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A Turkish Mayor Goes to Moscow: Vedat Dalokay and Development Politics in the 1970s

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Abstract

In 1975, the mayor of Ankara requested Soviet assistance to build a public transportation system and affordable housing in the Turkish capital. This article uses Vedat Dalokay's appeal as a window into international development politics during a transformative decade. The 1970s saw growing leftism in Turkey, and Dalokay hoped that progressive urban planning would solidify voting trends among rural-to-urban migrants. He sought to introduce a new ideological element into Soviet–Turkish exchange, but politicians and academics in Moscow dismissed Dalokay's class-oriented projects. Instead, they increased their investments in the steel mills and electricity plants that were hallmarks of Soviet economic exchanges with the Third World. Whereas Dalokay's aspirations emerged from a Turkish intellectual climate that was being reshaped by dependency theory and by disillusionment in the possibilities for growth within boundaries defined by the political borders of nation-states, Soviet economists and bureaucrats remained wedded to the idea of development defined in terms of the territorial economy. The Ankara municipality eventually turned to Western Europe, but the Turkish government continued to negotiate gas pipelines and nuclear power plants with the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian governments. This article explores the ideological assumptions that have shaped economic exchange across the Black Sea.

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The 1970s brought what historians have called 'the shock of the global', and the decade upended Turkey's relations with the world.[1] Ankara had joined NATO in 1952 and rapidly become a key outpost of the transatlantic coalition, but, twenty years later, ties to the US were frayed. Early dismay, after Lyndon B. Johnson's heavy-handed warning in 1964 to the Turkish government over Cyprus, had grown in 1968 into violent student protests against American overreach; in 1974, when Washington imposed sanctions after the Turkish military's occupation of the Mediterranean island, anti-Americanism gripped the nation.

As US–Turkish relations worsened, the Soviet Union sought rapprochement. It had been Moscow's postwar threats that pushed Turkey to commit to the West, but now the Kremlin capitalized both on US–Turkish conflict over Cyprus and Turkish dissatisfaction with the pace of economic growth within the capitalist bloc. In the mid-1970s, Soviet credit and technology allowed Ankara to celebrate significant industrial achievements: the opening of the country's largest steelworks, a major new oil refinery, and the country's first aluminum plant. If the Cold War had initially presented Turkey with a binary choice between US capitalism and Soviet socialism, the 1970s marked the end of the era of exclusive alliances. Nevertheless, while the decade saw Ankara clash with Western allies and grow closer to Moscow, it ended with liberalization and the country's opening to international markets. Turkish elites struggled to understand the Kremlin's priorities amidst these tectonic shifts, and their experience helps us to understand the Soviet Union's participation in late-twentieth-century globalization.[2]

This article reconstructs a Turkish mayor's 1975 visit to Moscow to explore Soviet–Turkish economic exchange. Vedat Dalokay was elected to head Ankara's municipal government in 1973, and the party he represented, the Republican People's Party (RPP), brought a strident leftism into mainstream Turkish politics. Although Dalokay was a local politician, his horizons were fittingly international for a global decade. Just before departing for Moscow, he had moved to cut off the Spanish embassy's water and electricity in protest of Francisco Franco's execution of five Basque militants.[3] An architect by training, he was emboldened by the rise of social democracy in Europe and interested in how Soviet urban planning might address the

1 N. Ferguson, C. S. Maier, E. Manela, and D. J. Sargent (eds), *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge 2010).
2 O. Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge 2014), 91–2; J. Mark, A. Kalinovsky, and S. Marung (eds), *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington 2020); J. Friedman, *Ripe for Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World* (Cambridge 2021), 6–8.
3 'Dalokay Hakkında Güvenlik Mahkemesi Soruşturma Açtı', *Milliyet*, 3 October 1975; O. Kumbaracıbaşı, *İnönü'lü Günler* (İstanbul 2007), 71.

frustrations of poor migrants in Turkey's large cities. His hosts were well-informed about Turkish politics, and yet at no point were Dalokay and his Soviet colleagues on the same page. That divergence tells us much about the ideological currents of the late Cold War, about the political economy that shaped Europe's eastern periphery during a momentous decade.

Recently, scholars working on the US and the world in the 1950s and 1960s have underscored the social and economic implications of the US–Turkish relationship, in terms both of the transformative effects of US-led aid programs and of Turkey's influence on the elaboration of modernization theory.[4] The shock of the global not only weighed on Turkey's relationship with the US but also claimed the country's postwar model of development. In 1973, West Germany ended the recruitment of Turkish migrant labor and undercut the remittances that supplemented Turkey's export earnings; rising oil prices further strained Ankara's balance of payments; and economic anxieties drove political polarization and street violence. In a US-oriented narrative, the combination of sanctions, financial crises, and political instability makes Turkey's 1970s seem a period of disengagement and isolation.[5] In fact, the decade saw a reconfiguration of Turkey's international connections, including a dramatic expansion of those to Moscow.[6]

From Moscow's perspective, the overtures to Turkey were driven by both Cold War dynamics and an attempt to carve out a role in the globalizing world economy.[7] In 1967, as members of the Soviet committee responsible for 'international cooperation' reduced the number of foreign partners in response to what they saw as Nikita Khrushchev's unsystematic largesse, Turkey was among seven countries they singled out for continued efforts.[8] Whereas scholars today write of a 'Second World–Third World' nexus that suggests an ideological coalition and rejection of the First World, Soviet officials spoke of relations with 'developing countries' – a phrase whose economic emphasis allowed for the inclusion of poorer First World allies like Turkey and Iran.[9] Leonid Brezhnev's economic outreach crossed the socialist–capitalist divide, and hence historians of Soviet

4 N. J. Citino, *Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in US-Arab Relations, 1945–1967* (Cambridge 2017), 56–96; B. Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey* (Stanford 2018); N. L. Danforth, *The Remaking of Republican Turkey: Memory and Modernity since the Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge 2021); S. Güvenç and M. Uyar, 'Lost in Translation or Transformation? The Impact of American Aid on the Turkish Military, 1947–1960', *Cold War History* 22, 1 (2022), 59–77. For an important initiative to address the US-centrism of Turkish Cold War histories, see C. Örnek and Ç. Üngör, 'Introduction', in C. Örnek and Ç. Üngör (eds) *Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture* (Houndmills 2013), esp. 1–2.

5 W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd ed. (London 2012), 106–18.

6 S. J. Hirst and O. İşçi, 'Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian-Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development', *Diplomatic History*, 44, 5 (2020), 834–59.

7 For a review that addresses recent works on Soviet foreign economic relations, see A. M. Kalinovsky, 'Sorting out the Recent Historiography of Development Assistance: Consolidation and New Directions in the Field', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 56, 1 (2021), 227–39.

8 J. Fujisawa, 'The Soviet Union, the CMEA, and the Nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1967–1979', in A. Calori, A.-K. Hartmetz, B. Kocsev, J. Mark and J. Zofka (eds) *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War* (Berlin 2019), 64.

9 D. Engerman, 'The Second World's Third World', *Kritika*, 12, 1 (2011), 183–211.

foreign policy describe a shift from Khrushchev's 'ideological' support for revolutionary groups in the 1950s to Brezhnev's 'realist' approach to non-socialist countries in the late-1960s.[10] In one sense, investments in Turkey were a form of communist pragmatism: Soviet leaders were under no illusion that socialism would triumph in Turkey in the near future. But, along with countries like India and Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey was a key site of Soviet projects that were unquestionably ideological. Karen Brutents, who helped shape Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s, recalls in his memoirs that ideology was pervasive – not a schematic Leninism–Marxism, but a common set of assumptions, including the idea that the 'independence of developing countries' challenged the West's global hegemony.[11] Underlying this Soviet foreign policy was the idea that an independent Turkey would naturally drift away from transatlantic allies and be more amenable to Moscow. The independence that Soviet officials hoped to see in Turkey did not require autarky or guarantee socialism, but it did require industrialization, and hence the Soviet Union built factories on a NATO member's territory.

