue with Islamism at all, whereas the *raison d'être* of the *Ulusalcı* movement is the stance against political Islam.

The roots of the *Ulusalcı* movement go back to the early 1990s when the Islamist Refah Partisi (RP - Welfare Party), started to expand its support base. While the RP was an electorally insignificant right wing political party in the 1980s, it tripled its electoral support base in less than 10 years. Most remarkably, its success during the 1994 local elections when it won the mayoralties in most of the major cities in Turkey, and then its ascendancy to power in 1996 elicited a sense of shock and panic among secularist circles, who saw this Islamist victory as the alarm bell that signaled the beginning of a new threat that would take Turkey toward an Islamist revolution of the Iranian kind. In this process that would result in the 1997 ousting of the RP-led coalition government, the military unprecedentedly undertook a massive campaign and a series of meetings directly appealing to urban sectors such as the media, academia, business, or civil societal organizations in order to mobilize them against the rising "Islamist threat" (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 322). The 1994 electoral victory of the RP was perceived as such a serious threat by secularist circles that various grassroots organizations and new civil society associations, such as ÇYDD or CKD, were formed all campaigning for resistance and protest against the rising influence of political Islam. Secularist voluntary groups came together to raise money for and publish local newspapers and journals, thereby establishing the grassroots organizational base of the *Ulusalcı* movement (Çınar 2005: 19-20).

This initiative that started as a civilian resistance against the rising influence of Islamism in the early 1990s later developed into an active, fully established civil society movement taking

secularism as its defining element. By the early years of the 2000s, this movement took on even more pronounced features when it started to rally around secularism as a national cause, evoked as the core element of national identity that unifies the Turkish nation and needs to be upheld against Islamism at all cost. Such sacralization of the principle of secularism implied that it needed to be protected as the highest priority of the nation, even if this meant the suspension of democracy. It was at this time that the proponents and spokespersons of *Ulusalcı* nationalism started to hint at the possibility, or even necessity of a military intervention against the rising influence of Islamism in Turkey. In some meetings organized by *Ulusalcı* associations, placards started to appear that read “The Military to Duty” or “Atatürk’s Army Will Defeat the Sharia.”⁹ For the *Ulusalcı*, if what is at stake was the wellbeing of the nation, then a military coup and the suspension of democratic rights and freedoms were fully justified (Kınalı 2008).

Despite its high militarist tone, this newly emerging secularist trend had maintained a pro-EU stance until the late 1990s, with a claim to keep the country in its Western track as a measure against any deviation toward Islam. However, especially after the declaration of Turkey’s EU Accession Partnership on March 8, 2001, the implications of EU membership started to be scrutinized more critically including among *Ulusalcı* circles. The liberalization reforms, which the EU imposes as a condition for accession, such as balanced civil-military relations, granting of rights for ethnic and religious minorities, expanding political freedoms, and other similar measures were increasingly seen as infringements upon Turkey’s sovereignty, and the imposition of serious limitations on the military’s ability to keep the rising influence of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism under check.

Ironically, the Kemalist pro-Western stance was now adopted by the AKP, which was against the Kemalist Westernization project on the grounds that it alienated the Turkish nation

from its true culture rooted in Islam, but favored amiable relations with the West and championed the EU and its democratic ideals as a safe haven to survive the hostile secular environment and to avoid the fate of its predecessor, the RP, which was shut down in 1998 by the Constitutional Court for being a hub of anti-secular activities.¹⁰

Perhaps the most important turning point that marked the evolution of the *Ulusalcı* movement from a loosely organized secularist trend to a full-fledged political movement with an increasingly defined network of civil society associations was when the AKP won the general elections with an overwhelming majority and came to power in 2002. This electoral result not only meant that Turkey would be having its first experience with an Islam-based political party coming to power as a single party government, but also meant the AKP could actually make changes in the constitution with the majority power it had in the parliament and introduce elements of Islamic law into Turkey's current constitutional system. Soon after the AKP came to power in 2002, alliances among groups that were formerly in antagonistic terms with each other started to take shape among civil society associations that rallied around what can be referred to as "isolationist nationalism" that saw Turkey's national interests to be under the threat of Western imperialism (Uslu 2008, 75). One of the first instances of this unusual alliance was a demonstration that took place on February 23, 2003, protesting the Annan Plan that had proposed the unification of the Turkish and the Greek communities on the island of Cyprus. The novelty of the demonstration stemmed from the unique grouping of the gatherers which involved an unexpected alliance between the left and the right, including the former left-wing nationalist members of the Workers' Party (*İşçi Partisi*) and the ultranationalist supporters of the MHP, who were chanting slogans in unison against "Western imperialism" (Berkan 2004). This spontaneous union later took on a more formal tone and called itself "The Red Apple Alliance" (*Kızıl Elma*

Koalisyonu) – a name which signified allegiance to the unity of the Turkish nation.¹¹ This alliance was based on the claim that “Turkey, the last country belonging to the Turks, is under threat and that the country will be broken up and colonized by imperial powers and their domestic collaborators” (Dönmez 2008: 552). Several new associations sprang up announcing themselves as members of this alliance, including the National Forces Association (*Kuvvai Milliye Derneği*), and the Union of Patriot Forces (*Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği*). All these titles made references to the National Forces (*Kuvayı Milliye*) of the Turkish War of Independence, which were unofficial para-military groups that mobilized the war against Western powers after World War I. These associations, prone to acts of violence, now appeared with the premise of freeing the country from Western imperialism and the AKP’s political Islam. This alliance later expanded to include members of Turkey’s main social democrat party, the CHP and the right-wing nationalist MHP and came to be recognized as one of the first of similar alliances that constituted the broad base of the *Ulusalcı* movement (Berkan 2005).

