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A new argument for mind-brain identity
Type of publication: Article
Citation:
Publication status: Accepted
Journal: British J for the Philosophy of Science
Volume: 62
Number: 3
Year: 2011
Month: September
Pages: 489-517
URL: http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org...
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axr001
Abstract: In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a ‘nomological dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being ‘anomic danglers’ (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers’ (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental–physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject. 1 The Notion of a Nomological Dangler 2 The Probabilistic Incoherence of Naturalistic Dualism 3 The Inference to Mind–Brain Identity 4 The Technical Formulation of the Argument 5 Objections Related to the Core Argument 6 Objections Related to Technicalities 7 Conclusion
Keywords:
Authors Aranyosi, I.
Added by: []
Total mark: 5
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