In the 1970s, even as potential Turkish allies became disillusioned with existing economic models and sought to reimagine the borders and targets of development, Soviet diplomats and economists remained wedded to the idea of economic growth defined by the boundaries of the nation-state. Regardless of who was in power in Ankara, Soviet bureaucrats fixated on projects that would buttress Soviet connections to central government institutions and, they hoped, contribute to the growth of the Turkish national economy. This state-oriented approach to economics was only partly a product of great power politics and the attempt to cultivate influence in the rivalry with the US; at least equally, it emerged from Soviet convictions about the historical stages of development in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The article begins with the context that made Dalokay's appeal for Soviet aid possible: a Turkish embrace of ideas that we associate with dependency theory. The persistence of underdevelopment was worrying, and it drove Dalokay and his colleagues to creative alternatives, including greater interest in class politics. We then shift to Soviet politicians' lukewarm response to Dalokay, which, we argue, was the result of a skepticism – and, it must be said, condescension – towards Turkey's leftists and Ankara's politics. High-ranking Soviet officials recognized Turkey's economic issues but insisted that Soviet methods could solve the challenge of self-sustaining growth. Dalokay's hosts in Moscow had little interest in what they called his 'left-bourgeois' desire for a more egalitarian urban planning. Historians have shown that aid from Moscow fed the political fortunes of many admirers of Soviet-style planning, but Dalokay received no Soviet support.[12] His broader political

10 V. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill 2007); M. Trentin, 'State-led Development: The Privileged Linkage between East Germany and Ba'athist Syria, 1965–1972', *Contemporary European History*, 30, 4 (2021), 582, 593.

11 K. N. Brutents, *Tridtsat' let na Staroi Ploshchadi* (Moscow 1998), 286–90.

12 O. A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge 2005); D. Engerman, *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India* (Cambridge 2018); A. Iandolo, *Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 1955–1968* (Ithaca 2022).

failures were not of Moscow's making – he clashed with conservatives at home, was forced out of office in 1977 by his own party, and the radical leftist language he employed was curtailed by the military coup of 1980 – but his Soviet trip reveals much about a growing regional economy.[13]

In the central state archives in Moscow, a search for the keyword 'Turkey' turns up files that conform to set categories – correspondence with Turkish communists, records of interstate diplomacy, and budgets for the major industrial projects designed to boost Turkey's productivity. The folder of Dalokay-related papers sits awkwardly among them, and the Soviet officials who authored its contents seem to have been unsure what to make of their unusual guest. The lone transcript of one of Dalokay's meetings reveals two starkly different approaches to international relations. The document indicates that, on 23 October 1975, Dalokay met with Georgii Zhukov, a journalist and high-ranking member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Unlike the general with the same first and last name, this Zhukov was thoroughly civilian, and Dalokay's preamble drew on domestic politics to impress his Soviet interlocutor. The Ankara mayor explained that his party was 'left democratic', that rapid urbanization was transforming his country, and that, by addressing the lack of transportation and municipal services in poor urban areas, he and his allies hoped to accelerate the leftward drift of formerly conservative peasants.[14] But Zhukov's response was rooted in geopolitics. The Soviet official lamented Turkey's formal alliance with the US and expressed hope that the recently signed Helsinki Accords would usher Soviet–Turkish relations into a post-Cold War phase. Dalokay was comfortable with geopolitics and turned the conversation towards a Turkish priority – Cyprus – but, other than an album with photographs of the Soviet capital, he received little for his efforts. Zhukov's refusal to even acknowledge Dalokay's interest in Moscow's metro and prefabricated housing reflected a broader Soviet blindness to immense changes that were recasting Turkish politics.

The archival records are spare, but Dalokay's public records allow us to situate his trip in the broader Turkish transformation. He was a showman with a flair for storytelling, and, in the opening statement of one of his literary projects – the monthly journal of the Revolutionary Municipalities Association – Dalokay wove together nine hundred years of Turkish urban history to situate his embrace of radical politics in a safely national context.[15] Another work, a children's tale, is even more revealing.[16] The future mayor of Ankara was born into rural poverty in Eastern Anatolia, and, in *Kolo,* he repurposed scenes from his childhood into an award-winning tale about the costs of state-led development. Named for a beloved goat, *Kolo* ends with the arrival of the 'gendarme-state' and the disappearance of Dalokay's village under the reservoir created by the Keban Dam

13 İ. Tekeli, 'Vedat Dalokay'ın Ardından Belediyecilik Deneyi Üzerine', *Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi*, 131 (1991), 56.

14 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI) f. 5, op. 68, d. 240, l. 20 (Transcript of a conversation between G. A. Zhukov and Vedat Dalokay, 23 October 1975).

15 V. Dalokay, 'DBD'yi Niçin Kurduk', *DBD*, 1 (1977), 2–4.

16 V. Dalokay, *Kolo* (İstanbul 1981), 7, 92.

(completed in 1975, the dam was built with US, West German, French, and Italian aid).[17] Dalokay decried not only Anatolia's destitution but also the costs of heavy-handed transformation. His trip to Moscow was part of a latter-day development politics shaped by concern for social justice, and his aspirations to intervene in the urban economy broke with the high modernism of the postwar period.

The language of class had been absent in Soviet and Turkish politicians' earlier conversations about industrialization, but Dalokay hoped the 1970s marked a departure. Already in the aftermath of the First World War, a shared quest for economic development had begun to shape Soviet–Turkish encounters, and this political convergence was rooted in assumptions about the modern territorial state.[18] When Bolshevik and Kemalist revolutionaries established themselves in Moscow and Ankara, they anticipated that, even though interpretations of private property and the market divided them ideologically, they might cooperate to reduce the economic gap between the societies they governed and their more advanced Western rivals. The conflict of the Second World War forced a hiatus, albeit one that was short-lived. When Moscow and Ankara agreed in 1967 upon joint construction of industrial objects, the event marked a return to shared hopes that state intervention could accelerate the development of their territorial economies. Then, in the 1970s and for the first time, a stronger Turkish left and strains in the diplomatic alignment with the US expanded possibilities for a more class-based engagement with the Soviet Union. Alongside the anti-Americanism visible in the country's foreign policy, Turkish society now included a cohort of professionals interested in class-oriented models of development that were compatible with Moscow's own.

Key to the changed Turkish ideological terrain of the 1970s was the coalescence of a sub-national space that could be targeted in class-based terms. When Dalokay spoke to Zhukov of poor urban areas, he almost certainly used the word '*gecekondu*'. Although the word does not figure in the transcript, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs translator will have been familiar with it and the demographic phenomenon that it represented. Soviet academic works equated the Turkish word with the French 'bidonville' and the shanty towns of North Africa.[19] Translated directly into English, *gecekondu* means 'put up overnight'. Turkey had seen significant rural-to-urban migration after the Second World War, and Dalokay liked to cite statistics that indicated two thirds of Ankara's population lived in hastily built, semi-legal housing.[20] The Soviet Union's prefabricated apartment blocks were a technical solution, but Dalokay's appeal was more than a pragmatic coincidence of Soviet supply and Turkish demand. He empowered and relied upon a group of advisers with a distinctly leftist profile, and they saw

17 D. J. Stahl, 'The Two Rivers: Water, Development and Politics in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, 1920–1975', unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University (2014), 181–204.