What the national media started to refer to as “the *Ulusalcı* front” (*Ulusalcı cephe*) in 2000-2001, turned after the AKP came to power into a loose but tangible conglomeration of many actors and groups varying in stance and style, yet all sharing the same basic premise of *Ulusalcı* nationalism that Turkish national sovereignty is threatened by both the EU and the Islamism of the AKP government (Uslu 2008: 73). It had several proponents from within the CHP, MHP, and the Workers’ Party, and included civil societal organizations such as the ADD, ÇYDD, Great Union of Jurists (*Büyük Hukukçular Birliği*), or the League of Turkish Youth (*Türkiye Gençlik Birliği, TGB*), newspapers (*Cumhuriyet, Aydınlık, Yeniçağ*), magazines (*Türk Solu, İleri*), and TV channels (*BRT, Ulusal Kanal*) among others. Beside the weight of prominent intellectuals and journalists such as Atilla İlhan, Erol Manisalı, or İlhan Selçuk; the *Ulusalcı* movement included

several best-selling authors such as Turgut Özakman, Soner Yalçın, Yılmaz Özdil, and Hulki Cevizoğlu, as well. We pinpoint the emergence of *Ulusalcı* nationalism as a unique political movement at this time when diverse groups mobilized around a common ideological stance with the goal of influencing political decisions and shaping political outcomes either by organizing as part of or a new political party, or by mobilizing public opinion toward political change. Just like any other political movement, the *Ulusalcı* are not a monolithic group who think exactly alike on all of its key principles. While some emphasize the anti-imperialist/anti-Western stance as the single most important defining mark of the movement, others prioritize secularism, and some are less supportive of the military's role supporting Kemalism than others. However, the common attributes discussed here mark the *Ulusalcı* as a distinct political movement.

Ulusalcılık served as a national narrative that was equally embraced by the (active and retired) higher echelons of the civil-military bureaucracy and secular urban middle classes. Its popularity reached its peak with the Republic Rallies (*Cumhuriyet Mitingleri*) that were a series of peaceful, yet strident and massively attended demonstrations in 2007 to protest the AKP government. Using the slogan "Lay claim to your republic" ("*Cumhuriyetine sahip çık*"), the rallies were an expression of public alarm in reaction to the AKP's attempt to replace the presidency with their own candidate, Abdullah Gül, which was seen by *Ulusalcı* nationalists as the last bastion of the secularist establishment. These rallies, initiated by the ADD and later accompanied by nearly 600 NGOs, were first organized in Ankara on April 14, 2007, when over 300,000 people marched to Anıtkabir, the Mauseloum of Atatürk. Throughout April and May 2007, Turkey witnessed other similar massive demonstrations all convened as 'Republic Rallies', bringing the total number of participants well over 1,5 million.¹² Being arguably one of the largest

organized public gatherings that had ever convened, this was widely perceived as an unprecedented event in the history of Turkey.

This massive mobilization did not fully translate into votes in the subsequent 2007 general elections; but as the Republic Rallies demonstrated, the secular anti-Western nationalism of the *Ulusalcı* had gained widespread appeal. Jenny White notes that, this “Kemalist nationalist backlash [...] has given oxygen and credibility by an impressive array of actual and perceived threats and insults to the nation” (2013: 51). These include the widespread Eurosceptic conviction that the accession process is going nowhere due to the European reluctance, if not hypocrisy.¹³ International pressures over Turkey to settle the Armenian and Cyprus disputes, the numerous proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey, and increasing pressures toward the adoption of European political standards and norms were all considered as interventions to national politics and the violation of the sovereignty of the Turkish nation. To prove their point, *Ulusalcı* writers were pointing at the escalating terror of Kurdish irredentism since 2004, the US invasion of Iraq and its tolerance of the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq, as well as the so-called “sack incident,” when Turkish soldiers in Sulaymaniyah, Northern Iraq, were deported with sacks put over their heads by US troops (Yılmaz 2011: 186). Amidst this political turmoil, nationalism retained high resonance and conspiracy theories had fertile ground to flourish. The *Ulusalcı* perception that posited Turks as the heroic defenders of their country against the Western imperialists and their proxies (i.e. the Islamists, Kurds, non-Muslim minorities) became a conspiratorial master narrative that had two effects. First, this narrative proved to be an effective political toolkit that simplified and gave meaning to the complicated landscape of national and international politics (Gürpınar 2013b: 412). Second, as many felt insecure and humiliated by the concessions given for Turkey’s accession to the EU, the recurrent

emphasis on Turkish victory in the War of Independence against European powers had a healing effect. The rebranding of the glorious past helped restore national pride, as demonstrated by the tremendous success of Turgut Özakman's bestseller *Those Crazy Turks*.

Displacing the Founding Moment: *Those Crazy Turks*

While Atilla İlhan appears as the intellectual pioneer of *Ulusalcı* nationalism, it was rather Turgut Özakman and the publication of his non-fiction novel *Those Crazy Turks* in 2005 that has the lion's share in its popularization. The immense popularity of this novel marked the shift of *Ulusalcı* nationalism from being an idea to an outright political front proposing a distinct nationalist project and national identity for Turkey (Özdalga 2009, Yanık 2008). Narrating the last years of the Turkish War of Independence between 1921 and 1922 in 748 pages, *Those Crazy Turks* soon became one of the record-breaking best sellers in Turkish history. In just a couple of years after its publication, it reached one million in sales, an estimated additional million with pirate copies, and by August 2016 it had 419 editions.