18 C. S. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *The American Historical Review*, 105, 3 (2000), 807–31; C. S. Maier, *Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood* (Cambridge 2014); C. S. Maier, *Once within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500* (Cambridge 2016).

19 V. I. Danilov, P. P. Moiseev, and A. M. Shamsutdinov (eds), *Politika i ekonomika sovremennoi Turtsii* (Moscow 1977), 220.

20 C. Duranoğlu, 'Vedat Dalokay ile Bir Röportaj', *Ankara Tabip Odası Bülteni*, 1, 4 (1976), 42.

Soviet–Turkish connections in the broader, structural terms of the global economy. Their analysis was rooted in the identification of Turkey as a 'backward' or 'undeveloped' country, one whose woes were less the product of religious tradition than Western-dominated global capitalism. They saw Soviet and Turkish interests converge in an ideological sense, in opposition to a Western-dominated international economy that had produced squatter settlements across much of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[21]

At home, in Ankara, there could be no question that the *gecekondu* lay at the heart of Dalokay's politics. In four years as mayor, his most publicized actions consisted of ostentatious campaigns to provide services for the Turkish capital's poorest residents. His path to public service had begun with less political overtones, as he studied architecture in Paris at the Sorbonne and then established a successful private office in Ankara in the 1950s. His leftist politics became visible in the 1960s, when he rose to lead the Ankara Chamber of Architects.[22] Before his mayoral campaign of 1973, his public image was tied to the designs he produced for a modernist mosque. His proposal failed to win the competition for a new religious hub in Ankara, but it then triumphed in a similar vote in Islamabad. There, he provided the blueprints for one of Pakistan's modern landmarks. In public comments, Dalokay blamed his failure at home not only on conservatives' aesthetic preference for neo-Ottoman styles but also on the economic interests of Turkey's 'profit-seeking' bourgeoisie.[23] Once in office, he was even more explicit in his challenge to what he claimed was a 'rentier class' that dominated central Ankara. He proclaimed his municipal government would work 'from the outskirts to the center', and, just a month after he assumed office, he promised to turn the city's hippodrome and golf club (the latter of which he derided as a playground for '70 Americans and not more than a thousand members') into green spaces for the cramped *gecekondu* dwellers.[24] Financial hardship constrained many of his initiatives, but Dalokay brought a pronounced leftism into Ankara's politics.

Beyond Ankara's poor periphery, the *gecekondu* drove a leftward shift in Turkey's national politics.[25] In the late 1960s, Bülent Ecevit had taken control of the RPP – originally Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's party but mostly in opposition after 1950 – and reshaped it in the mold of 'left of center' European social democracy.[26] In 1973, Ecevit's party became the first left-leaning mainstream party to triumph in freely contested elections. Ecevit had gambled on the appeal of a new class-based politics in Turkey's cities, especially in their *gecekondu* neighborhoods, and his bet paid off when he assumed the post of prime minister.[27] He supported Dalokay, along with the RPP-nominated candidates who

21 Ł. Stanek, *Architecture in Global Socialism: Eastern Europe, West Africa, and the Middle East in the Cold War* (Princeton 2020), 176.

22 S. Bozdoğan and E. Akcan, *Turkey: Modern Architectures in History* (London 2012), 196–99.

23 Ö. Şenyapılı, 'Vedat Dalokay'la Konuşma', *Mimarlık*, 7, 12 (1969), 32.

24 Dalokay,''Ankara'daki Hipodrom ve Golf Kulübünü Park Yapacağını Açıkladı', *Cumhuriyet*, 31 January 1974.

25 E. Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton 1976), 214.

26 Y. Emre, *The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey: The Left and the Transformation of the Republican People's Party* (London 2014).

27 E. Özbudun and F. Tachau, 'Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a "Critical Realignment"?' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6 (1975), 460–80; Ş. İ. Özler, 'Politics of the

moved into the mayoral offices of large cities like İstanbul, İzmir, and İzmit. The newly elected mayors joined forces in what would become known nationally as the 'new municipal government movement', or, in its more radical moments, 'the revolutionary municipality movement'. As this group sought to bolster services for poorer citizens, they fought at the national level to prize resources from central government institutions and at the local level against established business elites in the cities.[28] In the latter battles especially, Dalokay and his allies came close to a class-based politics that could have been expected to earn the sympathy of Soviet counterparts.

In an era when capitalist and socialist sponsors supported competing infrastructural projects, the priorities of Soviet urban planning naturally overlapped with Dalokay's commitments. After all, Dalokay's approach to the *gecekondu* formed in reaction to US-influenced ideas that had dominated urban planning in Turkey in the preceding decades. Initially, in the aftermath of the Second World War, US officials and international organizations had displayed an urgency in their attention to squatters and shanty towns. Turkey was a prominent stop on the US housing expert Charles Abrams's 1952 international tour.[29] Ankara, because it had been subjected to ambitious interwar planning but already become home to a *gecekondu* periphery, was a particularly evocative site in the global struggle against urban poverty and political radicalization.[30] Abrams surmised that Turkey possessed the right ideas about modernization (the arch-modernizer Atatürk had introduced them) but lacked a professional class to supervise their implementation. Abrams advised on the founding of the urban planning-oriented Middle East Technical University (METU), which, although initially treated with caution by Washington because of its UN connections, soon became a recipient of significant US aid.[31] And, with the establishment of the public health-focused Hacettepe University next door, Ankara became one of the primary laboratories of US-aided development in the 1950s and 1960s.[32] Dalokay's politics drew on disillusionment with that process.

Dalokay welcomed a Soviet guest to Ankara in May 1975, and he ensured that his visitor, Vladimir Promyslov, saw that capitalism had bypassed the city's rural newcomers. Promyslov, Moscow's equivalent of a mayor and the author of multiple books about urban construction, traveled to Turkey at Dalokay's invitation and abided by the latter's unusual ideas for an itinerary. Promyslov quickly found himself in a *gecekondu* in Keçiören (İlhan Tekeli, one of Dalokay's advisers, remembers that they proceeded

Gecekondu in Turkey: The Political Choices of Urban Squatters in National Elections', *Turkish Studies*, 1, 2 (2000), 39–58.

28 B. Batuman, 'Spaces of Counter-Hegemony: Turkish Architects and Planners as Political Agents in the 1970s', unpublished PhD thesis, Binghamton University (2006); B. Batuman, 'Toplumcu bir Belediyecilik Modeli: "Yeni Belediyecilik Hareketi" 1973–1977', *Mülkiye*, 34, 266 (2010), 223–41.

29 A. S. Henderson, *Housing and the Democratic Ideal: The Life and Thought of Charles Abrams* (New York 2000), 175–81.

30 C. Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Cambridge 1964), 196.

31 D. Yorgancıoğlu, 'Re-constructing the Political and Educational Contexts of the METU Project', unpublished PhD thesis, Middle East Technical University (2010).

32 H. Reed, 'Hacettepe and Middle East Technical Universities: New Universities in Turkey', *Minerva*, 13, 2 (1975), 215, 226.

directly from the airport to the city's outskirts, a nod to Dalokay's promise to work from the outside in).[33] Dalokay, addressing a crowd of several hundred, proclaimed that Promyslov governed a city where all the homes had electricity and gas, that Moscow's inhabitants did not stand for hours in the mud to wait for a bus.[34] Dalokay engaged in a publicity stunt for the voters, and he also built a case for aid. He asked Promyslov whether the USSR could provide prefabricated housing, 'bread factories', and buses. The Moscow bureaucrat cabled all this home, and he noted a distinctly socialist veneer: he described two folk singers, who had followed the speeches with songs about the path 'from darkness to light, from prayer to labor,' as well as a hand-painted sign on one of the walls that read, 'Long Live Socialist Turkey'. Dalokay's performance combined the technicalities of servicing a poor neighborhood with the push for a more ideological union in Soviet–Turkish exchange, but Promyslov's report finished in a minor key.

Dalokay's and Promyslov's evaluations of socialist potential in Ankara's *gecekondu* formed in different reactions to the challenge of sustained growth in the Global South. On the Turkish side, a growing consensus about the structural inequalities of the international economy fed political radicalism. Doğan Avcıoğlu's *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (*The Structure of Turkey*), which argued that Turkey had failed to develop because of imperialism and needed a new 'national-revolutionary' plan, was a consistent bestseller after its publication in 1968.[35] The chamber of architects, of which Dalokay was still a member albeit no longer president, echoed Avcıoğlu's argument in their collective response to the government's announcement of a five-year plan for 1973–77. The country's leading architects claimed that expanding the service sector, as the five-year plan promised, would only increase Turkey's dependence on more advanced countries.[36] In the context of a deteriorating balance of payments, they expressed disappointment with Western aid and the import-substitution industrialization it had enabled. The Chamber of Architects maintained that industry itself was not a problem, but that Turkey's industry, which assembled expensive imported parts and exported little, furthered the trade deficit. The pages of *Mimarlık,* the most widely read architectural and urban planning journal in the country, featured English-language words like 'patents' and 'royalties' – symbols of the debt trap into which Turkey had fallen. The *gecekondu* entered prominently into these discussions because many Turkish intellectuals believed that its inhabitants were engaged in 'unproductive' labor – like shining shoes and sweeping streets – characteristic of urbanization in 'undeveloped' countries. The most idealist among these intellectuals drew up plans for systemic change, in particular land reform and economic redistribution; others, including Dalokay, brought leftist reform to local government to strengthen the political consensus needed to support that radical change.

33 Interview with İlhan Tekeli, 13 September 2022.

34 RGANI f. 5, op. 68, d. 240, ll. 2–12 (Report on visit to the Turkish Republic, 9 June 1975), 8–9.

35 D. Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (Ankara 1968); R. Turhan, 'The Effect of Dependency Theory on Discussions of "Underdevelopment" in Turkey," in C. Roldan, O. D. Brauer, and J. Rohbeck (eds), *Philosophy of Globalization* (Boston 2018), 269–86.

36 'Üçüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı ve "Yeni Strateji" Ne Getiriyor', *Mimarlık*, 10, 7 (1972); 'Kentleşme Sorunları ve Üçüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı', *Mimarlık*, 10, 10 (1972), 3–4.

Dalokay's appeal for municipality-built prefabricated housing constituted a rejection of the gradualism that assumed market growth would improve social conditions in the urban periphery. That gradualism had dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, as international grants allowed researchers to send METU and Hacettepe students into the *gecekondu* to conduct interviews (the relative dearth of studies of İstanbul is remarkable evidence of the influence of international funding). Initially, US diplomats did occasionally worry that an influx of conservative peasants into the cities might undermine Turkey's commitment to the capitalist bloc, but research increasingly reassured them that migrants both retained strong ties to their villages and professed an optimism about their prospects in the cities.[37] In other words, the risk of disgruntled urban masses radicalizing Turkish politics seemed low. Süleyman Demirel repeatedly won majorities in the *gecekondu* over the course of the 1960s, and his conservative Justice Party offered palliative measures. That decade, the Turkish government's major initiative for the *gecekondu* was to issue property titles to squatters; Demirel and his allies seemed intent to win votes without mobilizing the voters as a distinct political force. One of the most visible elements of Ankara's policy for the poorer population was an anti-natalist program in 1965, which marked Turkey's embrace of the population control movement that international organizations sponsored across much of the Global South: on the list of non-US recipients of Ford Foundation family planning support in the 1960s and early 1970s, Hacettepe was second only to the population center in Gandhigram, India.[38] Leading scholars argued that population control – containing the *gecekondu* – was not only a matter of health but also critical to meeting the Turkish government's economic growth targets.[39] But the 1973 elections changed all of that. The RPP and Dalokay won the *gecekondu* vote in part because they promised to treat the *gecekondu* as a constituency that could be the subject rather than the object of change.

The Turkish left's ambitions infused Dalokay's politics, and, after his election, he hired a group of scholars recently expelled from the urban planning department at METU.[40] By many accounts, the sociologist Mübeccel Kıray, who identified Turkey's urban challenges as a problem of political will, shaped the spirit of this group.[41] Her

37 B. Kayaoğlu, 'Loving and Hating America in Turkey and Iran: A Cold War Story of Alliance Politics and Authoritarian Modernization, 1945–1980', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Virginia (2014), 155; J. Gulick, 'Village and City: Cultural Continuities in Twentieth Century Middle Eastern Cultures', in I. M. Lapidus (ed.) *Middle Eastern Cities* (Berkeley 1969); A. Schnaiberg, 'Rural-Urban Residence and Modernism: A Study of Ankara Province, Turkey', *Demography*, 7, 1 (1970), 84; N. Levine, 'Old Culture-New Culture: A Study of Migrants in Ankara, Turkey', *Social Forces*, 51, 3 (1973), 355–68, 357; N. Levine, 'Value Orientation among Migrants in Ankara, Turkey: A Case Study', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 8, 1 (1973), 50–68. K. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge 1976), 25. Personal correspondence with Ned Levine, 18 January 2022.

38 A. Akın, 'Emergence of the Family Planning Program in Turkey', in W. C. Robinson and J. A. Ross (eds) *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs* (Washington, DC 2007); M. Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge 2010). See the chapters on Etimesgut in F. C. Shorter and B. Güvenç (eds) *Turkish Demography Proceedings of a Conference* (Ankara 1969); I. Mothner, *Understanding Population* (New York 1976), 39.

39 N. H. Fişek and F. C. Shorter, 'Fertility Control in Turkey', *Demography*, 5, 2 (1968), 589.

40 Batuman, 'Toplumcu', 231.

41 F. Atacan, *'Hayatımda hiç Arkaya Bakmadım': Mübeccel Kıray'la Söyleşi* (İstanbul 2001), 174–6; correspondence with Ned Levine, 18 January 2022.

analysis of İzmir had shown that, despite the city's dramatic urbanization, the urban masses failed to cohere. Her book *Örgütleşemeyen Kent* (*The City that could not Organize*) could be interpreted as a call for mayors like Dalokay to forge an agenda for Turkey's city-based majorities.[42] Tekeli remembers that Kıray imparted a confidence that political reform of the local economy would cure the social issues whose symptoms others sought to address with technical measures like birth control.[43] In a 1976 interview with the Ankara Chamber of Doctors – in a publication devoted to medicine – Dalokay said not a word about family planning or population control; instead, he spoke at length about the high rents brought about by real estate speculation. He cited a geographic concentration of Turkish doctors in wealthy areas with low populations, and he argued that a profit-driven healthcare sector led to underserviced *gecekondu* becoming the sites of cholera outbreaks.[44] Even if Ankara's municipal coffers were empty, Dalokay hoped an equitable distribution of existing resources could bring significant change.