The popularity of *Those Crazy Turks* was exceptional. Several civil society associations, universities, and the army purchased the book in bulk and handed it out for free (Aşık 2005). Charity organizations and private donors started campaigns to have the book donated in the thousands to various schools and libraries around the country. It was suggested by the opposition party (CHP) to have the book included as the official history textbook into the curricula of primary and secondary education and some schools complied on their own initiative by adding it as a supplement to the main textbook.¹⁴

Those Crazy Turks is a didactic novel with 45 pages of endnotes that give references to original documents. It presents a loosely fictionalized compilation of historical anecdotes in

chronological order. A few fictitious characters like Nesrin the nurse, or Captain Faruk were added for dramatic effect and to smooth out the flow of events. Apart from the love affair between them, the main sentiment throughout the novel is self-sacrifice and national devotion that made the “Turkish miracle” (the defeat of the Allied powers against incredible odds) possible. The opening scene of the book, in which the Ottoman Sultan gives an honorary dinner for the British Navy Admiral Poe in 1914, already gives away the main plot of the novel as the onset of the assault of the Western imperialists and their treacherous local collaborators that resulted in the Ottoman’s humiliating defeat in WWI. One of the running themes throughout the novel is the slavish cooperation of the Ottoman government residing in Istanbul with the leaders of the Allied forces, while the Turkish nation was giving a heroic defense against them in Anatolia. The contrast between the treachery of the Ottoman rulers and the selfless patriotism of the unnamed national heroes is summarized in the following words:

Destitute Anatolia was continuously pumping blood and lives to five different fronts. So much so that toward the end of the four-year war, every young person who weighed more than 45 kilos was sent to the front. [...] Finally the government had to admit defeat and called for truce. After a rapid decline starting in the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire had finally become a trivial colony and transformed into a garish masquerade empire. (Özakman 2005: 15)

In the narration of the events, Özakman occasionally inserts his own voice and makes references to the present so as to remind the reader that what has happened in the past is now being repeated. This intervention reaches its peak in the final pages, where the author directly appeals to the Turkish youth to warn them against present day Islamists who are spreading lies about the War of Independence and Atatürk:

Dear Young Ones! The War of Independence is one of the most legitimate, most moral, most just, and most sacred wars in the world. Be proud of your ancestors who brought imperialism and its pawns to heel, and who succeeded in establishing a brand new, modern state out of a wreckage. Don't let the honor of your martyr and veteran ancestors be tainted by a bunch of liars. (Özakman 2005: 688).

In many ways, the version of Kemalism expressed in the book is very similar to the official version that has been established as the founding ideology of the Turkish state. Its emphasis on the bravery and the honor of the Turkish nation before and during the War of Independence, the veneration of Mustafa Kemal as the wise and courageous leader of the War, the heroic selflessness of ordinary Turks, the devotion to independence at all costs, the devout adherence to territorial and national unity, the projection of religion as a source of backwardness are themes common to both official ideology and the *Ulusalçı* version of Kemalism as it finds expression in this book. In fact, the book delineates the need to reinstate Kemalism and its history, which is claimed to be under siege by the historical revisionism of both liberals and Islamists against the Kemalist order (see Gürpınar 2013b: 418). In his attempt to conserve the Kemalist episteme, Özakman acknowledges the clash between these two competing narratives of nationhood when he says that “Today Turkish youth believes in two histories that are different from one another. One of these is the real history that makes us all proud, which this novel takes as a basis and is based on sound, authentic documents... The other is the fake history that is full of lies, which was made up by those who have been trying to bring the Republic down” (2005: 687). This passage is a perfect example of the politics of nationhood that not only acknowledges that there are contending stories which are promoting their own versions of national history, but also establishes the book as telling the only true and authentic story of Turkish nationhood. Özakman blames the Islamists for

propagating a fake history who have been, and still are, trying to bring down the Turkish republic, just like their Ottoman predecessors tried to bring down the national struggle for independence.

In its claim to demonstrate “true Kemalism,” the narration of history presented in *Those Crazy Turks* departs from the official version in a slight but significant way. What the book presents as a factual rewriting of Turkish national history is in fact a reframing of Kemalism as an anti-imperialist ideology that strives for independence, which relocates the founding moment in the War of Independence and particularly its victorious conclusion in 1922 as the moment when the people of Turkey became a sovereign nation. As a nonfiction novel, the book goes into every detail surrounding the War, including the movement of the troops, correspondence and meetings among the leaders of the Allied powers, maps and plans of the Greek and the Turkish armies, and many other details of day-to-day developments, and concludes with the resignation of Prime Minister Lloyd George from his office, which is presented as the ultimate mark of the defeat of the imperialist powers and the victory of the Turkish nation. After a 680-page narration of the War culminating in victory in 1922, the official founding moment – the formation of the Republic in 1923 – is mentioned only in a single line in the one-page conclusion (Özakman 2005: 681).

Another attempt to authenticate the claim that the story told in *Those Crazy Turks* is indeed the one and only true story of Kemalism is Özakman’s account of his own experience with the War of Independence, which apparently became the main source of inspiration for writing this book. In the Preface, Özakman recounts a tour he attended with a group of his friends in 1948 when they took a ten-day trip on foot from Polatlı, Ankara to Dumlupınar, in which they followed the route of the Turkish army on its way to the August 30 victory, arrived on the site on August 29, slept on the ground that night akin to the soldiers who did the same 26 years ago, and welcomed the tens of thousands who arrived at the site from surrounding towns and villages to celebrate the

victory (Özakman 2005: 7). The recounting of this experience not only invites the reader to become part of the patriotic spirit of the War, but also serves to authenticate Özakman's authority to write and speak on behalf of the unnamed heroes of the Turkish nation as if he has participated in the War himself.

The book culminates in the August 30 victory narrated as the climax of not only the War but the whole history of the Turkish nation, as if its current existence would not have been possible without it. In order to further authenticate this date as the ultimate founding moment, Özakman quotes the following words of writer and a close acquaintance of Mustafa Kemal, Falih Rıfki Atay:

If we have established an independent state, become free citizens, we are walking straight as honorable people, if we were able to rescue our home country from the clutches of the West and our mentality from the clutches of the East, if we are looking at these seas as ours, feeling the warmth of a mother's embrace in this land, maybe even breathing, we owe all of this, everything to the August 30 victory.
(Falih Rıfki Atay, cited in Özakman 2005: 645).