This leftist urban planning was rarely influenced by Soviet ideas, but it contained anti-capitalist aspects that suggested grounds for convergence with Moscow's planners. To be sure, Dalokay's advisers were shaped by Turkey's postwar US connections: Esat Turak had studied at Harvard, İrem Acaroğlu had finished her PhD at Cornell, and both Önder Şenyapılı and İlhan Tekeli had received master's degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. When these individuals and other *Mimarlık* authors explored foreign models of social and prefabricated housing, their frame of reference was predominantly Western European and North American.[45] But the urban planners around Dalokay contributed to a consensus that the commonplace mixing of models was part of Turkey's problem, that planning, when implemented in an underdeveloped and capitalist society, allowed speculators to snap up land in sites targeted for development. Dalokay's colleagues advocated a more systematic urban program that would prevent private developers from trapping the poor in a cycle of spiraling rents. And this anti-capitalist rhetoric overlapped with anti-Western sentiment. Beginning in 1971, *Mimarlık* ran a regular anti-foreign campaign entitled 'let's rely on our own strength'; the journal also published the wages of non-Turkish architects and the details of projects awarded to foreign firms in Turkey.[46] The editorial board extended the argument about a debt-rent trap to explain the problems of municipal government at an international level: most large municipalities in 'backwards' countries, they claimed, were 'in the hands of international financial organizations like the World Bank'.[47] The journal contained few references to Soviet urban development, but the Soviet model of state planning and development projects financed through barter agreements offered a natural point of intersection.

42 M. Kıray, *Örgütleşemeyen Kent: İzmir'de İş Hayatının Yapısı ve Yerleşme Düzeni* (Ankara 1972).
43 Interview with İlhan Tekeli, 13 September 2022.
44 'Vedat Dalokay ile Bir Röportaj', *Ankara Tabip Odası Bülteni*, 1, 4 (1976), 41–5.
45 M. Gürbüz, 'Prefabrikasyon ile İnşaat', *Mimarlık*, 3, 12 (1965), 7–9; A. P. Çelik, 'Sosyal Konutun Orijini: Komün Evleri', *Mimarlık*, 8, 8 (1970), 41–2.
46 For an early example of this regular series: 'Kendi Gücümüze Dayanalım', *Mimarlık*, 9, 8 (1971).
47 'Kentleşme Sorunları ve Üçüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı', *Mimarlık*, 10, 10 (1972), 3–4.

Albeit quietly, Dalokay's most ambitious goals – a massive low-income housing project and a metro to connect it to the city center – assumed Soviet connections. As he catered to the existing *gecekondu*, he also sought to offer an alternative. Playing on the idea that *gecekondu* had risen in the cover of night, he promised a new residential area named *Akkondu* – 'built by day' – which would house 350,000 inhabitants.[48] As was so frequently the case, the direct inspiration was Western: his advisers cited the British 'garden city' and the German '*Siedlung*' as precedent.[49] But Dalokay's request for Soviet prefabricated housing was part of this project.[50] And, when Dalokay returned from Moscow, he spoke of the effect of having seen a Soviet *mikroraion* (microdistrict) in person: 'we knew how Moscow had been planned, what planning meant over there … but to see that space with our own eyes was extremely influential. In particular, we committed to build a metro'.[51] The idea of a metro for Ankara was not original, but Dalokay gave old plans new direction. His predecessor, Ekrem Barlas, had contracted with the French firm Sofretu to conduct a feasibility survey for an Ankara metro system.[52] Dalokay, however, ended negotiations with the French and solicited a Soviet proposal. He claimed that, whereas the French insisted on building the metro from start to finish, the Soviet Union was prepared to enter into a joint project with a Turkish consortium, thus allowing Turkish contractors to acquire the know-how to build further metro systems on their own.[53] Ultimately, while he was in office, Dalokay made limited progress on both projects: he only managed to acquire the land for Akkondu (eventually renamed Batıkent, or 'Western Town') and did not make headway with the metro; nevertheless, the projects became the subject of intensive public discussions and would evolve after his departure from the mayor's office.[54]

Dalokay's initiative increased Turkish interest in Soviet urban planning, facilitated by the ongoing shift in Ankara's diplomacy. In June and October 1975, when Promyslov visited Ankara and Dalokay traveled to Moscow, a fierce climate of anti-Communism still prevailed in Turkey. The mainstream newspapers acknowledged the mayors' visits in small columns with few details.[55] Then, the possibilities for writing positively about the Soviet Union changed in December 1975, when Kosygin visited the staunchly anti-communist Demirel, recently reelected as prime minister, and the two jointly presided over the ceremonial inauguration of the Soviet-built steelworks in İskenderun. Within days, Fikret Otyam, a leftist journalist at *Cumhuriyet*, published two lengthy interviews

48 'Dalokay: Gecekondular akkondu olacak', *Milliyet,* 1 December 1973; *Ankara Belediye Başkanlığı 1976 Mali Yılı Çalışma Raporu* (Ankara: 1977), 45.
49 'Ankara'da Or-An Toplu Konut Yerleşimi', *Mimarlık*, 8, 8 (1970), 22–40.
50 Aleksei Rodionov indicates that İhsan Alyanak, mayor of İzmir, requested Soviet prefabricated housing to help provide an alternative to Turkey's third-largest city's *gecekondu*. A. A. Rodionov, *Turtsiia: perekrestok sudeb. Vospominaniia posla* (Moscow 2006), 47–8.
51 F. Otyam, 'Dalokay'ın Moskova Gezisi ve Ankara'nın Sorunları', *Cumhuriyet,* 2 January 1976.
52 *1972–1973 Ankara Belediyesi Çalışma Raporu* (Ankara, 1974); See also the American references in: İ. Tekeli, 'Metropoliten Planlama', *Mimarlık*, 8, 5 (1970), 98–108.
53 F. Otyam, 'Dalokay'ın Moskova Gezisi'.
54 *Ankara Belediyesi Başkanlık Uzmanları Çalışma Raporları* (Ankara 1976).
55 'Dalokay, Metro İçin Rusya'ya Gidiyor', *Milliyet*, 15 October 1975; M. Ekmekçi, 'MSP'ye Dikkat', *Cumhuriyet*, 16 October 1975.

with Dalokay about the Moscow trip of several months prior.[56] Otyam claimed that he would not publish a statistical comparison of the housing question in Moscow and Ankara to avoid legal troubles (making clear to readers that the threat of prosecution for Communist propaganda still existed) but his words contained bold sarcasm. Dalokay displayed even less fear as he used stories about Moscow to advance causes that he was fighting for at home: he claimed that the Soviet capital had no pollution and that its urban planning was made easier by the absence of real estate speculation.

Dalokay's references to a Soviet ideal free of private property and pollution notwithstanding, most Turkish intellectuals wrote about Soviet cities cautiously. Unsurprisingly, given their desire to employ Soviet aid despite strong anti-Communism in Turkey, they denied ideological content in Soviet urban forms. Demirtaş Ceyhun, an architect-turned-writer who accompanied Dalokay to Moscow, detailed his Soviet experience first in articles for *Cumhuriyet* and then in book form. Ceyhun claimed that he had casually challenged the Soviet architect Mikhail Posokhin to explain why the Soviet Union had not produced a distinctive style, and he informed his readers that the buildings in Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku were no different than 'the capitalist West's architectural design'.[57] Ceyhun's question echoed ones being asked by Henri Lefebvre and other Marxists at this time – did Soviet space possess distinctively socialist qualities? – but he asked for a different purpose.[58] Ceyhun and Dalokay both used claims of similarity to incorporate the Soviet Union into a broader foreign foil. When Dalokay spoke in an interview about his visits to London, Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and Moscow, he repeatedly praised 'the West' to disparage Turkey's lack of progress. And, in case the implications of including a Soviet city in this generalization were not clear enough, his editor clarified, 'when he [Dalokay] says "the West," it should be understood as the world beyond our borders'.[59] Turhan Temuçin, a leftist doctor and writer, followed Dalokay's footsteps to Moscow and Leningrad in May 1977, and Temuçin engaged in similar praise of the Soviet Union to highlight Ankara's problems – he claimed to have seen a Moscow with sparkling clean streets, an efficient transportation system, and no air pollution.[60] Dalokay, Ceyhun, and Temuçin did not openly endorse socialist urban forms but they incorporated the Soviet Union into a progressive imaginary to spur change at home.