As founding moments are maintained not only with historical narratives, but also with commemorative practices, it is important to note that the popularity of the book was accompanied by a tremendous rise in the number of the events and their participants that commemorate important dates of the War of Independence, such as May 19, the date when Atatürk landed in Samsun to initiate the War, August 30 celebrated as the Victory Day, and other similar dates. In 2005, the March of Victory (*Zafer Yürüyüşü*) was invented as a new tradition that annually replicates the Turkish soldiers' march from Şuhut to Kocatepe, Afyonkarahisar, on the night of August 25, 1922, commemorating the beginning of the final battle (the Great Offensive) of the

War.¹⁵ Likewise, the battlefronts, which were ordinary stretches of land until then were turned into participatory museums serving as sites of national pilgrimage where participants would be initiated into citizenship by becoming part of the experience of the War.¹⁶

This narrative displacement of the founding moment from 1923 to the 1919-1922 period serves multiple functions toward establishing the *Ulusalci* as a distinct nationalist movement, and the construction of a new Turkish national subject as anti-Western and primordially secular. First, it allows for the reframing of Turkish national history around its military power fueled by patriotism and anti-imperialist nationalism, rather than civilian reforms toward modernization and Westernization as the official conception of national history does. Second, it creates a sense of national unity by designating the European imperialist powers as the common enemy and main source of threat to the nation. Third, it serves to defame Islam and Ottomanism by framing the Ottoman state and the Islamic Ulema, which had collaborated with the European powers during the War, as traitors that also threaten the wellbeing of the Turkish nation. Fourth, it serves to frame the present day Islamists and the AKP government as the direct continuation of the Ottoman state and an equally treacherous power that the Turkish nation needs to be protected from at all cost. And finally, it allows the reframing of secularism as the primordial characteristic of the Turkish nation, which is its most crucial weapon in protecting itself against the destructive advances of Islamism and Ottomanism.

Having already authenticated himself as a legitimate spokesperson of the Turkish nation, Özakman says: “[...] this is our essential struggle. We are not only battling imperialism, we are also battling the traitor Istanbul government and its extensions” (2005: 213). In the book, Western powers are consistently referred to as “imperialists” and the Ottoman government in Istanbul is portrayed as a devious traitor that did everything in its power to collaborate with the enemy and

undermine the independence movement. The consequent framing of the War as against the European imperialists and their Islamist collaborators gives way to a conspiratorial interpretation of politics and a permanent sense of insecurity that is utilized to create a need for national unity against a common enemy that still continues to threaten the wellbeing and sovereignty of the Turkish nation. These effects of the restructuring of national history around a new founding moment can be summed up under the two constitutive pillars of *Ulusalcı* nationalism: anti-Westernism, and primordial secularism. In the *Ulusalcı* imagination, the War of Independence that was fought with the European imperialists on the outside, and their Islamist collaborators on the inside, is also being fought today by the *Ulusalcı* in defense of the Turkish nation against the imperialist EU internationally, and the AKP regime domestically.

The European “White Cannibals”: Secularist Anti-imperialism and Anti-Westernism

One of the most important effects of the relocation of the founding moment is that it allows the framing of the War, rather than the formation of the Republic, as the most significant moment of Turkish national history, and the fight against European powers as the worthiest cause around which the Turkish nation unified. For the *Ulusalcı*, Turks can preserve their sovereignty and independence only if they unite against Western powers, which the novel *Those Crazy Turks* vilifies as the worst common enemy who will ruthlessly use every opportunity to bring Turkey down.

Özakman, in both his book and interviews, uses the words “West” and “imperialists/imperialism” interchangeably. While he invites the reader to respect the science and arts of the West, he warns against their “selfish, dark, and imperialist side”, which he attempts to

capture in the phrase “the white cannibals” (2005: 127). According to Özakman, even if the West may appear to have become more amiable after the end of World War II, this is in appearance only and in truth “they are the same as they were 1000 years, 500 years ago. We should never forget how selfish politicians and diplomats that represent the West are” (*Tempo*, September 5, 2005). He warns his readers that “these people are civilized toward themselves but barbaric toward others” (Özakman 2005: 127).

After the publication of the book, several other public figures emerged with similar claims asserting that Kemalism is essentially *Ulusalcı* and anti-imperialist, and the Kemalist motto “Full Independence!” really means that Turkey should close all doors to the EU and the US internationally, and suppress political Islam and Kurdish nationalism domestically. These views were widely repeated on banners and chanted slogans during the Republic Rallies in 2007. Instead of the existing alliances with the EU and the USA, some prominent *Ulusalcı* figures like Tuncer Kılıç, who was the longest serving Turkish general at NATO as the official representative of the Turkish military, and the former secretary general of the National Security Council, proposed that Turkey leaves NATO and initiates what has been called the “Eurasia” project and seeks to establish new alliances in the region with the Russian Federation and Iran (Oğuzlu 2011: 670).

The isolationist stance toward the EU and the US adopted by the *Ulusalcı* movement in international politics is accompanied by exclusionary nationalism in domestic politics, which finds expression in the reluctance to acknowledge, if not the outright rejection of the Kurdish issue, let alone the recognition of the rights of Kurds as an ethnic minority. This stance, which brings the *Ulusalcı* into closer ideological proximity with the ethnic nationalism of the right-wing nationalist MHP, is articulated in *Those Crazy Turks* as the unquestioned assumption that the national community in Turkey consists only of Turks. The Kurds are mentioned in the book only

on a few occasions, and always as an external force that either fought with Turkish forces (2005: 82), or were targeted by the enemy to mobilize against the Turks (143, 693). The War is depicted as a struggle of good against evil, pitted against each other in black-and-white terms, where Turks always appear as the courageous, innocent and honorable heroes, whereas Europeans are cruel imperialists and the Kurds and Arabs are sinister traitors.

The shifting of the founding moment from 1923 to 1922 was accompanied in the *Ulusalcı* imagination by the replacement of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty – the founding treaty of the new Turkish Republic – with the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920. Sèvres was the peace treaty signed between the Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and envisaged the partition of the empire among the European powers, as well as the formation of an independent Armenian state and an autonomous Kurdistan. After the victory of the War, the Lausanne Treaty replaced the former and has been celebrated ever since as the most important international agreement which established Turkey as a sovereign new state in the international community. Although it was never enacted, the Sèvres Treaty has been seen by both official sources and the media as the utmost insult to the sovereignty of the Turkish nation and proof of the devious imperialist schemes of European colonial powers. It has haunted Turkey as a persistent paranoid memory referred to as the so-called “Sèvres Syndrome,” which signifies the fear that Western powers never gave up their imperialistic aims over Turkey and still intend to divide and control the country (Şener 2014). As would be expected, the Sèvres Syndrome was revived by the *Ulusalcı* in their attempts to frame the present-day EU as the mere continuation of the same imperialist power that had attempted to colonize Turkey after WWI. *Ulusalcı* nationalists started to point their fingers at the EU, saying that Turkey is now facing the same threat that it did right before the War of Independence and that the country’s sovereignty and wellbeing are at stake.

This claim was strengthened when the EU challenged what was perceived to be Turkey's national interest by aligning with parties and countries in international disputes against Turkey, such as the Cyprus and the Armenian issues,¹⁷ and supported the political empowerment of Kurdish minority groups. The EU accession reform package was perceived as the AKP government's servitude to the EU's demands and was called an extension of "EU fascism." The head of the Europe and Middle East Studies Research Center of Istanbul University, and one of the lead spokespersons of *Ulusalcı* circles, Erol Manisalı noted that "*Ulusalcı* nationalism is a movement that resists the EU's colonizing policies. What we are experiencing now [under the AKP government] is fascism" (2008). Likewise, this rationale postulates the Kurds as the American proxies and the Kurdish irredentist movement as a foreign-supported plot in order to weaken and divide Turkey (Uslu 2008: 86).

Primordial Secularism of the "Crazy Turk"

In *Those Crazy Turks* Özakman provides an insistently secular narrative of the Turkish War of Independence, where Islamic sentiments are invisible if not associated with reactionaryism or treason. In the hands of *Ulusalcı* nationalists, secularism takes on a significantly different meaning than in mainstream Kemalism, which upheld secularism as a necessary part of modernization that requires Turkey to detach itself from Islam and align with Europe. In contrast, the *Ulusalcı* claim that Turks were secular from the start, and it was Islam that was imposed on them by outside forces, namely Arabs, thereby ascribing to secularism a primordial role as the true core characteristic of Turkishness.

In this re-composition of Kemalism that Toni Alaranta formulates as a shift from "universal secular-humanism to extreme nationalism," secularism is now more than a pillar of Turkish Enlightenment or an emancipation project (2014). In *Ulusalcı* rhetoric, secularism is seen

as a primordial quality that restores the Turkish nation to its original essence. According to the *Ulusalcı* writer İklil Kurban, Turks used to be already secular prior to their massive convert to Islam around the eighth century, and they owed their political and scientific success in that period to secularism (2009). From the *Ulusalcı* perspective, secularization reforms in the early Republican period (1923-1938) were not part of Westernization, but were done to return the nation back to its Turkish roots by reinstating national identity that had corroded under the influence of Islam. Moreover, Turks are claimed to be so naturally and primordially secular that they even secularized Islam itself. Referring to Alevism that developed in Anatolia over the centuries as opposed to the orthodox Islam of the Ottoman state,¹⁸ the *Ulusalcı* claim that Turks have “domesticated/tamed the Shariah of the [Arab] desert” (Saltık 2004, Erdemir 2005: 938-939).

Employing a political principle such as secularism as the primordial essence of a national identity is quite unusual because by definition the notion of a political principle involves intellectual debate and theorizing, and therefore is contingent upon historical, political and cultural context, is in direct contradiction with the notion of “primordialism” that asserts a natural, fixed, ahistorical, ethnic, almost sacred attribute that is rooted in biological or territorial factors. While secular modernity is supposed to appeal to reason and the “disenchantment of the world” in the Weberian sense, *Ulusalcı* nationalism mutates secularism into a primordial element of nationhood and rather leads to the re-enchantment of the world.

The primordialist secularism of the *Ulusalcı* movement also allows the framing of the contention with Islamism as a national struggle. Once secularism is established as a primordial quality of the Turkish nation, then Islamists can be condemned not only for being anti-modern, but more importantly for going against the very essence of the nation, for being outsiders and foreigners. This allows for the *Ulusalcı* nationalists to open a new front in their war against

Islamism where Islamists are blamed not only for collaborating with the enemy (EU) thereby acting against the sovereignty of the Turkish nation just like their Ottoman predecessors, but also for being non- or even anti-Turkish. In his book, Özakman often associates Islam with Arabs and talks about Islamic garb and appearance as “Arab-like” thereby farming Islam as an alien attribute that is an essential feature of another ethnic community and unbecoming of the Turk (2005: 544). Another highly popular and adamantly *Ulusalcı* writer Ergün Poyraz accused the AKP for pursuing policies that a genuinely Turkish party would never even consider, because, according to Poyraz, the AKP is an essentially “Arab Kurdish party that is a descendant of the army of the Caliphate” (2007: 5). The attempt to defame the AKP as an “Arab-Kurdish” party is a rhetorical tactic that taps into nationalist sentiments so as to frame Islamists as an ethnically foreign group that would not have any patriotic concern for Turkey’s national interests, which again establishes Turkishness as an essentially secular identity.

In this context, secularism is evoked as a valuable *nationalist* principle against political Islam in general, and the AKP government in particular, who are, similar to the Ottoman dynasty during the War of Independence, seen to be “selling out” the Turkish nation to the Western powers in their efforts to make Turkey a member of the EU. In *Those Crazy Turks*, there are stories and anecdotes where people carry out gruesome atrocities in the name of Islam against the soldiers of the national struggle. Özakman refers to those who “attempt to use religion for their own personal benefits” as “ignorant, treacherous bigots” (2005: 694) and draws parallels between the betrayal of the nation by such fanatical Islamists and the current AKP government when he notes that the “conservative, reactionary, anti-revolutionary ideas and parties that emerged later” are a continuation of the group of “small-minded intellectuals, collaborators, traitors, fanatics, and

bigots who had no conception of independence and lacked any sense of patriotism” and who collaborated with the enemy during the War (2005: 692).