Read against the backdrop of rising Turkish leftism and progressive urban planning, Soviet politicians' lackluster response to Dalokay's endeavors is striking. The few documents directly related to Dalokay contain only just enough to demonstrate the ambivalence, but a broader array of sources explain the absence of empathy. From the Soviet perspective, improved relations were less dependent on tension with the US or Turkish domestic trends than they were on the post-Stalin Soviet government's establishment

56 F. Otyam, 'Dalokay'ın Moskova Gezisi ve Ankara'nın Sorunları', *Cumhuriyet,* 1 January 1976; Otyam, 'Dalokay'ın Moskova Gezisi'.
57 D. Ceyhun, *Bir Yeni Dev: Çağımızın Trajiği* (İstanbul 1977), 25.
58 H. Lefebvre, *La production de l'espace* (Paris 1974).
59 A. Tan, 'Kapitalist ve Sosyalist Ülkeler Belediyeleri, *DBD*, 5 (1977), 55–7.
60 T. Temuçin, 'Moskova ve Leningrad'da Belediyecilik', *Devrimci Belediyeler Dergisi*, 6 (1977), 25–30.

of relations with development-oriented countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This reorientation was just coming into fruition in the late 1960s, and Soviet officials retained hope that cooperation might break through their partners' economic impasse.

The Kremlin's attempt to rebuild ties with Turkey began before Dalokay's involvement in politics and was part of a regional, even a global politics. This was most visible in the parallelism with Iran – in 1953–56, Moscow orchestrated a softening of tensions with both countries; in the early 1960s, the Kremlin offered aid to Ankara and Tehran in return for Cold War neutrality; that failure was followed by diplomatic breakthrough in 1962–63; and then finally, in 1967, Soviet–Turkish and Soviet–Iranian agreements to build major industrial projects. The last episodes, the 1967 agreements, confirmed the broader geographic contours – they came just after a major agreement with India on industrial exchange, and in the same year as a similar agreement with Syria. For Moscow, then, rapprochement with Turkey was less about social forces and sympathetic counterparts than it was the slow and steady cultivation of long-term diplomatic relationships.

In the Soviet capital, Dalokay's radicalism thus made little impression. Promyslov, who lacked power on his own to allocate resources for aid to Ankara, was ideologically cautious when he presented Dalokay to his superiors. Writing to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, he advocated a royal welcome and asked that Dalokay be met by one of the highest-ranking officials in the Soviet Union – either Nikolai Podgornyi or Aleksei Kosygin. He pointed to RPP's recent electoral success, but his description of Dalokay's program said little about the matters that motivated the Turkish mayor. Promyslov emphasized that Dalokay supported 'the development of relations between the USSR and Turkey' and the 'increase of mutual trust'. The closest he came to acknowledging Dalokay's leftism or interest in development aid were references to Dalokay's 'democratic' politics and hopes for 'multi-dimensional cooperation' (the latter a bureaucratic formulation that indicated economic cooperation should accompany traditional diplomacy).[61] Andrei Kirilenko, a Politburo member and key figure in Leonid Brezhnev's inner circle, appears to have made the decision that Dalokay should meet with Zhukov rather than Podgornyi or Kosygin; calculations hinged on fear that a more prominent reception for Dalokay would harm Soviet relations with Greece and Cyprus.[62] While the concerns about conflicting allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean indicate that Soviet officials were not approaching relations with Turkey in an entirely bilateral vacuum, Promyslov's formulaic focus on 'relations between Moscow and Ankara' showed little desire to capitalize on the anti-Americanism that was coursing through Turkish politics.

In 1967, the planning department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiled an overview that contextualized relations with Turkey in the broader ambit of Soviet foreign relations.[63] The ministry employees began with the assumptions on which the entire Soviet

61 RGANI f. 5, op. 68, d. 240, ll. 14–15 (V. Promyslov to the Central Committee, 17 October 1975).
62 RGANI f. 5, op. 68, d. 240, l.16 (Note to A. P. Kirilenko, 21 October 1975).
63 RGANI f. 5, op. 59, d. 348, ll. 1–41 (Report on the possible development of Turkish foreign policy, prepared by the Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 February 1967).

approach to Turkey was based: the peasants' and workers' 'political consciousness' remained low; the Communist movement had not progressed beyond an 'embryonic' stage; and revolutionary change would not alter the 'landholding-bourgeois' structure of Turkish politics for at least a decade. Yet, the ministry's analysts acknowledged that tension with the US would create opportunities for the Soviet government to improve relations with Ankara. And recognition of Turkey's struggles to achieve Western-subsidized development were crucial in this Soviet analysis. The planners were confident that Turkey's trade deficit and the government's budget woes would force any Turkish government to seek alternatives to the West. The authors attributed significant improvement in Soviet–Turkish relations to a brief period in 1964–65, when the RPP (then led by İsmet İnönü and still in a more conservative guise) had held power. Yet, they were convinced that the strength of anti-American public opinion and economic imperatives would force even the conservative Justice Party to continue engagement with Moscow. In his memoirs, the Soviet ambassador for much of the 1970s, Aleksei Rodionov, recalled this logic: 'even though Demirel was a pro-Western politician', the Turkish leader was a 'realistic' thinker who 'accepted the need for a multilateral' (i.e. including the Soviet Union) foreign policy.[64] Pessimism about the prospect of a worker-led revolution and optimism about potential Soviet influence created a basic ambivalence about the two main 'bourgeois' parties.

These broader assumptions, however schematic in their ideological formulations, were incorporated into and reinforced by semi-annual updates circulated among the Party elite. These reports were signed by men like Boris Solomatin, deputy director of the Committee for State Security's (KGB) foreign department, and Lev Tolokonnikov, then a lieutenant general in the KGB.[65] They were based on information coming in from political officers in Ankara and the consulate in İstanbul, and the in-country staff drew their conclusions from political events and meetings with labor union representatives like Kemal Sülker.[66] In late 1967, Khadzhi-Umar Mamsurov, a colonel general and leading figure in the military's intelligence directorate (GRU), took stock after two years with Demirel in power.[67] He argued that the Justice Party represented the 'reactionary circles of the large bourgeoisie', was committed to the private sector and foreign investment, and had won the 1965 elections with US support; he described the RPP as representatives of the domestically-oriented 'trading-industrial bourgeoisie', advocates of a stronger role for the state in the economy, and supporters of expanded relations with the Soviet Union. Despite what would have seemed an obvious choice, Mamsurov indicated no preference for Ecevit and the RPP. Instead, he expressed confidence that Demirel too would continue to support Soviet–Turkish relations. Mamsurov shared the foreign ministry's

64 Rodionov, *Turtsiia,* 31.
65 Compare, for example, RGANI f. 5, op. 61, d. 554, ll. 19–26 (Report on Turkish politics by B. A. Solomatin, 14 March 1969); and RGANI, f. 5, op. 61, d. 554, 176–184 (Report on Turkish politics by L. S. Tolokonnikov, 3 October 1969).
66 RGANI f. 5, op. 59, d. 399, ll. 34–43 (Report on TWP by V. Pokrovskii, 27 February 1967); RGANI f. 5, op. 66, d. 878, l. 17 (Transcript of a conversation between Kemal Sülker and A. Sokolov, 17 November 1973.
67 RGANI f. 5, op. 59, d. 399, ll. 86–103 (Report on the political-military situation in Turkey, submitted by Kh.-U. Mamsurov, 15 September 1967).

ambivalence, along with a sense that the Soviet Union should cooperate with the Turkish state, whatever political group was in power.

The Turkish Workers' Party (TWP) was the only political party for which Soviet officials displayed sympathy, and the choice reflects a high bar for ideological allies. The TWP, founded by labor union leaders and initially led by a Turkish professor of law, Mehmet Ali Aybar, won 15 out of the 450 available parliament seats in the 1965 elections. Even this modest victory was short-lived, as Demirel's government changed voting laws to thwart any TWP consolidation of this success. Despite the TWP's electoral irrelevance, Soviet officials remained loyal to the party into the 1970s, even as the Turkish left fractured over the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia and the number of Moscow-aligned Turkish socialists dwindled.[68] The Soviet embassy in Ankara wasted much paper on Doğu Perinçek and young leftists who embraced Maoism, despite the latter's miniscule numbers.[69] The papers of Vasilii Mitrokhin, the ex-KGB archivist who smuggled top-secret documents out of Russia in 1992, allow us some sense of the Ankara embassy's political horizons.[70] Among the individuals close to Dalokay, the KGB sought to recruit Temuçin as an informant, but the rest of the lists demonstrate no particular interest in prominent intellectuals or left-leaning individuals who were involved with the mainstream parties.[71]

With little faith in the 'bourgeois' RPP, Soviet sources barely registered Turkey's 1973 elections. How different this was from the conclusion of Robert Dillon at the US State Department's Office of Turkish Affairs, who warned that the 'stunning election upset' had brought to power a party whose rank and file were not always 'friendly towards the US', or from the British ambassador, Horace Phillips, who referred to the success of men he called 'socialists' as 'surprising'.[72] Aleksei Vasil'ev, the lead correspondent for *Pravda*, expressed no such sense of surprise, for his training and background encouraged him to analyze Turkey as one of the Soviet Union's revolutionary nationalist partners in Asia and Africa. Within NATO, Turkey may have been unusually well-disposed toward Moscow; in a Third World context, mainstream Turkish politics could not be considered particularly leftist. Vasil'ev had graduated from the Oriental Studies department at Moscow's primary institution for training diplomats, studied abroad in Cairo, and been stationed in Vietnam for several years before his arrival in Ankara.[73] He could not ignore the same processes in Turkish society that gave Dalokay and his colleagues hope: after Ecevit's electoral success in 1973, Vasil'ev highlighted the importance of rural-to-urban migration and attributed the phenomenon to

68 A. Samim, 'The Tragedy of the Turkish Left', *The New Left Review*, 126 (1981), 70–1.

69 Ç. Üngör, 'China and Turkish Public Opinion during the Cold War: The Case of Cultural Revolution (1966–1969)', in Örnek and Üngör, *Turkey in the Cold War*.

70 C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York 2001).

71 Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge University, GBR/0014/MITN 2/24, 68.

72 Memorandum from Dillon to Cisco, 17 October 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1969–1976, 30: 654; The National Archives, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 9/2112 (Horace Phillips to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 January 1974).

73 Vasil'ev would go on to become director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for the Study of Africa and also to play a role in late- and post-Soviet diplomacy.

destitution in the villages rather than opportunity in the cities. Yet, he still cautioned against hopes that poor urban masses would drive progressive politics. He argued that the inhabitants of the 'slums' (he used '*trushchoby*', a more pejorative word without the Third World specificity of *bidonville* or *gecekondu*) were defined by a 'backwardness' that resulted from their continued connections to village life.[74] Although he described Ecevit as a politician 'of a social-democratic stripe', he made little of the *gecekondu* vote that resulted in RPP victory.[75] Vasil'ev shaped the most visible Soviet analysis of Turkish politics, and he influenced a narrative that downplayed the leftward shift in Turkish politics.

KGB operatives like Mamsurov and *Pravda* journalists like Vasil'ev rarely addressed the international political economy that shaped their country-specific analysis, but Soviet academic works connected similar ideas to a deep faith in the territorial economy. What is more, the academics who produced these works were embedded in the institutions that made decisions about which projects to support in Turkey. One of the most authoritative books on Turkey was a collectively authored volume, published in 1977 by the 'Turkish sector' of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.[76] The sector had been founded in 1956, during Khrushchev's outreach to the Third World, to reform Soviet Oriental Studies and create area studies knowledge with policy relevance.[77] By the 1970s, all the Soviet Union's leading scholars of Turkey were based there, and the 1977 volume drew on the work of individuals who had long shuffled between academic and foreign policy circles: Abdulla Shamsutdinov, who was the sector's first director and served in that role for twenty years, authored the introduction; Vladimir Danilov, who wrote the section on Turkey's domestic politics, had worked for the Soviet foreign service in Turkey, Syria, and the United Nations; and Nikolai Kireev, who was responsible for Turkish economics, had worked at the Soviet trade delegation in Turkey.[78] Like Vasil'ev, they drew on much of the same socio-economic data used by Dalokay and his allies. The chapter on urbanization frequently cited Ruşen Keleş, the most prominent Turkish expert on the *gecekondu* and someone who moved in the same circles as Dalokay. Gennadii Starchenkov, who contributed the section on urbanization, had joined Turkish colleagues in Liege for a conference organized by the International Union for Scientific Study of Population, and he was clearly thinking of Latin American comparisons and the Turkish *gecekondu* as part of global economic trends.[79] In other words, these Soviet academics were not working with different evidence than their Turkish counterparts. And yet, ideological precepts formed radically different interpretations. The 1977 volume drew no connection between urbanization and leftist politics.

74 A. M. Vasil'ev, 'Most cherez Bosfor', *Pravda*, 30 October 1973.
75 A. M. Vasil'ev, 'Parlament na rasput'e', *Pravda*, 27 November 1973.
76 A. M. Shamsutdinov, ed., *Politika i ekonomika sovremennoi Turtsii* (Moscow 1977).
77 Iu. A. Li and S. F. Oreshkova, *Sektor Turtsii Instituta Vostokovedeniia RAN (k poluvekovoi istorii sushestvovaniia)* (Moscow 2009); A. M. Kalinovksy and M. Kemper, 'Interlocking Orientologies in the Cold War Era', in M. Kemper and A. M. Kalinovsky (eds) *Reassessing Orientalism: Interlocking Orientologies during the Cold War* (Abingdon 2015), 1–2.
78 Li and Oreshkova, *Sektor Turtsii*, 41–6, 53, 56.
79 G. I. Starchenkov, *Problemy zaniatosti i migratsii naseleniia Turtsii* (Moscow 1975), 4, 8, 89, 148.

Soviet authors, like many of their Turkish counterparts, believed that *gecekondu* dwellers were engaged in 'unproductive' labor, in a service sector that had no equivalent in an idealized model of industrialization based on an imagined 'Western' precedent.[80] And for them, this was the significance of the *gecekondu.* Rather than the cradle of radical politics, urban arrivals were a burden on the economic growth of the Turkish nation-state.