Conclusion

As we have argued, the politics of nationhood involves the generation, institutionalization, and contestation of founding moments by contending political movements that produce, spread and promote their version of the national story, and strive to come to power to institutionalize their version of the national subject and national history as the hegemonic national project.

Through an examination of the emergence of the *Ulusalcı* movement at the same time that the ruling AKP came to power in 2002, this paper studies the *Ulusalcı* narration of the Turkish nation based on the analysis of the record-breaking best seller documentary novel, *Those Crazy Turks*, which narrates Turkish nationhood as primordially secular defined against the Ottomanist and Islamist ideology of the ruling AKP, and as adamantly anti-Western in contrast to mainstream Kemalism that interpellates the national subject as modern, Westernized and culturally secular. We argue that this re-framing of Kemalism and the creation of a new national subject is achieved by the displacement of the founding moment from the officially recognized date in 1923 marking the declaration of the republic, to the War of Independence period, 1919-1922. Claiming that the Turkish nation was secular from the beginning much before Islam emerged, *Ulusalcı* nationalists ascribe a sacred status to secularism and treat it as the primordial bond that binds the Turkish nation together. They see Islamists as an alien power conspiring with the West, including the USA and the EU, against Turkey’s sovereignty and wellbeing.

In a rather unexpected twist of events, in 2008 the AKP government initiated a series of investigations, lawsuits and arrests against various *Ulusalcı* organizations and prominent figures

as well as retired and active-duty officers of the army, who started to be questioned and tried for criminal activity, including plotting to conduct a military coup around a clandestine network named *Ergenekon*. The AKP undoubtedly benefited from the *Ergenekon* trials to diminish the organizational capacity of the *Ulusalci* opposition and, by and large, seriously limit the tutelary role of the military in Turkish politics. However, after the Gezi Park protests in 2013, both the AKP and the status of the *Ulusalci* movement changed with everything else in Turkey. A rift appeared between Turkey's two main Islamic camps – the AKP and the Gülen movement – eventually culminating in the failed coup attempt that took place on 15 July 2016. During this time, the AKP declared the Gülen movement as its main adversary, declared it a terrorist organization, and started to build unexpected alliances with *Ulusalci* circles in its fight against it. In 2014, the whole *Ergenekon* affair became largely undone after the Constitutional Court overruled the verdict for the violation of terms of fair trial. Many *Ulusalci* figures including several military officers, police commissioners, judges and prosecutors who were imprisoned under *Ergenekon* were not only released but placed back in key positions in the military, the legal system and the bureaucracy to help the AKP in its fight against the Gülen organization (Gürçan 2016). During this time the CHP started to negotiate its alignment with the *Ulusalci* and most of the leaders of the *Ulusalci* clique within the CHP resigned.¹⁹ In the midst of these shifting alignments, the *Ulusalci* perspective not only remained as a powerful influence among various secularist groups, but also the anti-Western nationalism that it propagated gained popularity beyond secularist circles to be endorsed by different groups including some AKP supporters and eventually the government itself. Erdoğan gradually drifted away from his pro-EU stance, after he subdued the military and judiciary and further consolidated his political power around an increasingly anti-Western, nationalist agenda (Taş 2015: 781). Accompanying this shift in the

ideological composition of the AKP, Erdoğan employed the *Ulusalcı* conspiracy-driven rhetoric portraying Turkey in a liberation war against the imperialist West and its collaborators inside. Today, the organizational and mobilizational influence of *Ulusalcı* nationalism is not as powerful as it was a decade ago; but its discursive premises continue to shape political debates and inform political alignments in Turkey.

Notes

All Turkish-to-English translations are by the authors unless indicated otherwise.

¹ The AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – Justice and Development Party) was established in 2001 under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan after its predecessor the Fazilet (Virtue) Party – and before that the Refah (Welfare) Party – was closed down by the Constitutional Court for activities against the “Laicism” clause of the Turkish Constitution. Erdoğan, who had been the Mayor of Istanbul since 1994 had to serve a short prison sentence and was banned from active politics until 2003 for the same reason. The AKP came to power in 2002 with a majority vote and consecutive electoral victories provided it an uninterrupted parliamentary majority and single-party government since then. The party initially defined its position as “conservative democracy” promoting religious values together with democratic principles and a free market system. Nevertheless, especially after the 2013 Gezi protests, it rapidly shifted to a more authoritarian and interventionist stance, and adopted a more overtly Islamist and Ottomanist position.

² *Ulusalcılık* literally translates as nationalism but has a different connotation from the commonly used version of the term (*milliyetçilik*). In the absence of an accurate and conclusive translation, scholars refer to *Ulusalcılık* with different terms such as “neo-nationalism” (Uslu 2008, Gürpınar 2013a: 456), “neo-Kemalism” (Dönmez 2008: 564, Yanık 2008: 9) or “secular nationalism” (Şevkli 2011). We chose to retain the term in its original not only because of this ambiguity in translation, but also to demonstrate and retain the discursive play in the Turkish wording.

³ The Islamism of the AKP is a ~~widely debated~~~~widely debated~~ topic. While some have argued that the AKP is not an Islamist but a “conservative democrat” (Özbudun and Hale 2010, Çayır 2008) or a “conservative globalists” party (Öniş 2007), others have maintained that the AKP is an Islamist

party which is evident in its national ideology that posits Turkey as an Ottoman-Islamic civilization (Çınar 2011), or in its endorsement of Muslim nationalism (White 2013).

⁴ Kemalism is the founding ideology of the Turkish state, which eventually evolved into an overarching ideology that consists of a variety of different political positions both from the right and the left, but all adhering to the common principles secularism, Turkish nationalism, and modernization.

⁵ For a critical assessment of secularist civil society in Turkey, see Navaro-Yashin (2002).

⁶ For a detailed account of primordialism, see Umut Özkırmı (2010: 49-71).

⁷ For a detailed account of the reproduction of “banal nationalism” on a daily basis, see Bilig (1995).

⁸ See, for instance, Bora (2003), Özkırmı (2013).

⁹ These placards appeared respectively in the 80th Anniversary of the Republic celebrations organized by the ADD in 2003, and the Çağlayan Republic Rally in April 2007.

¹⁰ The pro-EU stance of the AKP underwent a radical shift after the 2013 Gezi protests when Erdogan started to divert from the party’s established pro-Western position to adopt a more isolationist, nationalist, and at times antagonistic approach to the EU and the US depending on conjuncture.

¹¹ In Turkish mythology, the “red apple” refers to a legendary city that was the ultimate goal of Turkish conquests in Central Asia, which was later evoked by Ziya Gökalp as the symbol of Turkish unification when he developed his ideology of Turkism in a book called *Red Apple (Kızılelma)*, 1914) (Celnavora 1997: 104).

¹² *Turkish Daily News*, May 7, 2007, at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/anti-government-rallies-held-across-the-country.aspx?pageID=438&n=anti-government-rallies-held-across-the-country-2007-05-07>, accessed (December 19, 2009).

¹³ According to the 2007 Eurobarometer, 59 percent of the Turks showed distrust towards the EU (European Commission 2007: 36).

¹⁴ *Hürriyet*, August 30, 2005, at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/okullarda-yardimci-kitap-diye-okutulsun-346036>, accessed (December 21, 2009); Serkan Akkoç, “Ders kitabı yaptılar,” *Hürriyet*, October 14, 2005, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ders-kitabi-yaptilar-3374768>, accessed (September 9, 2016).

¹⁵ This route was officially sanctioned in 2005 as the “Victory Route” and has been receiving hikers ever since. <http://wowturkey.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=137222>, accessed (October 1, 2016)

¹⁶ Some of the most popular tourism agencies of Turkey started to organize hiking tours to such sites starting in 2006. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kurtulus-savasi-cephelerine-yolculuk-5367104>; <http://www.feststravel.com/savas-alanlarina-gitmek>; accessed (September 9, 2016);

¹⁷ On the Armenian issue (whether the treatment of Armenians in late Ottoman Empire constituted a genocide), *Ulusalcı* nationalists not only endorse Turkey’s official policy that denies its occurrence, but they also claim that the issue is a fabrication by Western powers to divide the country, as evident in the *Ulusalcı* motto “The genocide lie is an American game.” *Hürriyet*, March 7, 2007, at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/in-ankara-workers-party-protests-armenian-genocide-allegations-at-us-embassy-6080738>, accessed (October 12, 2015).

¹⁸ For a critical account of Alevism, see Dressler (2013).

¹⁹ *Hürriyet*, November 1, 2014, at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/emine-ulker-tarhan-istifa-etti-27494064>, accessed (May 24, 2016).

References

- Akbay, Cevdet (2013) "Gezi Parkı kalkışmasının arkasında neo-con çetesi var" [It is the neo-con gang behind the Gezi Park revolt], *Yeni Şafak*, July 5.
- Aktürk, Şener (2015) "The Fourth Style of Politics: Eurasianism as a Pro-Russian Rethinking of Turkey's Geopolitical Identity," *Turkish Studies* 16(1): 54-79.
- Alaranta, Toni (2014) *Contemporary Kemalism – From Universal Secular-Humanism to Extreme Turkish Nationalism*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Altun, Mesut (2016) "Tarihimiz 1919'da başlamadı" [Our history did not begin in 1919], *Sabah*, April 30.
- Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Aşık, Melih (2005) "Askerler Çılgın Türk'e Hücum Ediyor" [Officers storm to the Crazy Turks], *Milliyet*, October 22.
- Bahçeli, Devlet (2013) *Message on the 942. Anniversary of Manzikert Victory*, August 26, at http://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/2997/index.html, accessed (May 25, 2015).
- Batuman, Elif, (2014) "Ottomania." *The New Yorker*, February 17.
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/17/ottomania>.
- Berkan, İsmet (2004) "Hem *Ulusalcı* hem de Osmanlı" [Both *Ulusalcı* and Ottomanist], *Radikal*, March 22.
- Berkan, İsmet (2005) 'Kızıl Elma'nın Kaç Oyu Var?' [How many votes has got the Red Apple Coalition?], *Radikal*, September 28.
- Bhabha, Homi K. (1993) "Dissemination: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation," pp. 291-322 in H.K. Bhabha (ed.) *Nation and Narration*. New York: Routledge.

- Billig, Michael (1995) *Banal Nationalism*. 1 edition. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Bora, Tamil (2003) "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102(2/3): 433-451.
- Butler, Judith (1993) *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" / Judith Butler*. New York: Routledge.
- Çayır, Kenan (2008) "The Emergence of Contemporary 'Muslim Democrats'," pp.62-79, in Ümit Cizre, ed. *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey – The Making of Justice and Development Party*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Celnarova, Xénia (1997) "The Religious Ideas of the Early Turks from Point of View of Ziya Gökalp," *Asian and African Studies* 6(1): 103-108.
- Çınar, Alev (2001) "National History as a Contested Site: The Conquest of Istanbul and Islamist Negotiations of the Nation," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43(2): 364-91.
- Çınar, Alev (2005) *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Çınar, Alev (2010) "Globalism as the Product of Nationalism Founding Ideology and the Erasure of the Local in Turkey," *Theory, Culture & Society* 27 (4): 90–118.
- Çınar, Alev (2011) "The Justice and Development Party: Turkey's Experience with Islam, Democracy, Liberalism and Secularism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43(3): 529–41.
- Cizre, Ümit and Menderes Çınar (2003) "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the light of February 28 Process," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102(2/3): 309-332.
- Coşkun, Bekir (2016) "Bizim tarihimiz 1919'da başlar" [Our history begins in 1919], *Sözcü*, May 1.