The 1977 volume drew on the major Soviet studies of Turkish economics, most of which had less to say about class relations within the nation than they did about the nation's place within the global economy. In a 1968 book on Turkish foreign trade, Kireev applied ideas associated with dependency theory to Turkey. He emphasized that Turkey's industrialization, because it relied on the assembly of imported parts and payments to foreign companies for franchising licenses, was only exacerbating the country's trade balance and strengthening US 'colonial exploitation'.[81] For Elena Urazova, who published a book on the difficulties of financing industrialization in 1974, Turkey was a particularly interesting case because the future had seemed so bright in the 1930s. Both Kireev and Urazova celebrated Turkey as one of the first semi-colonial countries to establish political sovereignty and as the first 'Third World' country to receive Soviet industrialization aid.[82] Yet, both pointed to this history of investment as proof that industrialization in the context of 'free market anarchy' was an imperfect solution, and they called for nationalization of Turkey's foreign trade.[83] Unlike Dalokay and many of his colleagues, who drew on dependency theory to conclude that they must pursue radical political change, Soviet academics continued to hope for a technical solution – total control over foreign trade.

Soviet investment patterns offer ample evidence of the ways this understanding of the global economy shaped exchange with Turkey. In their 1967 report, the foreign ministry's planning experts explained why interstate industrial projects had to be carefully managed. The primary obstacle, the ministry's planners argued, was that Turkey was trapped in a US-dominated trade cycle and that, although Turkish markets needed imports available in the Soviet Union, the Soviet government was interested in few Turkish exports. With a clearing agreement that required relatively balanced trade between the two countries, Soviet officials believed expansion of bilateral trade required diversification of Turkey's exports. The ministry's planners heralded the Soviet-aided construction of industrial plants in İskenderun and Seydişehir not as bases to replace Western imports but as centers of production of 'aluminum, copper, and other goods *that we need*' [italics added for emphasis].[84] Already at this early moment, Soviet officials were hoping they might build a nuclear plant in Turkey, so that Turkish industry would have the energy to produce exports for Soviet markets. Thus, anxiety about Turkey's dependence on the West fueled Soviet projects that focused almost exclusively on the productivity of the territorial economy as a whole.

80 Shamsutdinov, *Politika i ekonomika*, 214–27.
81 N. G. Kireev, *Natsional'nyi i inostrannyi kapital vo vneshnei torgovle Turtsii* (Moscow 1968), 3–10.
82 Kireev, *Natsional'nyi*, 7; E. I. Urazova, *Turtsiia: problemy finansirovaniia ekonomicheskogo razvitiia* (Moscow 1974), 252.
83 Kireev, *Natsional'nyi,* 148; Urazova, *Turtsiia*, 262.
84 RGANI f. 5, op. 59, d. 348, ll. 14–15.

Dalokay's request for a Soviet-built metro did echo the general trends. When Promyslov visited Turkey, he promised that Moscow was willing to adopt a framework established in the 1930s when the Soviet Union built textile factories in Anatolian cities: Turkey would pay off industrial equipment with agricultural exports rather than hard currency.[85] And, in 1978, after internal party friction had forced Dalokay to abandon a re-election campaign he almost certainly would have won, Ecevit himself visited Moscow. Ecevit's visit to Moscow was part of an ambitious year, during which he also visited Yugoslavia and ended the caution with which previous Turkish politicians had spoken of the New International Economic Order.[86] By this point, Kosygin was taken enough with RPP's leftward drift that he wanted to gift Ecevit a political triumph to take back to Ankara. 'If we were to build a metro in the Turkish capital', Kosygin is reported to have said, 'this would be the first metro in Asia'.[87] But Turkey was not to be the site of such prominent Soviet urban construction. Domestic conflict culminated in the 1980 coup and the violent suppression of Turkish leftism.

Independent of Turkish social democrats' 1970s rise and 1980s fall, capital and commodity flows increased across the Black Sea as part of what we can now recognize as a second peak of global capitalism.[88] The volume of Soviet–Turkish trade jumped in each of the years 1972, 1979, and 1989, and post-Soviet Russia would become one of Turkey's leading trade partners in the twenty-first century.[89] Some of the transactions, especially those that came to be known as 'luggage trade', existed outside the state-led and industry-oriented model encouraged by Soviet officials. Many, however, extended the pattern of the 1970s. As the Turkish export economy diversified and the Soviet Union became increasingly reliant on energy sales, a Soviet–Turkish intergovernmental body established in 1976 channeled revenue from Soviet natural gas sales into construction projects executed in Moscow by firms close to the Turkish government.[90] At that point, Soviet politicians were still extolling an ideological alternative to the capitalist system, but they were in fact contributing to state-managed spheres within that system.

When Dalokay's projects evolved after he left office, Soviet engineers were conspicuously absent. The affordable housing units of Batıkent, which rose from plots of land acquired by Dalokay, welcomed their first inhabitants in 1983. The neighborhood held some of the political connotations that Dalokay had hoped for: Murat Karayalçın, who was involved in the development of Batıkent and would go on to become mayor of Ankara in the 1990s, referred to the community as 'project democracy'.[91] But in a sign of how the international framework

85 'Sovyetlerin, Bedeli Meyva ve Sebzeyle Ödenmek Üzere İstanbul'a Metro Yapma Önerisi Tekrarlandı', *Cumhuriyet,* 23 May 1975.
86 B. Aral, 'Fifty Years On: Turkey's Voting Orientation at the U.N. General Assembly, 1948–1997', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40, 2 (2004), 149–50; M. E. Arda, 'A Heuristic History of Global Development Governance since the 1960s and Turkey', in E. Parlar Dal, *Middle Powers in Global Governance: The Rise of Turkey* (London 2018), 191–97.
87 Rodionov, *Turtsiia,* 155.
88 J. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (New York 2006), 342.
89 V. N. Koptevskii, *Rossiia-Turtsiia: Etapy torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva* (Moscow 2003).
90 M. A. Birand, 'Rusya'da Bir Şeyler Oluyor', *Milliyet*, 31 January 1987.
91 M. Karayalçın, 'Batıkent: A New Settlement Project in Ankara, Turkey', *Ekistics*, 54, 325/326/327 (1987), 292–9.

had changed, Batıkent's most prominent foreign connection in the 1980s was a large grant from the Council of Europe's Resettlement Fund.[92] And when Ankara's metro was finally constructed in the 1990s, German, Italian, and Canadian companies participated in the consortia. While post-Soviet Russia's absence was partly a question of capacity, the Russian government's involvement in the construction of a nuclear plant on the Mediterranean coast in Akkuyu emerged from the negotiations of the 1960s and 1970s, from an ideological preference for projects that would immediately address the balance sheets of international trade over others that addressed the balance of social and political forces within the nation. More than a curious story about Marxist–Leninist ideology, Dalokay's failed appeal to Moscow tells us much about increased regional interconnectedness during a transformative decade. His absence from the accelerating Soviet–Turkish economic cooperation points to the ways that bilateral and state-oriented assumptions shaped the exchanges that emerged, even as the ideological divisions of the Cold War were receding and privatization becoming the watchword elsewhere.[93]

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92 Y. Koşaner, *A Critical Review of Batıkent 'New Settlement Project' in Ankara* (Eskişehir 1990), 15–16.
93 Hirst and İşçi, 'Smokestacks and Pipelines'; on Soviet 'bilateral interdependence', see E. Burton, J. Mark, and S. Marung, 'Development', in J. Mark and P. Betts (eds) *Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonization* (Oxford 2022), 102–6.