- Dönmez, Rasim Özgür (2008) “Vigilantism in Turkey: Totalitarian Movements and Uncivil Society in a Post-9/11 Democracy,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9(4): 551-574.
- Dressler, Markus (2013) *Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eğitimsen (2016) *2015-2016 Eğitim Öğretim İstatistikleri* [2015-2016 Statistics on Education], March 22, at <http://egitimsen.org.tr/2015-2016-egitim-ogretim-istatistikleri/>.
- Ellis, Joseph (2000) *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation*. New York: Vintage.
- Erdemir, Aykan (2005) “Tradition and Modernity: Alevis’ Ambiguous and Turkey’s Ambivalent Subjects,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 41(6): 937-51.
- European Commission (2007) *Eurobarometer 68 – Public Opinion in the European Union*, at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_first_en.pdf.
- Göle, Nilüfer (2000) “Snapshots of Islamic Modernities,” *Daedalus* 129 (1): 91–117.
- Gürçan, Metin (2016) “Power struggle erupts in Turkey’s security structure,” *Al Monitor*, October 12. At <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-power-struggle-between-islamists-and-secularists.html>, accessed (October 20, 2016).
- Gürpınar, Doğan (2013a) “The Reinvention of Kemalism: Between Elitism, Anti-Elitism and Anti-Intellectualism,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 49(3): 454-476.
- Gürpınar, Doğan (2013b) “Historical Revisionism vs. Conspiracy Theories: Transformations of Turkish Historical Scholarship and Conspiracy Theories as a Constitutive Element in Transforming Turkish Nationalism,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 15(4): 412-433.
- İlhan, Atilla (2005) *Yıldız, Hilal ve Kalpak – Gazi’nin “Ulusal” Solculuğu*. İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları.

- Khoury, Nadim (2016) "National Narratives and the Oslo Peace Process: How Peacebuilding Paradigms Address Conflicts over History." *Nations and Nationalism* 22 (3): 465–83.
- Kınalı, Hasan (2008) "Söz konusu vatansa gerisi teferruattır" [If the homeland is at stake, then everything else is trivial], *Hürriyet*, February 1.
- Kösebalaban, Hasan (2005) "The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity: The Case of Turkey," *World Affairs* 168(1): 27–37.
- Kurban, İklil (2009) "Aslında Türk ulusu laik bir ulustu" [The Turkish nation was indeed secular], *Vatan*, July 1.
- Manisalı, Erol (2008) "AB Faşizmi" [EU Fascism], *Yeni Çağ*, March 30.
- Morden, Michael (2016) "Anatomy of the National Myth: Archetypes and Narrative in the Study of Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 22 (3): 447–64.
- Navaro-Yashin, Yael (2002) *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*. Princeton University Press.
- Oğuzlu, Tarık (2010/2011) "Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?" ¹¹_{SEP} *Political Science Quarterly* 125(4): 657-683.
- Ongur, Hakan Ovunc (2015) "Identifying Ottomanisms: The Discursive Evolution of Ottoman Pasts in the Turkish Presents," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 51:3, 416-432.
- Öniş, Ziya (2007) « Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9(3): 247-261.
- Özakman, Turgut (2005) *Şu Çılgın Türkler* [Those Crazy Turks]. Istanbul: Bilgi.
- Özdağ, Elisabeth (2009) "Those Crazy Turks: Polemical 'Pamphlet' Rather than Historical Novel," *Middle East Critique* 18(1): 61-71.
- Özkırımlı, Umut (2010) *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Özkırmılı, Umut (2013) “The topography of nationalism in Turkey: actors, discourses and the struggle for hegemony,” pp. 71-86, in R. Kastoryano (ed.) *Turkey Between Nationalism and Globalization*. New York: Routledge.
- Poyraz, Ergun (2007) *Hilafet Ordusundan Arap Kürt Partisine* [From the Army of the Caliphate to the Arap Kurdish Party]. Istanbul: Togan.
- Saltık, Ahmet (2004) “Laiklik Nedir? Ne Değildir?” [What is Laicism and what is not?], *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* [Association of Atatürkist Thought]. At http://www.add.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=150&Itemid=31, accessed (December 21, 2009).
- Smith, Rogers M. (2003) *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Spillman, Lyn (1997) *Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Şener, Bülent (2014) “Sevr Fobisi/Sendromu: Türkiyenin Güvenlik Endişesini Anlamak Üzerine Düşünceler,” *Journal of Turkish Studies* 9(5): 1835–1835.
- Taş, Hakkı (2015) “Turkey – from tutelary to delegative democracy,” *Third World Quarterly* 36(4): 776-791.
- Taylor, Charles (1992) *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Tempo* (2005) “Denize Dökülen Ortadoğu Tasarılarıydı” [Whatever thrown into the sea were the scenarios on the Middle East], September 5.
- Türk Tarihi Heyeti [Turkish History Committee] (1930-Reprint in 1996) *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları : Kemalist Yönetimin Resmi Tarih Tezi* [The Outline of Turkish History]. 2nd ed. Istanbul: Kaynak.

- Uslu, Emrullah (2008) "Ulusalçılık: The Neo-nationalist Resurgence in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 9(1): 73-97.
- White, Jenny (2013) *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Yanık, Lerna (2008) "'Those Crazy Turks' that Got Caught in the 'Metal Storm': Nationalism in Turkey's Best Seller Lists," *Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies Working Paper Series*, No. 4.
- Yıldız, Ahmet (2001) *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene – Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938)* [How Happy is he who Calls Himself a Turk – The Ethno-Secular boundaries of Turkish National Identity (1919-1938)]. Istanbul: İletişim.
- Yılmaz, Hakan (2011) "Euro-scepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion," *South European Society and Politics* 16(1): 185-208.
- Zencirci, Gizem (2014) "Civil Society's History: New Constructions of Ottoman Heritage by the Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *European Journal of Turkish Studies. Social Sciences on Contemporary Turkey*, 19 (December): 1-20.
- Zerubavel, Yael (1997) *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.